SPORT

by Philip Richards

Double celebration for men and women’s football!
The men’s national team, Taifa Stars, have reached the finals of the 2025 Africa Cup of Nations (AFCON). They stunned Guinea with a single goal from Simon Msuva in front of home fans at the Benjamin Mkapa stadium, Dar es Salaam, last November to book their trip to Morocco in December 2025. They finished second in Group H after the winners DR Congo.

The women’s national side, Twiga Stars, have also qualified for this July’s equivalent competition (WAFCON) which is also being played in Morocco. They are drawn in the finals in a group containing defending champions South Africa.

Rugby Union

Tanzania XV Select rugby team pictured after their victory over the visiting Tritons Rugby Club from the UK – Tanzania Rugby Team facebook page.

A recent tour by a British club side has highlighted the great potential Tanzania has to develop in terms of participation and competitiveness on the regional and international stage. A UK based touring side, Tritons RFC, were defeated by a Tanzania Select XV as part of their East Africa tour towards the end of last year and took the opportunity to offer coaching clinics to up and coming young local talent. This steady but strategic approach to realising long term potential follows on from similar support from other British clubs such as Bryncethin RFC in previous years. Whilst rugby in the country has a long way to go to match the proven talent of neighbouring Kenya, many commentators are noting that with 54 countries, 40 rugby unions but only 5 competing nations, there is vast untapped opportunity for nations like Tanzania to emerge as the next African powerhouse.
(Daily News, 17/11/24, Tanzania Rugby Facebook page)

TANZANIA IN THE INTERNATIONAL MEDIA

by Donovan McGrath

Tanzania opposition laments its ‘naivety’ over president as repression intensifies
(Guardian online – UK) Recent killings and arrests of government critics suggest end of reformist approach under Samia Suluhu Hassan, say political rivals. Extract continues: When Samia Suluhu Hassan took office as Tanzania’s president in 2021, many in the east African country hailed what they hoped was a new dawn after the authoritarian and repressive rule of her predecessor John Magufuli. The signs were positive in her first few years in office: Hassan ended bans on newspapers and political rallies, and legislation that kept pregnant girls and young mothers out of school, all policies that Magufuli endorsed. But opposition leaders say recent killings of officials, a spate of disappearances, and arrests of government critics and bans on opposition gatherings suggest the end of the reformist approach. In late November the Chadema opposition party said three of its members were killed in incidents linked to local elections, which the governing Chama Cha Mapinduzi party (CCM) won in a landslide. Chadema’s chair, Freeman Mbowe, said on X that one candidate was shot dead by police in Tanzania’s commercial capital, Dar es Salaam, as he attempted to stop “fake and invalid ballots” being delivered to a polling station. Chadema said another candidate was shot dead at his home in Mkese in central Tanzania and that a party official was killed in a machete attack at his home in Tunduma near the border with Zambia. … [The] ACT Wazalendo opposition party said the head of its youth wing had been found alive on a beach with serious injuries after an apparent abduction. The party claimed that Abdul Nondo was “kidnapped” … by individuals they believed were state security agents. Police said investigations were continuing to identify those responsible. The deaths follow the killing … of a member of the Chadema secretariat who was found beaten with his face doused with acid. There is no evidence that Hassan has had any involvement in the deaths, which have been condemned by the government. In an interview with the Guardian, Tundu Lissu, another Chadema leader, said that, with the benefit of hindsight, his party’s expectations about political freedoms under Hassan “were wildly, wildly unrealistic”… He said: “She inherited the state machinery which was created by Magufuli and which was responsible for the repression that we went through for six years. How could we have thought that, given all this baggage, this would be a reformist?” An ardent campaigner for democracy, human rights and anti-corruption, Lissu was shot 16 times in an assassination attempt in 2017 that forced him to live largely in exile in Belgium for five years. No one has been charged with the attempt on Lissu’s life. … [The] events of the past few months have reignited fears of a return to intolerance. “She has done with a smile what Magufuli did with a snarl,” said Lissu. (9 December 2024)

Rescuers search for survivors after building collapses in Tanzania, killing at least one

Rescue workers assist at the collapsed building in Dar-es-Salaam


(Guardian online – UK) Dozens of people were trapped in underground shops after collapse of multi-storey building in Dar es Salaam. Extract continues: Rescuers were using their bare hands, drills and sledgehammers to reach dozens of people trapped under a building that collapsed in the centre of Tanzania’s commercial capital, Dar es Salaam. The multi-storey building in Kariakoo, the East African country’s busiest market, caved in as people were shopping, killing at least one person, the prime minister, Kassim Majaliwa, said. Hundreds of people, including army rescuers, clawed through the piles of rubble in the hunt for survivors, alongside excavators. At least 56 people had been rescued, the Tanzanian Red Cross Society said on X. … In 2013, a 16-storey building collapsed in Dar es Salaam and killed 34 people. (16 November 2024)

Firm disclosed phone data of shot Tanzanian politician, UK tribunal hears
(Guardian online – UK) Tigo’s former investigator claims he was unfairly dismissed for raising concerns over 2017 attack on Tundu Lissu. Extract continues: Gunmen tried to assassinate a Tanzanian opposition politician after a telecoms company secretly passed his mobile phone data to the government, according to evidence heard in a London tribunal. The mobile phone company Tigo provided 24/7 phone call and location data belonging to Tundu Lissu to Tanzanian authorities in the weeks before the attempt on his life in September 2017. The arrangement, which Tigo does not deny, was revealed in a claim by a former internal investigator for the company that was heard at the Central London employment tribunal. … Michael Clifford, a former Metropolitan police officer, claims that Millicom, the owner of the Tigo brand, sacked him for raising concerns about the affair. … Lissu was attacked in his car in the parking bay of his parliamentary residence in Dodoma on 7 September 2017. The car was sprayed with bullets and he received severe injuries. Nobody has been prosecuted for his attempted murder. Five days later, Clifford began investigating after hearing on a conference call that Millicom had been providing Lissu’s mobile phone data to the Tanzanian government. He later handed a summary of his findings to his superiors, his lawyer said. The report concluded that “information had been provided to the Tanzanian government since 22 August 2017”, the lawyers said. “From 29 August 2017, the intensity of the tracking increased and [Millicom] used its human electronic resources to livetrack 24/7 the location of two of Mr Lissu’s mobile phones.” The data was passed to the government via WhatsApp messages, which Millicom was later asked to delete. No formal legal request for the data appeared to have been filed. “In the claimant’s reasonable belief, this information tended to show that [Millicom] was involved in an attempted political assassination and act of terrorism,” Clifford’s lawyers said. Clifford claims that after escalating his concerns, his relationship with his managers began to break down and they began to marginalise him within the company, before making him redundant in the autumn of 2019. Millicom disputes Clifford’s claim. … (24 September 2024)

Scientists warn of impending eruption after spotting bulging around ‘Mountain of God’ volcano capable of spewing lava 10 miles away

Mount Lengai seen from Lake Natron, Northern Tanzania – photo Wikipedia


(Daily Mail online – UK) Extract: Scientists are warning of an impending eruption in Tanzania after discovering the country’s ‘Mountain of God’ volcano is bulging. The Ol Doinyo Lengai volcano, located in the north, was found to be swelling due to magma flowing beneath the Earth’s surface. The 9,718-foot-tall volcano has been active every 20 to 40 years throughout the 20th century, with its last eruption in 2007 spreading ash more than 10 miles away from the site and forcing thousands of people to evacuate. There has been a ‘rapid uplift’ in underground magma volcanic activity in the land surrounding the volcano since March 2022, posing a sign of imminent doom. ‘We have been able to detect transient motion in volcanic activity, and this is a precursor for any kind of eruption,’ said Ntambila Daud, a graduate student at Virginia Tech. Ol Doinyo Lengai – meaning ‘Mountain of God’ in Maasai – is considered to be a sacred site by the Maasai tribe who visit it to pray for cures to illness and infertility and ask for relief from any other misfortunes. Records of the volcano only go back to the 1880s, but it has erupted nine times since with the largest occurring 17 years ago. The explosion sent ash thousands of feet into the air and spread lava nearly two miles away from its western flank. Ol Doinyo Lengai is also the only one in the world to spew carbonite lava, a uniquely black or gray-coloured lava that turns stark white when it cools. This contrasts with other active volcanoes that project red, orange or yellow-coloured lava that will turn a deep black colour when it’s exposed to the air and cools. The different colours relate to the temperature the lave reaches when it hits the surface, with dark red being measured at 887 degrees Fahrenheit, orange at 1,652 degrees Fahrenheit, and white clocking at 2,100 degrees Fahrenheit or higher… Before a volcano erupts, magma will typically gather in a shallow reservoir under the land that causes the Earth’s surface to lift – like a balloon expanding underground… (16 September 2024)

