TANZANIA DEVELOPMENT TRUST

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by Sheila Farrell

Tanzania’s alternative education pathways: a second chance for teenage mothers
In spite of growing demand for skilled labour, almost two thirds of Tanzanian children do not complete their secondary school education up to Form IV level (equivalent to the UK’s GCSEs). The high drop­out rate is caused by many different things: poverty, sickness, long distances from home to school, and the multiple barriers that prevent girls from continuing their secondary education. One of these is teenage pregnancy.

Official figures for drop-outs due to pregnancy are around 8,000 girls per year, but the stigma attached to pregnancy means that estimates by NGOs working in this area are much higher, commonly reaching 15,000 girls, if pregnancies among primary school children are included. This is equivalent to around 1 in 200 girls at lower secondary schools.

Pregnancy is not the only, or even the largest, reason why young girls drop out of school, but behind the statistics are personal tragedies that undermine the lives of many young mothers and their babies, and perpetuate an on-going cycle of poverty.

Until November 2021 young girls who became pregnant were permanently excluded from the State education system. This has been changed by President Samia Suluhu Hassan through expansion of the Elimu Haina Mwisho (Education has no end) and Alternative Education Pathways (AEP) Programmes.

As well as adolescent mothers the AEP programme is intended to target students who drop out before completing secondary school, vulnerable and marginalized youth, and young people whose life circumstances make regular schooling difficult. As well as academic education, it provides:
• Flexible instruction that fits students’ family or work responsibilities;
• Life skills education (decision-making, communication, citizenship);
• Vocational and entrepreneurship training;
• Mentorship and counselling;
• Psychological support to help students re-engage with society.

AEPs have existed for many years outside of the formal education system in Tanzania, with the Institute of Adult Education (IAE) registering and overseeing Open Schools run by non-government bodies while offering secondary education at its own centres.

Unregistered tuition centres were also popular in the early 2000s, while some students have prepared themselves independently or used private teachers to sit for national examinations as private candidates. However, this is expensive – well beyond the means of most families in rural Tanzania.

During the 1990s and early 2000s, AEP evening classes were very common, including within state schools. After the government discontinued the use of state schools for evening classes, education opportunities for teenage mothers were expanded under two separate programmes.

The first was the Elimu Haina Mwisho Programme, a second-chance education initiative for young girls who have dropped out of school due to pregnancy, poverty, or other social challenges which began in 2018. It was funded by Mastercard, implemented by Karibu Tanzania Organisation, an NGO, and centred on 55 Folk Development Colleges, themselves derived from a Swedish model for adult education. In its first three years it educated 1,200 girls. Since then, it has become a permanent institution, with a hybrid financing model, recruiting hundreds of new students through regular local recruitment drives. The Tanzanian Government covers the standard monthly base salaries of the permanently-employed government teachers stationed at these colleges, with top-up funding for teacher training, specialist vocational instructors and various allowances paid for by grants from external donors.

In parallel with this has been the expansion of the AEP school network as part of the World Bank-sponsored Secondary Education Quality Improvement Project (SEQUIP), which is being implemented by the Institute of Adult Education. This started in 2022, with just over 3,300 students spread between 131 AEP learning centres, and now has over 12,000 students in 200+ learning centres. The majority of these centres are owned and operated by the State and teach mainly young mothers.

However, there is still a role for the non-profit sector in pioneering new education methods in this type of school, and Tanzania Development Trust has been playing its part through its partnership with Tumaini Open School in Tabora. This was started in 2020 by Ezekiel Kassanga, one of TDT’s local reps, using volunteer teachers to teach teenage mothers in the offices of another NGO. After a successful fund-raising operation by TDT, to which many BTS members contributed, the school opened at its present site in July 2023 with just 12 pupils. Within three years this has increased to 82 pupils, with its Phase 1 target of 100 pupils expected to be met later this year.

What has contributed to this success? First, it is a residential school with the teachers living on-site, which gives them time to get to know their pupils. At present there is not enough accommodation to allow the girls to bring their babies with them, but this is the ultimate aim. Once money becomes available, staff will be employed to look after the babies during classroom hours before returning them to their mums, avoiding the severance of mothers from children which unfortunately occurs now.

