by Ben Taylor

Presidential election – the three main party leaders: President Samia (CCM), Luhanga Mpina (ACT Wazelendo) and Tundu Lissu (Chadema)

General elections in Tanzania: October 29, 2025
Tanzania’s forthcoming general elections represent a significant moment in the nation’s democratic trajectory. These polls will determine the presidency, 393 seats in the National Assembly, and local government positions across the mainland and the semi-autonomous islands of Zanzibar, for the next five years.

With over 30 million registered voters, the elections occur against a backdrop of some political re-opening under President Samia Suluhu Hassan, who assumed office in 2021 following the untimely death of President John Magufuli. However, concerns remain over restrictions on critics, opposition participation and institutional disputes, raising questions about the credibility of the broader democratic rebuilding process.

In particular, it looks likely that President Hassan, seeking re-election as the candidate of the ruling party, CCM, will face no meaningful opposition candidate. Chadema’s leader, Tundu Lissu, will miss the election, as he is in prison on charges of treason, and his party has refused to legitimise the elections by putting forward candidates. In any case, the electoral commission has blocked them from participating. The Alliance for Change and Transparency (ACT Wazalendo), the only other party with significant support, has had its campaign interrupted by the electoral commission’s decision to block their proposed Presidential candidate, Luhaga Mpina, from standing – a move on which the High Court has (at the time of writing) not yet reached a final decision.

Voter turnout, which has historically fluctuated between 50%-70%, may be low, due to apathy or bans / boycotts. Meanwhile, a historic surge in female candidates – over 40% of parliamentary aspirants – highlights evolving gender dynamics.

The legacy of 2020
The 2020 general elections inevitably form part of the context for this year’s polls. These were marked by widespread allegations of fraud and violence that eroded trust in Tanzania’s electoral institutions. Incumbent President John Magufuli of CCM secured a landslide victory with 84.4% of the presidential vote, while his party claimed 365 of 393 parliamentary seats. Official turnout was reported at 50.7%.

Opposition parties, led by Chadema, rejected the results, alleging ballot irregularities, intimidation, and the disqualification of many candidates on questionable technical grounds. Chadema’s presidential candidate, Tundu Lissu, garnered just 13%, but rejected the outcome, fleeing to exile amid arrests of party officials.

The polls unfolded under Magufuli’s tightened political environment, including restrictions on independent media and political rallies, which stifled opposition campaigns. International observers, such as the European Union, were absent after being denied visas, leaving only limited Commonwealth and African Union missions that faced restrictions.

Critics argue these elections exemplified “electoral authoritarianism,” where formal democratic processes mask one-party rule. Hassan’s ascension promised reforms, but the 2020 legacy – including distrust in election authorities – persists, fuelling opposition demands for constitutional reforms and true independence for the electoral commission.

Authoritarian drift?
Tanzania heads to the polls amid what some analysts have described as a new narrowing of political space under President Hassan. Once hailed for tentative reforms post-John Magufuli’s death in 2021, this democratic re-opening been increasingly called into question. Freedom House downgraded Tanzania from “Partly Free” to “Not Free” in its 2025 report, citing manipulated voter registrations and broader erosion of electoral integrity. Similarly, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), says the ruling party’s approach has transformed what could have been a competitive democratic exercise into one of unchallenged CCM dominance.

UN human rights experts in June 2025 expressed concern over a “pattern of enforced disappearance and torture” against political opponents, urging the government to halt such practices. Amnesty International reports that four government critics have been forcibly disappeared and one killed in 2024-2025, attributing these to efforts to curb opposition ahead of the elections.

More recently, the Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority (TCRA) suspended the license of Jamii Forums, a major social media news platform on September 6, and has directed police to “patrol the internet” for election-related content since August. Human Rights Watch (HRW) reports broader clampdowns, including bans and/or measures to block access to online platforms like WhatsApp and Twitter / X.

In response to such criticisms, President Hassan on September 17, 2025, urged unity and highlighted the preparedness of security forces to maintain order during the elections: “Peace and stability in our country are more important than anything else. Elections are not a war but a democratic process. Our defence and security organs, both in Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar, are fully prepared to protect this peace. Citizens must remain calm and united.” Earlier, in March, she said that “we have sworn to protect the rights and dignity of every Tanzanian, and we will not hesitate to act against anyone who exploits these freedoms to incite discord.”