Smiling Sophie, Duchess of Edinburgh, is stylish in statement print frock as she stands in for King Charles during Tanzania visit

The Duchess of Edinburgh at a trachoma outreach camp at Mlandizi Health Centre in Kibaha District – photo Royal.uk


(Daily Mail online – UK) Extract: Sophie, Duchess of Edinburgh was all smiles … as she visited a medical centre during her trip to Tanzania. The mother-of-two arrived in the country earlier this week. During her trip, she will be celebrating how the UK and African nation have collaborated on various issues including health, agriculture and women’s empowerment. … Sophie – who is the global ambassador for the international Agency for the Prevention of Blindness (IAPB) – met with TT surgery beneficiary, Hadija Shaban Kawam and Hon. Jenista Mhagama MP, Minister of Health. The women smiled for pictures as they chatted in front of Hadija’s home in Kibaha. … The duchess also visited the Mlandizi Health Center Tanzania – which offers eye treatment services through the Non-Governmental Organization Sightsavers – so she could see some of the treatments in action. As part of the duchess’ visit, she witnessed a live TT surgery – which corrects trachomatous trichiasis. This is a condition where one or more eyelashes touch the eye due to lid scarring, according to the World Health Organization (WHO). … While at the clinic, she also spoke with Trachoma patient Jumanne Seif Lwambo, during his appointment as well as medic Dr Hiza. Sophie is visiting the African nation solo, flying there to deliver a message from King Charles to the Commonwealth nation. … Charles expressed his ‘gratitude’ for Sophie’s work on the ground, aiding the people who are fighting tropical diseases… (19 September 2024)

Africa’s kleptocrats enable illegal forestry
(Mail & Guardian online – South Africa) Extract: Illegal forestry in Africa thrives where there is conflict and where law enforcement is weak. About 30% of Africa’s forests are fast disappearing because of illegal logging and timber trade, according to the African Union. The unseen effects may be far more devastating in the long term than in the immediate aftermath of the denuded wastelands. Africa’s tropical forests, where illegal logging is most prevalent, are the most carbon-rich ecosystems, storing 150 to 300 tonnes of carbon per hectare (above ground). Mature forests, particularly old-growth ones, have had decades or centuries to accumulate carbon in their biomass and soils. It can take as long for new forests to sequester as much carbon as a mature forest holds. Established forests also contain diverse species that contribute to overall forest health and resilience. A new forest also lacks the biodiversity of an older forest, which can affect its ability to store carbon and withstand stresses such as climate change or disease. When trees are cut down, much of the carbon they’ve stored is released back into the atmosphere as CO2, contributing to global warming. Forests degradation accounts for up to a fifth of global greenhouse gas emissions, the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reported in 2022. One of the worst culprits in Africa is the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which lost more than a million hectares of forest annually from 2010 to 2020, the third highest rate of forest denudation in the world (behind China and Brazil), according to the Global Initiative against Transnational Crime. Kleptocrats on the continent are profiting from the illicit forestry trade, which is estimated by Interpol and the United Nations Environment Programme to be worth $51 billion to $152 billion annually, said Justice Richard Goldstone, vice-chairperson of Integrity Initiatives International, an organisation designed to establish an International Anti-Corruption Court (IACC). He was speaking at Good Governance Africa’s 10th anniversary event … The illegal timber trade in Mozambique is a prime example. The Environmental Investigation Agency’s (EIA’s) multi-year investigation shows that the timber trade not only violates the log export ban, it finances insurgents in Cabo Delgado province, all of which is made possible by systemic corruption in the timber sector. The country loses an estimated half a billion dollars a year to illegal logging trade with China, according to the EIA… In Equatorial Guinea, for example, Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue, son of President Teodoro Obiang Nguema, profited hugely from the transport and export of rare hardwoods. As minister of agriculture and forestry, he sold national forests to private companies and used a shell company linked to the ministry to charge fees for processing, loading and transporting timber, Carl Pilgram, of the US-based Africa Center for Security Studies, and Catherine Lena Kelly, of the National Defense University in Washington DC, reported in The Conversation … “In 2021, the Zambian Anti-Corruption Commission seized 47 trucks containing illegal rosewood bound for Namibia and Zimbabwe… stated the report. “In 2019, Gabon’s vice-president and minister of forestry were part of a rosewood trafficking scandal.” … One of the most powerful incentives for governments to get their house in order is public pressure, and in the case of the forestry industry, it ideally comes from the very communities affected by deforestation and in whose interests it is to protect their forests. Forest conservation projects based on equitable partnerships with local residents and characterised by innovative and transparent revenue-sharing agreements are a powerful mitigant against bad actors in governance. An example is Carbon Tanzania, which generates value for Tanzania’s economy and its people by producing nature-based carbon credits that enable local people to earn revenues from the protection of their landscapes… (26 October 2024)

Samia heads to Cuba to promote Kiswahili, health ties
(East African online – Kenya) Extract: Tanzanian President Samia Suluhu Hassan is expected to arrive in Cuba . . . for a three-day state visit that officials say will strengthen bilateral ties between the two countries, with a special focus on promoting the international use of Kiswahili language. During the November 6 to 8 visit, President Hassan will hold talks with her host, President Miguel Diaz-Canel Bermudez, on new economic and diplomatic partnerships to address the global challenges for mutual benefit, a dispatch said. They will explore strategies to open up new avenues for cooperating alliances in areas such as health, education, arts, sports, tourism and the emerging blue economy, Tanzania’s foreign ministry said. Despite five decades of US sanctions, Cuba has managed to build a public health system that is among the best in the world… A major item on Samia’s itinerary will be her attendance as chief guest at the opening of the International Kiswahili Conference in Havana on … the last day of her trip. The conference, the first of its kind, has been organised by Tanzania’s envoy to Cuba, Humphrey Polepole, as part of an initiative to promote the use of Kiswahili in the Caribbean and South America… The two leaders will also launch a new Spanish-to-Swahili dictionary and booklet of common sayings in both languages, produced jointly by the University of Dar es Salaam and the University of Havana… (6 November 2024)

REVIEWS

by Martin Walsh

MYSTICAL POWER AND POLITICS ON THE SWAHILI COAST: UCHAWI IN PEMBA. Nathalie Arnold Koenings. James Currey, Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2024. xxii + 286 pp. ISBN: 9781847013842 (hardback) £95.00; ISBN 9781805433231 (e-book, EPDF) £29.95; ISBN 9781805433248 (e-book, EPUB) £29.95.


In Mystical Power and Politics on the Swahili Coast: Uchawi in Pemba, anthropologist Nathalie Arnold Koenings paints a picture of a society where the visible and invisible, the mundane and the mystical, are deeply intertwined and where colonial and local perspectives often clash and converge in complex ways. Insisting that scholars of Zanzibar should pay more attention to Pemba, where she has done research since 1996, Arnold Koenings demonstrates how uchawi (typically translated as ‘witchcraft’ but here ‘mystical power’ and usually left untranslated)—entangled with rather than juxtaposed with uganga ‘healing’ and Islam—“has shaped Pemban histories and worlds and that, in old, new and ever-changing forms it continues to do so” (p. 20). Part history, part anthropology, part love letter to Pemba, the book will change how scholars think about uchawi, uganga, and Zanzibar.