Grandparents are also important, and a social worker has been employed to liaise with the girl’s families, persuading them of the benefits of continued education and working hard to remove the stigma associated with extra-marital pregnancy in conservative rural societies.

One of the main selling points of the school has been the high quality of education it offers. So far, with six teachers, it has benefitted from small class sizes and a willingness to let the girls learn at their own pace. It makes extensive use of computers and distance learning materials, providing girls with the skills they need to secure well-paid jobs after leaving school. And it encourages them to think as widely as possible, aiming to produce independent, self-confident young women of whom their families can be proud.


Tumaini is a girls-only school. Almost all of its teenage mothers come from poor families and are educated free of charge. But its reputation is beginning to spread, and it is now taking in fee-paying girl students who do not have babies of their own. In its business model, the aim is to grow the school to around 300 pupils of whom roughly one-third will be fee-paying. This is still some way off, but the school is moving in the right direction.

In spite of low income levels, education is highly prized in Tanzania and some poor families take on additional work in order to pay private school fees. Tumaini is trying to avoid high fee levels in order to become the local community’s private school of choice, but still needs to find ways of funding its £45,000 p.a. operating budget.

Like any organisation operating on a shoe-string budget, Tumaini is constantly innovating and trying to find better ways of doing things. The school’s director Ezekiel Kassanga is being helped in this by two TDT’s volunteers with extensive teaching experience in Tanzania: Nanette Archer and Steve Scorer. If you think you could help Tumaini in any way, even if you are not a teacher yourself, please get in touch with them at nanettearcher@tanzdevtrust.org or stevescorertanzdevtrustorg.
Alternatively you can find out more about the school and follow its progress on tumainiopenschool.org.

Tanzania Development Trust faces threats and opportunities
In its annual report on the state of the charity sector in the UK, published in March 2026, the Charity Commission pointed out that while the total income of registered charities was increasing faster than inflation, reaching over £100bn in 2024-25, the vast majority of the funding (90%) went to charities benefitting communities in the UK.

This is because many UK-oriented charities receive payments for their charitable activities or run trading activities such as charity shops. Only one third of the UK charity sector’s income comes from donations and legacies, with small charities like TDT being the most dependent on these more discretionary sources of income.

TDT is also heavily dependent on funding from grant-making charities – those that spend their income from investments or endowments supporting other charities working in the field. They awarded a total of £12bn to other charities in 2024-25 and accounted for just over one third of TDT’s income in 2024-25 compared with around 10% of income for all charities eligible to apply for this type of funding.

This is an area in which there has been a marked increase in competition for funds during the last 12 months, following the ending of most USAID and the cut-back in UK overseas aid from 0.5% of Gross National Income in 2025 to 0.3% by 2027 to help fund defence spending.

Within UK overseas aid there has also been a significant shift away from poverty relief, health and education towards expenditures aimed at fostering trade and investment. Now the UK charity sector, which spent £11bn overseas in 2024-25, is almost as large as the UK Government’s overseas aid programme whose target for 2024-25 was £13.3bn.

Whilst TDT will continue to apply to other organisations for grants in future, the external chances of success are likely to decline, so it will have to be continuously on the lookout for new opportunities and make full use of new technology to strengthen the way it presents the projects it wishes to support. It has already made substantial improvements to its website (https://tanzdevtrust.org) and its social media posts are now reaching a far larger number of people than 12 months ago.

But there is still a lot more to do to keep the money rolling in. We realise that people read Tanzanian Affairs for many different reasons, and may not wish to donate to TDT, so we will try not to annoy you with too many pleas for help. However, conversations with BTS members during its 50th Anniversary year highlighted a strong desire to continue to expand TDT’s work in Tanzania, even though the external financial environment is becoming more challenging.

So, if you have any suggestions about how TDT could increase its income, or would like to help in any other way, please contact sheilafarrelltanzdevtrustorg, the TDT Trustee responsible for fund-raising.

SWAHILI MATTERS

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by Donovan Lee McGrath

Espen Sørensen aka Mzungu Kichaa


“Mzungu Kichaa” ni nani?
Espen Sørensen, anayejulikana zaidi kwa jina la kisanii Mzungu Kichaa, ni mwanamuziki wa Denmark aliyekulia Tanzania baada ya kuhamia huko na familia yake akiwa na umri wa miaka sita. Akiwa na uwezo wa kuongea Kiswahili kwa wepesi, alijihusisha na muziki wa Bongo Flava na kufanya kazi na studio maarufu ya Bongo Records. Uhusiano wake wa karibu na muziki wa Afrika Mashariki uliwezesha utoaji wa albamu yake ya kwanza, Tuko Pamoja.