The Tanzania Police Force, in an official statement released on June 18, in response to reports of abductions and disappearances, denied state involvement and attributed many cases to unrelated factors: “In the cases reported at police stations and thoroughly investigated – where the missing individuals were later found either alive or deceased – evidence in some instances has revealed causes such as self-staged abductions, jealousy in romantic relationships, superstitious beliefs, property disputes, acts of revenge, travel to foreign countries to learn extremist ideologies, and fleeing from justice after committing crimes.”

The statement further defended the police’s role: “The government, through the Police Force, has the responsibility to protect people’s lives and property and not otherwise. Furthermore, all reported incidents involving the disappearance of various individuals are still under investigation until the truth is established about what happened to our fellow Tanzanians.”

Beyond Tanzania, the SADC Electoral Commissions Forum (ECF­SADC), which deployed a pre-election assessment mission to Tanzania from August 12-16, reported “no major issues flagged” in preparations for the elections. They recommended enhancements like increased voter education, framing the process as stable rather than flawed. The AU has offered similarly measured endorsement through a June 2025 pre­election assessment that “praised logistical preparations” while urging civic education and rights safeguards, avoiding outright criticism and focusing on constructive engagement.

Chadema’s ban and boycott stance
Chadema, Tanzania’s largest opposition party, will watch this year’s election from the sidelines, facing a controversial ban and/or their own boycott. In April 2025, the (so-named) Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) disqualified Chadema from presidential and parliamentary contests, after party officials refused to sign the 2025 Election Code of Ethics. Chadema had said it would not sign the code until the government undertook electoral reforms. This followed the arrest of Tundu Lissu, Chadema’s recently-returned leader, on charges that critics have described as politically motivated, and raids on party offices. Chadema, which polled strongly in 2020 in urban areas, also now faces exclusion from all by-elections until 2030.

Rather than a full boycott, Chadema has framed its response as a “No Reforms, No Election” campaign. They call for a truly independent electoral commission, revival of the stalled constitution writing process abandoned in 2013, and legal changes to allow independent presidential candidates and judicial review of presidential election results.

Party officials insist this is not disengagement but a fight for fairness. Nevertheless, the ban / boycott / protest effectively undermines the opposition challenge at the polls, handing CCM a much clearer path.

Zanzibar
Zanzibar’s elections are likely to be more competitive. As a semi-autonomous region, Zanzibar elects its own President, 85-member House of Representatives, and local councils under the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC), as well as casting votes for Tanzania’s president and MPs in Tanzania’s National Assembly. CCM’s Hussein Mwinyi seeks re-election as President of Zanzibar.

Debates over the relationship between Zanzibar and the Union simmer, with many islanders supporting calls for independence referendums, or at least for constitutional reforms to give Zanzibar increased autonomy.

The opposition landscape on the isles is also somewhat confused. The decline of CUF after 2015 paved the way for ACT Wazalendo as a rising force on the islands. This left-leaning party blends social justice with anti-corruption rhetoric. Nevertheless, lingering elements of CUF threaten to weaken ACT Wazalendo’s vote share and their potential post-election coalition role.

ACT on the national level
Nationwide, ACT Wazalendo faces some similar challenges to Chadema. Their presidential candidate for Tanzania, Luhaga Mpina, was initially banned by INEC from standing. The ban stems from an objection by Attorney General Hamza Said Johari, who argued that Mpina lacks the necessary qualifications based on a prior ruling by the Registrar of Political Parties, citing irregularities in ACT Wazalendo’s internal nomination processes.

Mpina was MP for Kisesa constituency, representing CCM, and served for three years as Minister of Livestock and Fisheries under President Magufuli. In August 2025 he left CCM and joined ACT Wazalendo.
The High Court overturned this decision on appeal, only for INEC to reinstate the ban. ACT Wazalendo immediately challenged the second ban through multiple legal avenues, culminating in a constitutional petition filed on September 19. At the time of writing, with less than one month remaining before the election, the court ruling is pending, thought to be imminent.

Election Monitoring Initiatives
The EU has deployed a 100-member Election Observation Mission (EOM), following Tanzania’s invitation. The African Union conducted a June pre-election assessment, praising logistics but urging civic education. SADC’s Electoral Commissions Forum visited in August.

Other Significant Developments
Beyond core issues, the 2025 elections spotlight women’s empowerment, with over 200 female parliamentary candidates – a 50% jump – driven in part by quotas as well as by Hassan’s trailblazing example.

by Ben Taylor

What do the Manifestos say?
As Tanzania gears up for the elections, the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and opposition Alliance for Change and Transparency (ACT Wazalendo) have unveiled their manifestos outlining their goals for 2025–2030. CCM’s document, launched on May 31, 2025, emphasises continuity and alignment with the ambitious Tanzania Development Vision 2050, targeting a $1 trillion economy. ACT Wazalendo’s manifesto, released August 11, 2025, adopts a bolder, reformist tone, critiquing “elite capture” and pledging radical shifts toward equity and resource nationalism. Both prioritise economic transformation, job creation, and social welfare but differ in scope and ideology: CCM’s business-friendly growth-focused approach versus ACT’s interventionist, people-centered reforms.