After the Introduction, the book has three parts. The first and longest part, “Power”, which Arnold Koenings rightly describes as the book’s “ethnographic heart” (p. 21), has five chapters. The first uses her experience with wachawi ‘witches’ (disguised as dogs) and waganga ‘healers’ to introduce the centrality of “mystical power” to everyday life in Pemba. She then juxtaposes that experience with archival colonial reports. A central theme linked to Arnold Koenings’s work as a storyteller is the role of narration in both local experiences and colonial documents. Like Popobawa in my work, Arnold Koenings shows that uchawi “has a lively discursive life” (p. 33), and whether one believes in it or not, how people talk about it has real effects on the world. Chapters Two, Three, and Four take us on a tour of “uchawi’s house”, a central theoretical (and, in some accounts, material) structure introduced to Arnold Koenings by a jinn, Shekhe Abdulaziz wa Bahr al Shem, who possessed one of her interlocutors. Encountering an interview with a jinn as a central primary source surprised me, but not, it seems, Arnold Koenings; it is a fascinating part of the book, and I was equally fascinated by her nonchalant treatment of it.

According to the jinn-sheikh, uchawi is a house with seven rooms, each representing a different level or type of uchawi, from the simplest forms practised by ordinary people to more complex and powerful forms. We encounter the first four rooms in Chapter Two (uchawi of a jealous soul, uchawi of those who keep jinn, uchawi that uses jinn to harm others, and the uchawi of those falsely claiming to have mystical knowledge). In Chapter Three, we enter the fifth room: uganga. While many previous scholars (and, in my experience, many people who visit waganga) distinguish uchawi and uganga, Arnold Koenings convincingly demonstrates that they share a common origin, knowledge base, and tools and that the distinction between them is often ambiguous and context-dependent. Chapter Four explains the sixth and seventh rooms of uchawi. The sixth involves powers of “invisibility, shapeshifting, bilocation and flight”, and, again, we see that these “extreme capacities are reserved for experts across both categories”—wachawi and waganga (p. 87). The seventh room comprises “uchawi’s most murderous realms” inhabited by wachawi who require child sacrifice (p. 96). In the final chapter of the book’s first part, Arnold Koenings examines uchawi in relation to power in ordinary Pemban life and discourse.

In the book’s second part, “Crisis”, Chapters Six and Seven turn to the effects of the Zanzibar Revolution on Pemba. In Chapter Six, Arnold Koenings demonstrates how, before the revolution, power and authority were associated with elders, crystallised in the institution of usheha ‘headmanship’, and that both sheha and elders, more generally, were associated with mystical power. During and after the revolution, age-based power relations were disrupted, often through violence and forced “modernization”, and Pemban uchawi lost much—but not all—of its power. Chapter 7 addresses additional reasons for uchawi’s diminishment, including the loss of land to non-Pembans (including land inhabited by jinns and wachawi) and reduced access to resources during President Abeid Karume’s rule, leading to increased competition and disruption to people’s normal ways of caring for one another.

The book’s final section, “Transformations”, contains its eighth and ninth chapters. Chapter 8 addresses contemporary Zanzibari and broader Tanzanian politics in relation to Pemba, which Arnold Koenings shows has become synonymous with opposition in ways not unrelated to its longtime association with uchawi itself. In Chapter 9, she addresses the rise of reformist Islam, demonstrating how its critique of shirk, including uchawi, some forms of uganga, and jinn exorcism, has led many Pembans to disassociate themselves— at least discursively and publicly—from these practices. The book concludes with a chapter on recent economic development in Pemba and its ongoing effects on not only mystical power but also on ordinary life and people’s identities as Pemban.

Arnold Koening’s book offers unique insights about and fascinating examples of the intertwining of political and mystical authority and the importance of storytelling in constructing social and imaginative worlds. Scholars of the Swahili Coast, in particular, will benefit from her rich description of Pemba’s social and geographical landscape, illustrating how historical and cultural contexts shape local practices and beliefs. I learned a great deal from her deep understanding of the moral ambiguity of uchawi, which can be both protective and harmful, complicating its depiction both in the colonial archive and in the discourse of contemporary Swahili Muslims influenced by reformist ideologies. I also appreciated reading about her experiences and interactions with Pembans and their jinn, which provide a vivid account of how she came to understand the complex dynamics of uchawi in Pemba. The book offers a nuanced understanding of how uchawi is perceived, practised, and integrated into the social fabric of Pemba, emphasising the everyday nature of uchawi and its deep entanglement with social relations, desires, and moral judgements.

If I have one critique of the book (and only if I must!), it is simply that its length will make it difficult to include in an undergraduate course, and few of the chapters can stand alone. One chapter that could work for undergraduates, I think, is Chapter 9, which I plan to include in a course on Islam in Africa: it offers a much more nuanced and humanising perspective on how ordinary Muslims engage with reformist ideas than much of the previous literature on the Swahili coast has done.
But what could Arnold Koenings have left out? The ethnographic material is so rich that I can’t fault her for wanting to include so much of it. As a scholar of Swahili, I was enchanted by her lingering on individual Swahili words, excavating them for deep meanings and metaphorical connections to one another—as she says, moving “with grave alertness to the power of language to create the world of which it speaks” (p. 15). As a lover of good writing, I was delighted with the writerly sensibility she brings to the book, weaving in her interlocutors’ stories with her own experiences and deft analysis. Mystical Power and Politics on the Swahili Coast is a book to enjoy as much for what you will learn from it as for the writing itself.
K.D. Thompson

K.D. Thompson is Evjue-Bascom Professor of the Humanities in the Religious Studies Program at the University of Wisconsin Madison. Their books include Popobawa: Tanzanian Talk, Global Misreadings (Indiana University Press, 2017), and the edited volume (with Erin Stiles) Gendered Lives on the Western Indian Ocean: Islam, Marriage, and Sexuality on the Swahili Coast (Ohio University Press, 2015). They are currently writing an ethnography of an Islamic radio station in Tanga.

ZANZIBAR WAS A COUNTRY: EXILE AND CITIZENSHIP BETWEEN EAST AFRICA AND THE GULF. Nathaniel Mathews. University of California Press, Oakland, CA, 2024. xvi + 338. ISBN 9780520394520 (hardback) £80.00; ISBN 9780520400702 (paperback) £25.00; ISBN 9780520394537 (e-book) £25.00.

Although not explicitly stated, this book is based on the author’s doctoral dissertation and is the product of many years’ research on the relationships between the peoples of Zanzibar and of Oman. It begins with an introduction that establishes the problematic, and provides an overview of the history of Zanzibar, with particular attention to the Omani contribution in the longue durée, exploring the relationships between Oman and Zanzibar and the effects of the Zanzibar Revolution, and paving the way for the ensuing discussion.

The rest of the book is divided into three parts. The first part, “Belonging in Zanzibar”, deals with the history of the Omani presence in Zanzibar, the rights that they claimed, and that were often contested or denied, in the Isles in the run-up to independence, and the political struggles between the ASP and the ZNP in the early 1960s. The author then goes on to the explore the events surrounding independence and the revolution and draws on new sources and eyewitness accounts, largely from those of Omani heritage, to flesh out the extant narratives of a period that has long been the subject of discussion among Zanzibaris; what is not in question is that the revolution led to the emigration of large numbers of Zanzibaris of Omani origin.

Part Two, “Belonging in Diaspora”, deals with the tensions between those who suffered under the revolution and the leaders of the revolution and their allies on the mainland, and gives voice to an opposition that was increasingly vocal, both inside Tanzania and, more significantly, in diaspora. Many refugees had ended up in the UK or in the Trucial States, particularly Dubai, and while many were simply engaged in trying to survive, others were speaking out against the Zanzibari regime. New narratives provide valuable insight into this period and the struggles in the diaspora.