Mzungu Kichaa alikuwa miongoni mwa wasanii wa kwanza kurekodi kwenye Bongo Records mwishoni mwa miaka ya elfu moja mia tisa na tisini pamoja na wanamuziki mashuhuri wa Tanzania kama Juma Nature, Professor Jay na wengine. Katika kipindi hicho alipata jina la utani “Mzungu Kichaa.” Ingawa mwanzoni yeye hakuwa msanii mashuhuri sana, alishiriki kuimba sehemu za kibwagizo katika nyimbo mbalimbali mnamo mwaka elfu mbili na moja.

Baada ya kusoma Muziki na Anthropolojia ya Utamaduni nchini Uingereza na kukamilisha shahada ya uzamili katika masomo ya Afrika, alirejea kwenye shughuli za muziki. Mwaka elfu mbili na sita alianzisha kundi la Effigong, na mwaka elfu mbili na nane akaanza rasmi kazi yake kama msanii pekee. Albamu yake ya kwanza ilitolewa Afrika Mashariki mwaka elfu mbili na tisa, na baadaye ikatolewa Ulaya baada ya kupata nafasi ya kuchezwa kwenye vituo kadhaa vya redio.

Nyimbo za albamu hiyo, zikiwemo “Jitolee” (akimshirikisha Professor Jay) na “Wajanja,” zimeimbwa kwa Kiswahili na zinazungumzia masuala ya kijamii kama vile umaskini nchini Tanzania. Ili aitangaze albamu hiyo, Mzungu Kichaa alifanya ziara ya muziki nchini Tanzania, Kenya na Denmark
mwaka elfu mbili na tisa. Wimbo wake wa “Jitolee” ulipata mafanikio makubwa na ukawa maarufu nchini Tanzania na Kenya.

Who is “Mzungu Kichaa”?
Espen Sørensen, better known as Mzungu Kichaa, is a Danish musician who grew up in Tanzania after moving there with his family at age six. Fluent in Swahili, he became involved in Tanzania’s Bongo Flava music scene and worked with the influential studio Bongo Records. His deep connection to East African music led to the release of his first solo album, Tuko Pamoja.

Mzungu Kichaa was among the early artists recording at Bongo Records in the late 1990s alongside notable Tanzanian musicians such as Juma Nature, Professor Jay, and others. During this period, he earned the nickname “Mzungu Kichaa,” meaning “Crazy White Man.” Although he was not initially a prominent performer, he contributed vocals to several tracks around 2001.

After studying Music and Cultural Anthropology in the UK and completing a master’s degree in African Studies, he returned to music. He formed the group Effigong in 2006 before launching a solo career in 2008. His debut solo album was released in East Africa in 2009 and later in Europe after receiving radio airplay.

The album’s songs, including “Jitolee” (featuring Professor Jay) and “Wajanja,” are performed entirely in Swahili and address social issues such as poverty in Tanzania. To promote the album, Mzungu Kichaa toured Tanzania, Kenya, and Denmark in 2009. His single “Jitolee” became a hit in both Tanzania and Kenya.

REVIEWS

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by Martin Walsh

A ZANZIBAR ARCHITECT’S UNSUNG LEGACY: THE STORY OF AJIT SINGH HOOGAN. ARCHITECT, ARTIST, PHILANTHROPIST. Issak Esmail Issak. DL2A – Buluu Publishing, Paris, 2023. 66 pp. (paperback). ISBN: 978144750255. £8.51 (from https:// www.lulu.com/)

This thin book is actually two books: the first 37 pages on Ajit Singh Hoogan are followed by “Part Two: Sportsman and MP: The Story of Parmukh Singh Hoogan”, the “unsung” architect’s only living grandson. Despite their brevity, both segments pack a punch. In fact, both are in essence recordings for posterity of unsung legacies – that of the architect, and that of his politician-grandson. The book is richly illustrated with more than 40 photographs – most from the family archives.