CCM Manifesto: Building on Stability for Inclusive Growth
CCM’s manifesto for 2025–2030 emphasizes continuation and acceleration of economic transformation, infrastructure development, social services, and stronger institutions. Some of the highlights include:
• Economic growth & industrial transformation: A target to modernize the economy by adding value to local resources rather than exporting raw materials. Industry sector growth target of 9% annually by 2030.
• Agriculture, livestock & irrigation: Aim to improve agricultural production significantly: subsidies on inputs, better seeds, more modern farming, increased irrigation, increase grazing lands (livestock) and fishing sector improvements.
• Employment & revenue: Target to generate 8.5 million jobs in both formal and informal sectors. Strengthening revenue collection, aiming revenue-to-GDP ratio of 15.6%.
• Infrastructure, trade & local industrial zones: Greater investment in roads, ports, railways (including a new/revamped line connecting Tanga, Arusha and Musoma on Lake Victoria), and logistics to boost trade and connectivity. Establishing district-level industrial zones to support localised industrialisation.
• Social sectors & human development: Free education from primary through secondary; more vocational training.
• Housing: formalising housing, surveying, granting ownership, improving access to decent housing.
• Constitutional reform & governance: CCM pledges to revive the constitution review process. Increased attention to inclusivity, participation of civil society, youth, community leaders in consultations.
• Debt, macroeconomic stability: Ensuring national debt remains sustainable and that external and domestic borrowing is used for productive projects.

ACT Wazalendo
ACT Wazalendo positions itself more strongly on redistribution, governance reforms, social justice, and asserting community rights over land and natural resources. Key features include:
• Land, natural resources & resource nationalism: The party describes land as “life” and calls for bold reforms in how land is managed, reversing “arbitrary privatisations,” returning lands improperly converted (ie. to protected areas), allocating idle land to youth/vulnerable groups. They also propose greater transparency in extractive industries; ensuring citizens benefit from mining, oil, gas, forests.
• Social services, equality, human development: Universal health insurance; free education up to university level; improved access to clean water and electricity; stronger social protection, especially for informal sector and rural communities.
• Infrastructure & connectivity: Major infrastructure plans include a Southern Standard Gauge Railway (linking Lindi, Mtwara, Songea/ Ruvuma and mining projects in Njombe), rehabilitation of regional rail lines, strategic roads, and improving ports (Mtwara, Tanga, Bagamoyo, Kigoma). Rural electrification and last-mile access to water, transport and communications networks.
• Governance, justice & constitution: Police and judicial reforms, repealing repressive laws, restarting constitutional review within six months for power limits and an independent electoral body, and a three-tier Union structure for Mainland-Zanzibar equity.
• Inclusive economy & empowerment of ordinary citizens: Reducing elite dominance in national resources; putting citizens at centre of economic planning; formalisation of informal businesses and support for small traders; fair markets and prices for farmers, herders, fishermen; removal of unfair levies etc.
• Environment, climate, tourism: Balancing development with environmental protection; more community-based conservation, protecting coastal areas, mangroves, reefs; implementing green growth; reform in tourism to ensure more of the value stays in Tanzania.

What about Chadema?
Given that Chadema is boycotting the election / has been deemed ineligible, they have not published a manifesto. However, for completeness, their stated priorities include:
• “No Reforms, No Election” is Chadema’s central campaign slogan, calling for “fundamental” reforms in the electoral system. This includes a new constitution or significant constitutional reforms; reforms of electoral bodies and processes, to ensure elections are free, fair, and credible; equal opportunity for all political parties in elections; and fairness in how the rules are applied.

In conclusion
Many of the promises (from both manifestos) are ambitious in scale. Implementation will depend heavily on financing, institutional capacity, corruption control, legal frameworks, and external economic factors (e.g. global markets, climate change). Both align with Vision 2050’s $1 trillion goal but diverge on means: CCM via private partnerships, ACT through state assertiveness.

ACT’s proposals around land restitution and resource sharing may face pushback from existing stakeholders (private investors, communities that benefited under the old allocations, foreign investors). For CCM, sustaining high budget commitments (on infrastructure, jobs, agriculture subsidies) without increasing unsustainable debt or wasting resources will be a challenge.