“Belonging in Oman” investigates the place of returnee Omani Zanzibaris and their descendants in Oman, and a restoration, and a rethinking, of links, political, economic and social, between Oman and East Africa, leading to a renewed recognition of Oman’s place in the Indian Ocean world, itself inscribed within a growing if not uncontested acceptance of the place of Omanis of all descriptions, in contemporary Oman. Once again, the strength of the text is its use of primary sources, whether oral or published, to provide new insights into the encounter between the Swahili and the Omani worlds.

An obvious question that arises when exploring the movements of Zanzibaris of Omani origin in the 1960s is, why didn’t they go to Oman? Although the author acknowledges that the Omani administration regularly sent Omani Zanzibaris onward to Dubai, he does not explain why, nor does he explore the political context during the reign of Said bin Taimur, despite repeated references to the Imamate (centuries-old, but curiously described as “nascent” on p. 23), and the fact that refugees holding Imamate passports were generally refused entry to Oman. Most Manga Arabs were from the Omani interior – that is, from the Imamate – and it would have been interesting to hear how relevant the internal political struggles in Oman were to the reluctance of the Sultan to welcome subjects of the Imam, deposed and living in exile in Dammam and continuing to issue passports to Zanzibaris?

Choosing terminology when discussing diasporas is often difficult, but I found the author’s use of the term “Afro-Arab” – to refer to locally-born Zanzibaris with Omani origins – awkward, excluding as it does Omanis arrived as children, people of Hadrami origin (also Arabs), never mind mainlanders with Omani ancestry or Omanis with African ancestry, and thereby essentialising a category whose internal differences are often as great as those between themselves and others. The utility of the term even to the author seems dubious, given that he discusses many who do not meet his definition and one wonders why he felt the need to invoke the term, particularly since the very specific use of it here is not intuitive and requires explanation.

There are a few curious (if minor) errors – the author’s statement (p. 175) that Zanzibar is “the only Muslim majority ‘country’ in the region” will come as a surprise to both Comorians and Somalis; and the reference to “dhows that departed [from East Africa to the Gulf] from September to January” (pp. 107­108) seems at odds with the fact that the monsoon saw northward-bound dhows generally leaving Zanzibar in March or April, certainly well before September. It would have been nigh impossible to sail northwards in December or January.

A final remark, perhaps not entirely the author’s fault, regarding the poor proofreading: multiple typos, mis-spellings, and in one case even an entire paragraph repeated (pages 106 and 126). In most cases the errors are obvious, but not always: for example, when the author refers to the Zanzibar nationality decree (which was promulgated in 1911) as existing “since 1941” is this an error or a typo? Regardless, this decree meant that Zanzibaris were of course never British subjects, and only became British Protected Persons in 1949. Incidentally, the status still exists, if only as a residual category: there are still a few (elderly) BPPs.

The strength of this text lies in the exploration and synthesis of hitherto unheard accounts of the period, particularly among Zanzibaris in the Gulf. The author is clearly familiar with and comfortable in both places, and this is evident in his work. This book will be a valuable contribution not only to the historiography of Zanzibar and the revolution, but to that of Oman and the wider Indian Ocean World.
Iain Walker

Iain Walker is Research Associate at the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology. He received his MA from the University of Edinburgh and his PhD from the University of Sydney. His principal ethnographic interests are in the Comoros, but he has also worked with Comorians in Zanzibar and on the Hadrami diaspora in the western Indian Ocean. He has published widely on these topics. His most recent book was Islands in a Cosmopolitan Sea: A History of the Comoros (2019).


MEMORIES OF GERMAN COLONIALISM IN TANZANIA.
Reginald Elias Kirey. De Gruyter Oldenbourg, Berlin, 2023. xx + 247 pp. ISBN 9783110996296 (hardback) £82.00; ISBN 9783111055619 (eBook) open access via https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9783111055619/ html.

The author claims that “German colonialism [is] the most remembered colonial period in Tanzania” (p. 3). The first chapter elucidates the theoretical concept of “memory history” that informs the book, a concept not to be confused with “oral history”! The second chapter may be the reviewer’s favourite in the book. In the first instance, it details the oft-neglected fact that a significant number of Germans returned to Tanganyika in the 1920s or arrived for the first time. And of course, the processes of German incarceration, expulsion and selective renewal would be repeated in the context of the Second World War. The author details the interwar tensions between the territorial government and the various local German associations that began to echo metropolitan German aspirations. (Those readers interested in a more autobiographical representation of this period could usefully consult the 1995 publication of Werner Voight, 60 Years in East Africa.) This chapter also includes the saga of the lengthy return of Mkwawa’s skull as specified by the Treaty of Versailles. Kirey misses the 2017 Cambridge doctoral dissertation by Jeremiah Garsha that is devoted specifically to this topic (https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/items/53cbed8f­3602-49d7-b442-6cfef0f7922c).

The third chapter deals with the issue of German official archives, documentation hidden, destroyed, and damaged – not only during the East African campaign but by benign neglect in later years. This chapter opens with an extensive quote allegedly by Marcia Wright, later Professor of History at Columbia University. Except it isn’t. The quotation actually comes from a government circular issued to respond to Wright’s 1962 report. (Her original report is available in the UNESCO digital archives; she published a revised version in a 1965 volume of The American Archivist.) Within this chapter the text suitably acknowledges the important local work of Peter Geissler and Eckhart Franz from Germany’s primary archivist school in Marburg. Yet the bibliography and footnotes remove their names from the 1973 published guide (cited over 20 times in this chapter) that details their work and instead assigns authorship to the Tanzanian government! There is also no mention that an updated version of the guide was published in 1984. In short, it is somewhat disconcerting to see an assured use of archival sources start to be combined with an often clumsy treatment of secondary sources. But let us return to the flow of analysis in this second chapter. The author provides a fascinating account of the recovery, translation and care of German records retrieved across the country, a process starting in the 1920s and arguably ending around 1935. Kirey tries to work this process into his theoretical framework of memory history; readers can decide how successful that is.

The discussion in subsequent chapters takes a more specific look at three geographical areas in Tanzania (Songea in the south, Moshi in the north and the administrative capital of Dar es Salaam). In those areas oral interviews elicit specific memories of that early period (some 20 in Songea, 24 in Moshi and 4 in Dar). Architectural edifices, old and more recent, are considered as visual reminders of the colonial past. Again, referential oddities start to appear here. Gilbert Gwassa’s Maji Maji research is featured here even though it did not take place within the confines of any administrative entity associated with Songea. Patrick Redmond’s specific research on the Ngoni, with its extensive coverage of Songea sources, is completely ignored. Footnote 11 on p. 89, referring to Heike Schmidt’s work, has an incorrect quotation and pagination. The colonial official R.M. Bell is mentioned but Kirey seems completely unaware that Bell’s consideration of Maji Maji was published in Tanganyika Notes and Records in 1950, and that a more extensive manuscript rendition of his research sits in the Bodleian library in Oxford. The Moshi section explores the role of German missionaries, yet arguably the greatest concentration of German missionary effort existed in the south of Tanzania.

The reviewer vacillates between fascination and exasperation when reading this book. One might suggest that the doctoral oversight in Hamburg was perhaps not as rigorous as it might have been and that the immediate rush to publication might have benefitted from a pause to solicit more local comment from colleagues in Dar es Salaam.
Lorne Larson

Lorne Larson was one of the first doctoral graduates in history from the University of Dar es Salaam. He has taught East African history in Tanzania and Nigeria. He specialises in the German colonial period and is most interested in the history of southern Tanzania.

OBITUARIES

by Ben Taylor

David Brewin, former editor of Tanzanian Affairs, died at The Chiswick Nursing Centre on 11 December 2024 at the age of 97.