The named author, Issak Esmail Issak, is a Zanzibari who holds Norwegian citizenship. As a fiction writer, dramatist and filmmaker, Issak came to this project with creative storytelling skills. He built the book from two interviews with Parmukh Singh Hoogan, the first focused on his grandfather’s life and works, and the second on his own life and career. While Issak edited the first interview a fair amount, he left the second one more or less as is. While confusing at first, Issak’s decision to write up the interviews and present them in the first-person ultimately makes sense: Parmukh Singh is the actual author of both, and Issak the interviewer and editor.

Ajit Singh Hoogan has arguably the most significant legacy of any architect in Zanzibar, at least in terms of government buildings, as the first trained local architect and the government’s de facto architect from 1941-65 during major bursts of construction. The city’s first airport, its largest hospital, largest high school, national archives, and many smaller colonial-era buildings were built following his designs. Although he stayed on in Zanzibar for two years after the January 1964 revolution, only a few revolutionary-era projects bear his design signature.

What makes Part One especially interesting is Parmukh Singh’s story of his grandfather’s migration to Zanzibar and the almost-coincidental path that brought him to architecture. Parmukh clearly came to this first interview having researched the scholarly work on his grandfather, particularly from Sarah Longair and myself. However, he not only adds his own personal perspective; he deepens the analysis by adding other aspects of Ajit’s importance for Zanzibar and for Malawi (where he served as Senior Architect from 1966 to 1978), including his role as an artist and curator of art. The account attends to what is arguably his most significant achievement as an architect, design-wise: Pritam Nivas, the family home.

While there are criticisms one might level at Ajit Singh – for having loyally served the colonial regime and then the arch-conservative nationalist regime of Hastings Kamuzu Banda in Malawi – Part One closes with two thoughtful insights that provide a measured sort of reply. The first comes as Parmukh/Issak sums up the context for Ajit Singh’s career (p. 29): “Ajit Singh had seemed to belong everywhere…. Accepting of all, and easily carving out a non-partisan space between parties, factions and identities, he was admired by many. But few of those in positions of power and maneuvering capacity were forthcoming to facilitate an alternative when those prudent spaces of balancing acts were threatened.” The second (p. 31) illustrates how the living room of Pritam Nivas “sums up the man and his world… perhaps a simpler and more elegant and humane world than we inhabit today.” Ajit Singh was a complicated man and he left a complicated legacy; hopefully, after this book and Parmukh’s tireless work to bring attention to it, that legacy will no longer be unsung.

Part Two continues the story of this legacy in a quite different way, by telling the life story of his last surviving grandchild. Parmukh Singh’s autobiography is, like the man, humble and yet sharply direct. It begins when his otherwise “happy childhood” (p. 42) was interrupted by the Revolution. Parmukh has one of the most balanced and reflective perspectives that I have yet come across on the Revolution and its legacies. While not shying away from the brutality and violence of the early revolutionary era or the problematic policies of the revolutionary government in more recent times, Parmukh Singh was, after all, also a Member of Parliament from 2000-2010 within the ruling party, Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM), literally the Party of the Revolution. He tells the story of his growth into a CCM political career after his 1982 return to Zanzibar subtly, and through sports, especially through his leadership in Kikwajuni Sports Club (KSC). Although Parmukh Singh was more of a classic “backbencher” in Parliament, his insights on his experiences in Dodoma and elsewhere (such as while part of Tanzania’s delegation to the 2001 UN Conference Against Racism in Durban/eThekwini) provide for lively reading. One feels like one has been allowed in to the everyday world of MPs in Part Two.

While the whole book is a quick read, both parts linger with the reader. Issak has facilitated the emergence in print of an important voice and noted raconteur of Zanzibar, Parmukh Singh Hoogan, while also bringing to light the important legacies of his grandfather, Ajit Singh Hoogan.
Garth Myers

Garth Myers is the P.E. Raether Distinguished Professor of Urban International Studies at Trinity College, Hartford, CT USA, where he also directs the Center for Urban and Global Studies. He is the author of six books and over 80 book chapters and articles, as well as co-editor of two volumes of scholarship, the vast majority of which concerns African urban development, with a special emphasis on Tanzania.