Born in Whitby in 1927 to a bank clerk father and deaf “socialite” mother, Brewin spent his childhood moving around Yorkshire and the north-east before joining Newcastle University to study agriculture.

After just a year, however, he decided to interrupt his studies and join the army; the second world war was still underway. The army was tough, he says, but had the positive effect of “beating the shyness out of me.” Posted to Palestine in the last days of the British Mandate, David was put in charge of half of all the army stores in Palestine in several huge warehouses.

Having the opportunity to see how agriculture was practiced in Cyprus, David found his calling. He returned to finish his agriculture degree and then applied to join the colonial service as an agriculture officer, resulting in a posting to Tanganyika.

David worked in the country for 15 years, from 1952 to 1967, spanning the transition from colonial rule to independent nation. He served first as the Agricultural Officer for the Lake Victoria districts of Musoma, North Mara and Ukerewe on the eastern side of Lake Victoria, supervising a team of 20 staff managing agricultural laws and marketing procedures. For two years he was Principal of Ukiriguru Agricultural Training Centre. And from 1962 he took responsibility for training programmes of the Ministry of Agriculture, founded (and edited) the magazine Ukulima wa Kisasa (Modern Agriculture) and played a key role producing an agricultural radio drama in Swahili based on The Archers, about the every-day life of a typical farmer, in this case featuring Mzee Simba.

His career then took David beyond Tanzania – to Swaziland and then to the World Bank for five years in Washington DC followed by five covering West Africa from Abidjan in Côte D’Ivoire. Head of the Bank at the time was Robert MacNamara, a fierce task master, such that David “was made to feel as if I was in the army again”. He worked 12-15 hour days, often seven days a week. “It was the hardest work I ever had to do in my life, but my most valuable experience ever,” he said. Then David joined the British Council, working as an education and training specialist, a role that took him all across Africa and beyond.

By the time David retired from the British Council at the age of sixty-five, he had already been editing Tanzanian Affairs for the best part of a decade, and he continued to do so until 2016 – producing a total of 97 issues over 32 years. In doing so, he created a highly respected and invaluable record of Tanzania’s progress and challenges under five different Presidents.

Issue 19


His first issue – no.19, July 1984 – comprised 20 pages produced on a typewriter with hand-written headings. It included excerpts from two speeches from the then President Julius Nyerere as well as news of the death of Prime Minister Edward Sokoine in a road traffic collision. The same issue reports that the country’s population had just passed 20 million, that infant mortality had fallen substantially, that the economy was struggling with growth below the rate of population growth, and that discussion was ongoing about the need for constitutional reforms (including a new bill of rights while preserving the President’s power of “preventive detention”.) Forty years on, a similar range of topics remain prominent in our coverage.

Personally, in working alongside David to produce Tanzanian Affairs, I found him to be enthusiastic, hardworking and principled. I greatly looked forward to our opportunities to meet and talk, and always went away from such conversations with a sense of having learned something new and interesting. He will be greatly missed.

Paul Harrison, chair of the Britain-Tanzania Society paid tribute. “David Brewin opened up a wider world of understanding about Tanzania for me. He generously shared his deep knowledge and passion for the country, introducing me to key figures of the time when I was a student in the 1990s, providing a platform to engage in meaningful discussions. His dedication to documenting Tanzania’s history and development through Tanzanian Affairs has been invaluable in comprehending the country’s trajectory. I am deeply grateful for his mentorship and the connections he provided. He will be fondly remembered by me and many BTS members.”
(Many thanks to the South-East Bayswater Residents Association – SEBRA – for their permission to draw on their 2017 profile of David Brewin for this obituary)

The incoming director for Africa of the UN’s World Health Organization (WHO), Tanzania’s Dr Faustine Ndugulile, has died at the age of 55, just three months after he was elected to the position (see photo in TA 139). He was undergoing treatment in India at the time.

Before his appointment to the WHO position, Dr Ndugulile had a distinguished career in politics and public health within Tanzania. He represented the Kigamboni constituency in Dar es Salaam as an MP since 2010 and held several governmental positions, including deputy minister for health and communications minister.

He was appointed to the health ministry position in 2017 and stayed there until President Magufuli sacked him in May 2020, at the height of the coronavirus pandemic, amid reports of a disagreement over how the country should respond to the situation. Ndugulile was often photographed wearing a mask when hardly any Tanzanians were doing so, while the President was a Covid sceptic and refused to adopt the kind of measures that the rest of the world had taken to control the spread of the virus.

Before joining politics in 2010, Ndugulile had served as a director in the health ministry overseeing diagnostic services. He played a key role in establishing the National Blood Transfusion Services in 2006, where he served as the founding programme manager.

The former Registrar of Political Parties (RPP), John Tendwa, died in December, aged 75. He died at Muhimbili National Hospital after battling a prolonged illness.

Tendwa served as RPP from 2001 to 2013, a pivotal period during which Tanzania’s political system underwent significant reforms. His tenure was marked by efforts to ensure fair party registration, foster transparency in political processes, and advocate for political pluralism. His commitment to a free and fair political environment helped solidify the country’s multiparty system.

In an interview with Mwananchi newspaper, Tendwa once responded to accusations of bias toward opposition parties, saying, “My goal was to understand their challenges and ensure no party was left behind in the democratic process.”

Tendwa’s passing prompted tributes from political leaders across all major parties. CCM secretary-general Emmanuel Nchimbi described him as a man of integrity who played a crucial role in shaping Tanzania’s democratic development.

Chadema secretary-general John Mnyika said Tendwa will be remembered as a symbol of fairness and inclusivity. “His efforts to ensure that political parties had a fair chance to engage in the democratic process were invaluable. His willingness to engage with opposition parties and address their concerns set him apart as a true champion of democracy.”

Political activist Buberwa Kaiza also praised Tendwa for his impartiality, saying his legacy would be remembered for generations. “He tried his best to be fair compared to other registrars. His legacy as a champion of democracy and fair political processes will remain with us for years to come.”

Retired Tanzania People’s Defence Forces (TPDF) General and former Chief of Defence Forces, David Musuguri, died on October 29, 2024 at the age of 104.

Born in Butiama on January 4, 1920, Musuguri—nicknamed General Mutukula—was credited with expelling Dictator Idi Amin from the Kagera region of Tanzania to the west of Lake Victoria, and later from Uganda, in the 1978-89 war.

As the Tanzanian forces mobilized in 1978, General Musuguri devised a strategy that combined bold offensive tactics with a deep understanding of the Ugandan terrain. The plan aimed for a swift assault on Amin’s forces while minimising civilian casualties. His leadership galvanized the troops; they were not merely fighting for a cause, but for the oppressed and for justice. He successfully commanded his forces during key battles, including those at Simba Hills, Masaka, and Lukaya.

Many years later, in a rare interview the General expressed his desire to capture Idi Amin with his own bare hands and hold him accountable for his atrocities. The two had met in Kenya while serving in the King’s African Rifles, a British colonial army in East Africa. “Idi Amin was disrespectful because I taught him at Kahawa Barracks in Nairobi in 1947. At that time, I was already a sergeant in the King’s African Rifles,” the retired General recounted.

Musuguri was enlisted in the King’s African Rifles (KAR) in 1942, serving with them in Madagascar during World War II. When Tanganyika attained self-rule on December 9, 1961, several KAR units were transferred to the newly formed Tanganyika Rifles.

During the Tanganyika Rifles mutiny in January 1964, Musuguri was stationed in Tabora, where rebellious troops declared him a major. He eventually rose to the rank of brigadier and was promoted to Major General in 1979, commanding the TPDF’s 20th Division during the Uganda-Tanzania War.

After the war, in 1980, Musuguri was appointed Chief of Defence Forces, and on December 30, President Julius Nyerere promoted him to Lieutenant General.

On February 7, 1981, Ugandan President Milton Obote honoured Musuguri with two spears for his gallant actions in the Battle of Lukaya. He retired from the army on August 31, 1988, after nearly 50 years of distinguished service in the King’s African Rifles, Tanganyika African Rifles, and the TPDF.

The executive secretary of Tanzania’s Planning Commission, Lawrence Mafuru, died on November 9, 2024 at Apollo Hospital in India.

Mafuru was known for his experience in the banking industry before his appointment to the government. He began his journey in 1998 at Standard Chartered Bank, specialising in international trade finance. He went on to hold various leadership positions within the Tanzanian financial sector, including head of treasury at the National Bank of Commerce (NBC), chief executive officer of NBC, and chairman of the Tanzanian Bankers Association (TBA).

“Mafuru will be remembered for his exemplary service, diligence, and creative approach in his various roles within the government,” said President Samia Suluhu Hassan in a post on X, formerly Twitter.

RESPECT FOR DEMOCRATIC NORMS

by Ben Taylor

Growing concern over President Samia’s respect for democratic norms
After President Samia Suluhu Hassan took office in March 2021, there were signs that she intended to “re-open” the country, both politically and economically. Her predecessor, President John Magufuli, had restricted the activities of opposition parties, and anyone critical of his government, as well as applying a firmly nationalist approach to economics that discouraged investment.

“Tanzania is less sinister and less mad since she took over,” wrote The Economist earlier this year. Right from the start, however, questions were being asked as to how concerted President Samia’s new direction would be, particularly on politics. In part, this was because President Magufuli remained popular both with the public and with some powerful figures within the ruling party, CCM, and it was clear that any pro-democracy moves the new President introduced would meet with resistance – resistance that would also carry the temptation and/or promise of a relatively easy ride in forthcoming elections. Would the demands of holding the party together trump her supposed democratic instincts? And in part, it was because President Samia’s own position was not well known. She had spent over five years as a loyal Vice President to her predecessor, without ever marking out her own position on key questions. How committed was she, truly, to moving the country in a more democratic direction?

A number of recent events and trends have led to rising concern that her commitment is lukewarm at best. One pan-African publication described this as Tanzania’s moment of truth, where “the red flags are getting redder.” Another went with “Back to bulldozer politics”.

A planned celebration in Mbeya in August of International Youth Day by the opposition party, Chadema, was blocked by the police. More than 500 young Chadema supporters were arrested as they attempted to gather in defiance of the ban. Several senior Chadema leaders – including secretary general John Mnyika, national vice chair, Tundu Lissu and central committee member Joseph Mbilinyi – were detained for 48 hours and allegedly roughed up by the police, and party leader Freeman Mbowe was also arrested. Police Commissioner, Awadh Juma Haji justified their actions by saying the police would do everything in their power “to resist such glaring threats to public order”.

Further, in recent months, numerous opposition figures have reportedly disappeared. In July, regional police in Tanga confirmed that they were holding Kombo Mbwana, a Chadema district leader – some 30 days after he went missing. He had not been presented before court, despite appeals by his lawyers. Two other party leaders – Dioniz Kipanya from Rukwa and Deusdedith Soka from Dar es Salaam – have gone missing in the past few weeks, with no word from authorities. In August, the Tanganyika Law Society (TLS) released a list of 83 people who had recently disappeared recently under mysterious circumstances.

There have also been other grounds for concern, too. There was the heavy-handed response to criticism of the controversial DP World contract to manage the port of Dar es Salaam (see TA136 and 137).

There was a recent announcement by Zanzibar’s police commissioner Hamad Khamis Hamad that they would review political speeches with the aim of identifying utterances made against the state or aiming to incite hatred. And there has been the reappointment of former close allies of President Magufuli to influential positions – most obviously the controversial Paul Makonda who was recently made regional commissioner for Arusha, after three years in the wilderness. He recently called himself the “favourite son of President Samia,” surely a knowing reference to the persistent rumours that he could be the illegitimate son of President Magufuli.

Even the reforms that the President herself had been strongly associated – such as establishing dialogue with opposition parties and forming commissions for criminal justice reform, constitutional reform and the running of elections – have slowed or stalled, showing little sign of progress in the past year. Recommendations are gathering dust on shelves, while local elections are due before the end of this year, and presidential and parliamentary elections will be held in October 2025.

Those elections are, of course, a major part of the context in which all of this is taking place. There is still an outside chance that President Samia may face a challenger in becoming the CCM presidential candidate. Having risen to the presidency through the untimely death of the previous incumbent, rather than through an election, as well as being the country’s first female president, President Samia could be forgiven for feeling nervous at the prospect of not delivering a victory as clear as that of President Magufuli. Indeed, such was the extent of his win in the 2020 official election results, she cannot hope to match that outcome, whether or not the country returns to a more credible democratic electoral process.

A second factor, particularly in the most recent developments, is the recent “Gen Z” protests in Kenya. Across several weeks, widespread protests by young Kenyans, organised on social media, piled pressure on President William Ruto to reverse tax changes. A heavy response by state security forces, which killed dozens, failed to quell the unrest, and eventually, President Ruto fired his entire cabinet and was forced to halt planned tax hikes.

When announcing the ban on Chadema’s youth day rally in Mbeya, Commissioner Haji specifically cited a statement by one Chadema youth leader that called upon opposition supporters to be “inspired by
our colleagues in Kenya”.

At the time of writing, the jury is still out on whether President Samia is genuinely committed to democratic reforms but having to proceed slowly in order to bring her party with her, or her stated commitment was only ever a strategy to buy herself time as the country’s new leader. What is clear, however, is that observers both within and outside the
country are becoming less willing to give her the benefit of the doubt, and that their doubts are growing.

MAASAI EVICTIONS

by Ben Taylor

Thousands of Maasai gather to protest against evictions and are addressed by Arusha Regional Commissioner, Paul Makonda – Photo – IWGIA

Maasai evictions – and protests – and concessions
On August 18, 2024, hundreds of Maasai community members gathered to protest the denial of basic rights and the loss of their ancestral land in Ngorongoro, Tanzania. The protest is the latest in a series of actions against a government relocation plan aimed at moving 110,000 Maasai from Ngorongoro to Msomera, Sauni, and Kitwai, over 300 kilometers from their current homes.

Dressed in their traditional red clothing and holding leaves – as a symbol of peace recognized across many Tanzanian tribes – the demonstrators blocked the busy Ngorongoro-Serengeti Road. They carried posters, prayed, and marched, singing in the Maasai language to voice their grievances.

The government argues the relocation is essential to preserve the Ngorongoro Conservation Area, a UNESCO World Heritage site. “Due to escalating human-wildlife conflicts, overpopulation of humans and livestock, wide-spreading zoonotic diseases, shrinking wildlife corridor and grazing land, lack of safe water sources and poor sanitation, and the quest for socio-economic development of its citizens, the consensus was reached through a participatory and transparent process for a voluntary relocation program,” said Mudrik Ramadhan Soraga, the Zanzibar minister for Tourism and Heritage, speaking to a meeting of the World Heritage Committee in July in New Dehli, India.

Officials further maintain the relocation is voluntary, but residents have described the exercise as an eviction, pointing to the cutting off of essential services such as water and health to make their case. “Conservation is a good thing, we are not against it. We are against … discriminatory conservation, implemented in a militaristic way,” Maasai lawyer Denis Oleshangay told reporters. However, he said, “they are trying to make life so hard that no one will stay.”

The government has offered to build new homes to encourage “voluntary relocation” for those who agree to move to Msomera, as well as cash payments to support the move. The government reported having spent TSh 286 billion on the relocation effort, and said in early September that this has resulted in 9,778 residents moving since July 2022.

The immediate trigger for the latest protest appeared to be concerns that residents had been stripped of their right to vote in Ngorongoro. On August 3, some Ngorongoro residents alleged that the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) had transferred the names of voters from Ngorongoro to Msomera, a place where only 2% of Ngorongoro residents have relocated.