FASHIONING INLAND COMMUNITIES: TRADE AND POPULAR CULTURE IN CENTRAL EAST AFRICA. Yaari Felber-Seligman. The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, WI, 2025. xxii + 308 pp. ISBN 9780299350406 (hardback) US$89.95. ISBN 9780299350437 (eBook/pdf) US$109.95. ISBN 9780299350482 (eBook/ epub) US$109.95.

This book is a welcome addition to the literature on the history of the region that it quixotically designates as “Central East Africa”: principally southern Tanzania and nearby parts of northern Mozambique and eastern Malawi, where Makonde, Yao, and other Ruvuma languages are spoken. It builds on field research undertaken in 2010–11, the resulting doctoral dissertation (Encircling Value: Inland Trade in the Precolonial East African-Indian Ocean World, ca. 1st-17th Centuries, Northwestern University, 2014), and subsequent papers, some of which appeared under the author’s former name, Andrea Felber Seligman.

The central thesis of Fashioning Inland Communities is that fashion, in the broadest sense, has played an important role in the evolution of communities and patterns of local and regional trade since the emergence of the ancestral Ruvuma speech community in the first half of the first millennium CE. Following an introduction that sets the historical and linguistic scene, Felber-Seligman develops this argument through four substantive chapters linked by three chronological interludes — “Foundation”, “Expansion”, and “Turbulence”. The long titles of the chapters will give readers a flavour of their contents: “Popular Aesthetics: Early Fashioning of Trade and Community ca. Sixth–Fourteenth Centuries”, “As Good as Copper: New Trade, Popular Fashion, and Regional Culture, Fourteenth–Seventeenth Centuries”, “Resource Entrepreneurs: Everyday Trading and Engaging New Networks, Fourteenth– Seventeenth Centuries”, and “Refashioning Affinities: Negotiating Materiality, Hierarchy, and Transregional Style, Mid–Nineteenth to Mid–Twentieth Centuries”. It’s not entirely clear, to me at least, why the 18th century and the first half of the 19th century are missing from this scheme.

Felber-Seligman’s sources are wonderfully varied, but at the core of the author’s method is an approach to historical reconstruction that draws on the linguistics-light and inference-heavy version of “Words and Things” (Wörter und Sachen) that was popularised by the late Christopher Ehret and continues to be propagated by his students. A lexical appendix lists the 32 reconstructed word roots around which the author’s speculative history has been woven. It’s an eclectic list of terms, drawn from a wide variety of semantic domains, including agriculture and other economic activities. Only some of the evidence that might justify Felber-Seligman’s lexical reconstructions and allow others to assess them is presented. It’s particularly regrettable that the table of Rufiji-Ruvuma phonological correspondences that appeared in Felber-Seligman’s PhD did not make it into this volume, all the more so because the 2014 dissertation is behind a paywall. I can imagine why an uncomprehending book editor might want to omit this kind of thing, but it’s essential for proper analysis and evaluation.

Even so, it’s immediately apparent that some of the author’s reconstructions and inferences are questionable. Take, for example, the reconstructed Ruvuma root *-kólò, which is glossed as “matriclan (also female domestic animal)”. The Bantu etymology of this as a term for kin and groups of kin is well established, though as an anthropologist I would like to see a lot more evidence for its historical identification with particular kinds of corporate grouping, matriclans included. Contemporary cognates in the wider region refer to a variety of kin-group structures, and these can morph over time much more easily than many non-anthropologists realise. Moreover, Felber-Seligman is mistaken in claiming that Proto-Ruvuma speakers extended its meaning to include “small female livestock”. As Ehret himself recognised, the livestock term has a very different source from the inherited Bantu word for a group of kin: the roots may look the same, but they’re actually non-cognates. The historical scenario imagined by Felber-Seligman to explain this supposed semantic development has no basis in fact (“By renaming female livestock as *-kólò, the same term that described a matrilineal clan, female elders affirmed their control over domestic livestock”, p. 31). The history of gender relations deserves serious attention, but speculative historical narratives of this kind are not uncommon in parts of the Ehretian tradition.

Another zoonym that has led Felber-Seligman astray is the generic term for honeyguides, Indicator spp. The root of this is reconstructed as *-ségú, and, recognising that there are many cognates of this in Southern Bantu, the author assumes that it has been borrowed from that direction:

“When early speakers of Yao and Makonde adopted the word *-ségú, probably by the mid-second millennium, they indicated that they appreciated the advantages of these useful birds. This term appeared to be a loan assimilation by Makonde and Yao from Chewa and Nyanja. It probably reached Ruvuma communities through their trade networks with early Nyanja speakers who described these birds as nsadzu. Their knowledge of honeyguides circulated among networks they, in turn, had with communities located farther south, including speakers of Shona, Sotho, and Ndebele, whose terms they adapted. Along interior networks that brought copper wire and other goods to the Lake Nyasa region also came exchanges of resource technology, including how to partner with honeyguide birds. Over time, certain Ruvuma adapted this loan word to their own pronunciation patterns. They likewise innovated wax and honey prospects to link this resource to coastal trade centers.” (p. 110)

This is an attractive hypothesis, which Felber-Seligman combines with reference to the always-fascinating science of honeyguide-human mutualism, before going on to discuss the regional and international beeswax trade.

Unfortunately, this scenario is equally implausible, and there’s no evidence at all that honeyguides “were unknown to ancestral communities” of Ruvuma speakers before they migrated into the lowlands of (what is now) southern Tanzania as Felber-Seligman asserts. Quite the contrary: cognate terms have been recorded across a wide swathe of East Africa between the northern end of Lake Nyasa and the Tana River in the northeast. Perhaps originally borrowed from a non-Bantu language, Felber-Seligman’s *-ségú was clearly an inherited term in Ruvuma, and in all likelihood speakers knew about the guiding behaviour of honeyguides all along. All of the East African cognates have the same inherited shape, with /g/ or demonstrable /g/-loss. The geographical distribution of the cognates makes a southern origin improbable, since closely related forms occur across Tanzania. It’s difficult to derive any of them from “Nyanja” (= Chewa) nsadzu and other /g/-less forms to the south, and the author should have taken this into account.

It’s a shame that lexical reconstruction should be the weakest part of Fashioning Inland Communities. Again and again, Felber-Seligman fails to spot evidence from Eastern Bantu languages to the north of the Ruvuma group — in the case of the honeyguide name, he even misses cognate terms from neighbouring Rufiji and nearby Kilombero languages. It’s easy, of course, to miss data in languages that you’re not familiar with, especially if you don’t trawl the dictionaries and other sources, but rely on better-known compilations, as the author seems to have done. Ironically, in this instance, Nurse and Hinnebusch also got their “doubtful” reconstruction of the honeyguide’s name wrong in their classic study of Swahili and Sabaki (1993), one of the Eastern Bantu sources that Felber-Seligman does consult.

Making mistakes is, of course, part and parcel of any etymological endeavour, and Fashioning Inland Communities shouldn’t be judged solely on these grounds. Yaari Felber-Seligman has done important research with Ruvuma language speakers, and drawn together an impressive amount of evidence from different disciplines and sources, including archaeology, history, and comparative ethnography. They have skilfully woven all this material together into a series of compelling narratives in support of their main thesis. I look forward to revisiting these narratives, and will surely return to them many times, and not just to pick them apart or merely raid them for information. I agree wholeheartedly with the author’s observation that “Over the centuries of Ruvuma history, popular fashion provides a rich window into historic Ruvuma engagement with trade, community, and aesthetics” (p. 165). And, as Felber-Seligman aptly concludes, “More collaborative research is surely needed before we can gain a comprehensive picture of historic Ruvuma and many other Africans’ popular cultures” (p. 170).

Martin Walsh
Martin Walsh is the Book Reviews Editor of Tanzanian Affairs.

OBITUARIES

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by Ben Taylor

His Eminence Polycarp Cardinal Pengo, the Roman Catholic Archbishop Emeritus of Dar es Salaam passed away on February 15, 2026, in Dar es Salaam. Widely seen as one of Africa’s leading prelates during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, he was laid to rest on February 28 at the Pugu Pilgrimage Centre. The funeral drew thousands of religious leaders, faithful, diplomats and government officials.

Cardinal Pengo served the Church for more than 55 years as a priest and over 40 years as a bishop. He was widely respected for his firm moral convictions, defence of human dignity, and commitment to national unity.