“We are shocked and saddened that the entire Ngorongoro Division, which currently has a population of 110,000, will not be voting at usual polling stations,” said James Moringe Mollel, Councillor of Loitile Ward. “They claimed the relocation was voluntary, but for example, I have been assigned to a hamlet in Msomera as my polling station, a place I’ve never even visited.”

Further, an official plan contained in the Government Gazette published on August 2, 2024, involved delisting 11 wards, 25 villages and 96 sub villages in Ngorongoro.

Prof Issa Shivji, one of Tanzania leading legal scholars, responded in a social media post that the villages’ delisting will have far-reaching legal and democratic implications for the people of Ngorongoro, and urged authorities to rethink their plan.

The protest than began on August 18th continued uninterrupted for five days, despite heavy-handed policing. According to some reports, this included the arrest of 39 members of the Maasai community. A week later, according to these same reports, the locations where the arrested were being held had not been revealed, and no charges had been brought.

The international human rights group, Amnesty, issued a statement calling on the government “to immediately disclose the whereabouts of the 40 arrested community members, grant them access to their lawyers, and due process, including being promptly brought before court to challenge the legality of their detention.”

Five days into the protest, the minister of State in the Prime Minister’s Office responsible for Policy, Parliamentary Affairs and Coordination, William Lukuvi, addressed residents in Oloirobi Village, in Ngorongoro Ward. He was accompanied by the Minister of Constitutional and Legal Affairs, Prof Palamagamba Kabudi, Deputy Minister of Natural Resources and Tourism, Mr Danstan Kitandula, Arusha Regional Commissioner, Paul Makonda, and the Police Force’s Commissioner of Operations and Training, Awadh Juma Haji.

Mr Lukuvi said in his speech that he had been sent by President Samia Suluhu Hassan, and that he had been instructed to ensure health and education services must continue to be adequately delivered. “Education services must be fully provided, and hospital services must be fully available. I want Mr Makonda to ensure that in all areas where services have been suspended, they are restored so that residents do not face difficulties in accessing social services,” he stated.

Mr Lukuvi also said that President Hassan has directed that local government elections, scheduled for November, should be held in Ngorongoro, and preparations should proceed accordingly in the area as per existing boundaries. “The President has sent us to assure you that your rights to vote in the forthcoming elections remain intact. The director of Elections (from the Independent National Electoral Commission) will ensure all polling stations are set up to enable citizens to exercise their constitutional rights,” he said.

At the same meeting, Prof Kabudi affirmed that all Tanzanians are equal and assured the residents that they will receive the same rights and treatment as those in other regions.

Map showing Msomera relative to the Ngorongoro Conservation Area – data from openstreetmap.org

“Our country was founded by the Father of the Nation, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, as one united nation built on love, peace, and unity. President Hassan upholds these principles and urges you to preserve peace and stability while safeguarding the nation. Let us embody the spirit of peace and love, just like all other Tanzanians,” he said.

In a separate development, the Arusha High Court has blocked implementation of the Government Notice that formally dissolved wards, villages, and hamlets, including those in the Ngorongoro District, until further court notice.

Thanking the government on behalf of the residents, Ngorongoro legislator Emmanuel Shangai said in the previous four years, residents have seen no leaders visiting the area, but today the President has sent them. “I urge you to trust the government because the President is for all Tanzanians. It is possible that some of her subordinates misled her, which is why these issues arose,” he said.

The government case
A series of articles in the (Tanzanian) Guardian newspaper presented the government case on the Ngorongoro issue, highlighting the legacy of a 1959 land use policy. Initially designed to accommodate human and wildlife populations, the policy aimed to harmonize their coexistence within the Ngorongoro Conservation Area (NCA).

The Maasai were allowed to graze their livestock within the conservation area, maintaining their cultural practices and livelihood. And in return, certain restrictions were imposed to ensure that wildlife habitats were preserved and that the ecological integrity of the region was not compromised. These restrictions included prohibiting permanent structures and agricultural activities that could disrupt wildlife habitats.

However, over time, the growth of both human and wildlife populations has intensified the competition for scarce resources like water and grazing land. Pressure on wildlife habitats intensified, leading to more frequent and severe human-wildlife conflicts.

Recently, the Tanzanian government, through the Ngorongoro Conservation Authority Area (NCAA), announced its goal to improve the living conditions of residents in the Ngorongoro division, especially those within the conservation area. This aims to separate human and wildlife habitats to enhance conservation efforts.

RESHUFFLES APLENTY

by Ben Taylor

In August, President Samia Suluhu Hassan announced her fourth cabinet reshuffle of 2024 and her fourteenth since taking office in March 2021.

The latest reshuffle sees the return of former ministers Palamagamba Kabudi and William Lukuvi to the cabinet, while two other ministers, Angela Kairuki and Ummy Mwalimu, have been removed. Kabudi, who has been reappointed as the Minister of Constitutional and Legal Affairs, and Lukuvi takes up the post of State Minister at the Prime Minister’s Office, overseeing Policy, Parliament, and Coordination. This role effectively makes him the Chief Whip in Parliament.

Lukuvi’s appointment reflects the trust President Samia places in him. Prior to this ministerial appointment he had been a key political advisor to the President since January 2022.

Jenista Mhagama, who was replaced by Lukuvi, has been reassigned to the Ministry of Health, where she takes over from Ummy Mwalimu, who has been completely removed from the cabinet. Mwalimu’s depar­ture is widely attributed to recent challenges at the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF).

Pindi Hazara Chana has also been reappointed, in her case to the Ministry of Tourism and Natural Resources, replacing Angela Kairuki, who has been made an advisor to the President. Chana, who was removed from the Ministry of Tourism in February 2023 and later served in the Ministry of Sport and Culture and then Constitutional Affair Minister, now returns to her former role.

President Samia also announced the appointment of Hamza Johari as the new Attorney General succeeding Dr Eliezer Feleshi who has been appointed as a Justice at the court of appeal. Johari, who previously served as the Director General of the Tanzania Civil Aviation Authority, played a key role in negotiating the Dubai-Tanzania port agreement, which granted multinational DP World a 30-year contract to run, oper­ate, and develop Dar es Salaam port.

Earlier, in July, Tanzania’s information minister Nape Nnauye was removed from his post following an outcry over comments he made suggesting that elections could be rigged. He was filmed at a rally saying that he would help a fellow ruling party MP win in the 2025 election, and that “election results are not necessarily those in the ballot box, rather they depend on the person counting and making announce­ments”. He will now be replaced by former land and housing develop­ment minister Jerry Slaa.

At the same time, foreign minister January Makamba was also sacked, with Tanzania’s ambassador to Italy, Mahmoud Thabiti Kombo, chosen as his successor. This means that between 2021 and 2024, Tanzania has had five different foreign ministers, a post that the President describes as “the heart of the government.” The Ministry has not had any Minister who has stayed in the ministry for more than a year since President Samia Suluhu came into power.

Many observers have associated Makamba’s sacking with his political ambition for the Presidency. “She saw the previous minister was going against her expectations,” argued political analyst Thomas Kibwana. He added: “If the new minister is to serve for a long time, it is essential that they do not have excessive political ambitions that can detract him from the current responsibilities.”

In announcing the changes, President Samia did not mention specific reasons for her decisions but emphasised the need to put the national interest first. “Your own interests as a human being are secondary, but the nation’s interests come first,” she said. She referenced a Swahili proverb, saying that “positions of power are like borrowed clothes. If you use them well, and the owner sees you wearing them properly, looking neat, and not misbehaving they might let you keep the clothes for a while. But if they find that you are misbehaving with the clothes they lent you, they will not wait; they will take back their clothes.”

Since January, when Makamba had represented President Samia at the Italy-Africa summit, he had been on the receiving end of a social media campaign claiming that he used the trip to set up a network for his own bid for the Presidency.