Born in 1944 and ordained to the priesthood in 1973, Father Pengo studied moral theology, became a seminary rector, and was appointed a bishop in 1983. Pope St. John Paul II ordained him a bishop in St. Peter’s Basilica in 1984. He led the Dioceses of Nachingwea (1984-86) and Tunduru-Masasi (1987-90) until his 1990 appointment as coadjutor archbishop of Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania’s leading see. He acceded to the see in 1992 and governed it until his resignation, for reasons of age, in 2019.

St. John Paul created him a cardinal in 1998, making him the second Tanzanian to be elevated to the College of Cardinals. His fellow African bishops elected him president of the Symposium of the Episcopal Conferences of Africa and Madagascar (SECAM) from 2007 to 2009.

Speaking at the funeral service, the current SECAM President, Cardinal Fridolin Ambongo Besungu, described Cardinal Pengo as “a prophet of human dignity and peace in Africa,” praising his moral clarity on issues of justice, reconciliation, and respect for life.

In a telegram released on Saturday, February 21, Pope Leo XIV expressed his “heartfelt condolences” to the clergy, religious and lay faithful of the Archdiocese of Dar es Salaam. He remembered the late Cardinal Polycarp Pengo as a “wise and gentle pastor.”

Dr John Battersby Wood OBE, MA, B.Ch, FRCP, Consultant Chest Physician at Hereford County Hospital, founder of The Hereford-Muheza Hospital Link Society and former UK Governor of the Commonwealth Foundation (1994–2001), passed away in January at the age of 89.

John Wood was born on 13 July 1936 in Surrey, but the family moved to Manchester shortly afterwards, where John attended the local primary school in Bramhall and won a scholarship to Manchester Grammar School. He made a habit of winning scholarships, with one to Brasenose College, Oxford (1956) and later to St Mary’s Hospital Paddington, before qualifying in medicine in 1960.

In 1959 he met the love of his life, Bridget, also a medical student. They married a year later and remained happily married for the next 66 years. In 1967 John accepted a Senior Registrar post in Kampala, Uganda; he and Bridget moved their family, by then four children under six years old, to Africa. John worked at the newly built Mulago teaching hospital in Kampala, where, amongst other duties, he was surprised to take on the role of the country’s specialist in leprosy. It was here that his love of Africa began, along with his unstinting work in helping less favoured people in other parts of the world.

Returning to the UK in 1969, shortly before Idi Amin came to power, John settled in Hereford, where he remained employed in Hereford hospitals until his retirement in 1996.

John founded the Hereford-Muheza Link Society in 1985, linking Hereford hospitals with a hospital in Muheza, Tanzania. It continues to organise a regular interchange of staff between Muheza’s Teuli Hospital and the Hereford hospitals, so that hospital and health workers from both sides benefit from first-hand experience of healthcare in the other country. As well as nurturing the relationships between the two hospitals, it has also managed to send out regular containers of donated equipment to Tanzania.

This link is believed to be one of the longest and most successful in the UK, and recently celebrated its fortieth anniversary. Following his retirement from the NHS, John maintained an active interest in the charity and watched as it continued to carry out his vision of friendship, education, healthcare and co-operation across borders, as well as valuable research into malaria prevention.

John was appointed by Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd to the post of UK Governor of the Commonwealth Foundation. He served two stints as UK Governor from 1994 to 2001, helping to address the civic and cultural affairs of Commonwealth countries. He was extremely proud to carry out this role, and in 2004 was awarded an OBE in the Queen’s Birthday Honours list for services to the Commonwealth.

Throughout his life, John was a keen sportsman and musician. Village cricket was his joy, which he played while at Oxford, in London and in Hereford, though he also enjoyed golf, table-tennis and, together with Bridget, sailing. He loved playing the piano and was the village organist for over 50 years. He was also an enthusiastic member of the Hereford Writers Group and published several books of his poems and short stories.

Tanzanian Minister William Vangimembe Lukuvi died in Dodoma on March 25, after a heart attack.
At the time of his death, Lukuvi was serving as a Senior Adviser to the President for Political and Social Relations, a position he had held since June 13, 2023. He was also the incumbent Member of Parliament for Ismani, a seat he had held continuously since November 1995.

Mr Lukuvi had held various senior government positions over the years, earning a reputation as one of the country’s most experienced political figures. He started as Deputy Minister of Labour and Youth Development, before being promoted to Minister of State in the Prime Minister’s Office for Policy, Co-ordination and Parliamentary Affairs between 2000 and 2005, and again from November 2010 to January 2015. Finally, he served as Minister for Lands, Housing and Human Settlement Development from January 2015 until January 2022.