Finally, the Director of the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB), CP Salum Hamduni, has been appointed as the Regional Administrative Secretary for Shinyanga Region. Hamduni, who was appointed as PCCB Director in May 2021, leaves the organization amid an ongoing public awareness campaign against election-related corrup­tion. Crispin Chalamila, a senior official from the President’s Office, has been appointed as the new Director of PCCB.

MISCELLANY

by Ben Taylor

Tundu Lissu announces presidential bid for 2025
Tundu Lissu, the vice chair of the opposition party Chadema, has announced that he has informed his party about his intention to run for the presidency of the United Republic of Tanzania through his party. He was also the party’s presidential candidate in 2020.

“I have indicated my intention as a presidential aspirant through my party officially,” Lissu explained in an online interview in August.

In 2020, Tundu Lissu was a presidential candidate representing Chadema, competing against the late President John Magufuli. In that election, which many described as the most flawed election in Tanzania’s history, Lissu received 1,933,271 votes, while President Magufuli was declared the winner with 12,516,252 votes.

Lissu’s announcement comes after various signs suggest some tension with the party, between him and the party chair, Freeman Mbowe. This rift was reportedly heightened during Chadema’s recent internal party elections, where Lissu said that there was a lot of corruption fuelled by money coming from the ruling party, CCM.

Taxing cryptocurrency
In the 2024/25 budget, Tanzania has announced a 3% tax on digital assets transactions. The new measure defines digital assets as anything of value that is intangible, including cryptocurrencies, token codes, and numbers held in digital form generated through cryptographic or other means.

The Act specifically targets non-resident individuals or entities that own platforms or facilitate the exchange or transfer of digital assets. This means the law will require crypto exchange sites and brokers to register in Tanzania’s tax system and withhold a tax rate of 3% when making payments to a resident as a result of transfer or exchange.

While the global market value of cryptocurrency stands at an estimated USD $2.46 trillion (2.2% of global GDP), Tanzania does not yet have a specific legal framework for digital assets. However, in 2019, the Bank of Tanzania issued a public notice against the use or trading of crypto­currency in the country.

Nevertheless, various reports indicate that a significant number of Tanzanians own cryptocurrencies. One report by a Singaporean cryp­tocurrency research firm, Triple A, estimates that about 2.3 million Tanzanians own cryptocurrency. A separate survey within Tanzania, conducted by Financial Sector Deepening Tanzania (FSDT), found that 1.7% of Tanzanian adults – equivalent to over 580,000 people – have invested in cryptocurrencies.

ECONOMICS – AIR TRAVEL

by Dr Hildebrand Shayo

Tanzania has launched a more modern passenger and cargo fleet to compete in the sky race
Many readers will remember that eleven years ago, British Airways (BA) discontinued direct flights from London Heathrow to Dar es Salaam, due to what was then described as an inability to operate profitably. This marked the end of nearly forty years of BA flight services to Tanzania.

If the agreement to fly to London is successful and Air Tanzania (ATCL) begins operating direct flights from Dar es Salaam to UK airports – ideally London Heathrow or Gatwick – will travel agencies and the business community be able to profit from the direct flight to Tanzania at a competitive rate?

British Airways (BA) was the most dependable passenger airline for diplomats, government officials and intellectuals flying through Heathrow to the UK and the US for nearly forty years. According to statistics, the United States and the United Kingdom are among the leading countries where tourists arrive in Tanzania yearly.

The relevant inquiry is whether the acquisition of a more modern passenger and cargo fleet and the potential for direct flights from Tanzania to the major airports in the United Kingdom will support the economies of these two historically significant countries. Can Tanzania, through market-driven competition, close the 13-year-old gap created by British Airways’ (BA) withdrawal of flight services between London Heathrow and Dar es Salaam?

In this analysis, I’ll examine the main factors driving this expansion and any potential financial effects on Tanzania’s aviation sector. Such discussion could signal what would keep ATCL competitive nationally, regionally and internationally.

After a history that is well known, ATCL now operates a fleet of sixteen aircraft, comprising three widebody Boeing B787-8s, one widebody freighter B767-300F, two narrow bodies B737-9, four Airbus A220-300s, six regional turboprops DHC-8-Q300 and five HDC-8-Q400s.

According to the ATCL route plan, the national carrier presently offers 13 domestic services and 11 international destinations. With further fleet expansion, it plans to add flights to other destinations including Kinshasa, N’Djili Goma, Lagos, and Muscat.

Economic benefits from fleet expansion will have a substantial financial impact, especially on revenue and tax contributions. They will increase Tanzania’s regional influence while at the same time increasing ATCL’s operational capacity. Tanzania continues to be a centre for our economic region. Improved business class seats with better cushions and a premium economy cabin on an extra new aircraft with a 262-seat capacity that can load 20 cargo tonnes on ATCL flights will put the ATCL fleet in a more competitive market.

Looking at the areas where ATCL can resist competition in African aviation, most countries, including Tanzania, with national airlines, strive to maintain their competitiveness through market protection, preferential treatment, and incentives.

Therefore, ATCL operators must pay close attention to how State-owned airlines in Africa and the Middle East manage to maintain a lopsided competitive advantage and continue to provide high-quality services. It is crucial to remember that the free market economy in the airline sector has not historically performed as predicted in countries attempting to resurrect their national carriers.

Competitors from other areas, for example, have different strategies and often do not subscribe to the same school of economic thought. It is absurd to believe that ATCL can successfully compete with heavily subsidised regional airlines that are well-known in the industry and dominate long-haul travel.

One important thing to remember as Tanzania expands its fleet to compete in the sky race is that the continent’s airline market structure differs significantly from other regions, such as the US, where the deregulation of the aviation industry has been a significant driver of the industry’s expansion. In specific markets, the one-size-fits-all approach is inapplicable, and replicating it would be detrimental to Tanzania’s long-term investment goals.

Building a sustainable enterprise requires certain fundamental principles, which the government is putting in place as it prepares to strengthen ATCL. The reciprocity principle is the first. ATCL must have an equivalent chance back home in regions around Tanzania where international airlines are permitted to operate.

Some airlines prefer to fly during the day into the nation, but on their soil, ATCL might only be permitted to utilise the airports during times that would be detrimental to the airline. Although open skies imply a mutual connection, certain airlines have often taken advantage of it. Tanzania shouldn’t fall into that trap with our ATCL.

Similarly, cargo is one of airlines’ primary sources of income. This corporate sector should support ATCL, just as other nations do. Rather than importing specific goods from Europe for the continent’s emerging industries sector, Tanzania should go in the same direction as the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), cultivate relationships with African producers to import the raw material directly.

The new aircraft would improve trade potential. The efficiency and capacity of the B787-8 would enable improved trade connections, which will help industries like manufacturing and agriculture by giving them better access to international markets.

For airlines operating in Tanzania to genuinely establish Dar es Salaam and Tanzania as the primary hub of East Africa’s aviation sector, the airline must support its long-haul operations to reach global market destinations while simultaneously expanding service quality rapidly domestically and regionally.

By synchronising essential sectors and generating more economic value, ATCL should catalyze trade connections throughout Africa. It’s a chance to expand both intra-African trade and the airline. To establish Julius Nyerere International Airport and Amani Karume International Airport as the principal hubs of Africa’s aviation sector, ATCL should vigorously expand locally and regionally while supporting the airline’s long-haul operations.

Tanzania’s aircraft fleet is expected to boost air travel, demonstrating the aviation industry’s exceptional growth potential, which Tanzania, led by President Samia, has in this sector. In my view, expansion points to a bright future for the aviation sector in Tanzania that is driven by several causes, including the country’s strong economic growth, rising demand for air travel, government efforts, infrastructure development and fleet upgrades.

The enlarged fleet brings the potential for improved connection, job creation, economic growth, and tourism, all of which contribute to the nation’s overall development. To facilitate the smooth integration of the expanding fleet into the aviation ecosystem, industry stakeholders must prioritise environmental sustainability and tackle infrastructure issues that, if not well managed, could be a constraint in achieving ATCL’s full market potential.