President Samia Suluhu Hassan’s office issued a statement, “The President extends her heartfelt sympathies to the Speaker of Parliament, the bereaved family, the people of Ismani and the nation at large during this difficult time,” the statement read.

FROM THE EDITOR

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by Ben Taylor

Dear reader,

Welcome to the latest issue of Tanzanian Affairs. Events of the past few months in Tanzania mean that this is a somewhat mournful edition. The October 2025 election and its aftermath have deeply affected all of us who love Tanzania. The shadow it casts will remain heavy for some time.

Nevertheless, I believe that what we do in TA is even more important than ever at such a time. Prosperity thrives on peace and stability; peace and stability on justice and truth. Our contribution may be small, but by continuing in our commitment to honest reporting of the facts, we are doing our bit to help Tanzania find the right path.

I hope the next issue will have more positive news. And if you have any ideas, stories, or resources you’d like to see featured in future issues, please don’t hesitate to reach out.
Warm regards, Ben Taylor (Editor)

ELECTIONS & AFTERMATH

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by Ben Taylor

Standard newspaper cover – October 29th (election day)


Standard cover – October 30th


Standard cover October 31st


Standard cover 3rd November

Tumultuous 2025 “elections” and their aftermath
It was already clear well before election day that Tanzania’s general “election” of October 29, 2025, would be far from a perfect exercise of democracy. But few predicted the horror that befell the country on polling day and its aftermath.

The country’s first mass protests in decades rose up soon after polls opened, targeting a combination of election infrastructure and the property of prominent ruling party figures and supporters. This was met with a swift and uncompromising response by security forces – one that has reportedly cost the lives of hundreds, or very possibly thousands of citizens.

The “election” itself
President Samia Suluhu Hassan of CCM was contesting re-election as President essentially unopposed after her two meaningful opponents, Tundu Lissu of Chadema and Luhaga Mpina of ACT Wazalendo, were both blocked from standing. Lissu languished in a prison cell awaiting trial on charges of treason – charges that independent observers have described as baseless and politically motivated. Mpina was barred from standing by the “Independent” National Electoral Commission on the grounds on a supposed irregularity in his party’s nomination process.

There were wider signs of democracy in trouble as well, with new restrictions on the media and opposition political parties. UN human rights experts had earlier in 2025 expressed concern over a “pattern of enforced disappearance and torture” against political opponents, with over 200 cases documented.

Citing these and other concerns, Chadema declined to participate in the election at all. As a result, most CCM candidates for parliamentary seats were effectively unopposed as well.

Nevertheless, despite the lack of meaningful opposition, the “election” went ahead on October 29. Officially, President Samia was re-elected with 98% of the vote on an unprecedently high 87% turnout, figures that The Economist described as “ridiculous”. CCM candidates also “won” 270 out of 272 directly elected seats in parliament (ACT won the other two). A discreet, swearing-in ceremony for the President took place on military grounds on November 3, 2025.

The protests
In the lead up to polling day, various social media activists, including Mange Kimambi and Maria Sarungi, had been calling for citizens to take to the streets on election day to make their opposition to the “sham” elections clear. The widespread anger among citizens – particularly among young (so-called “Gen Z”) urban residents – appeared to stem from a combination of political and economic factors. Supporters of Chadema and Tundu Lissu were upset with the country’s political direction and increasing repression, with abductions featuring heavy on complaints on social media, while others focussed more on the lack of economic opportunities, especially for young people.

Nevertheless, previous attempts to mobilise similar protest movements in Tanzania (such as around constitutional and electoral reform in 2018) had largely fallen flat. There was therefore scepticism among observers that calls to protest on election day would deliver anything much.

In fact, the election day protests proved to be substantial. Thousands of protesters took to the streets of Dar es Salaam, Mwanza, Arusha and other urban centres across the country, marching and chanting and occasionally attacking polling stations and other election infrastructure or the property of prominent CCM leaders and supporters. Images on social media showed buses and petrol stations on fire, makeshift barricades with burning tyres erected, police stations and government offices torched or damaged, campaign billboards set on fire and ballot boxes and papers strewn across streets.

Protesters made concerted efforts to persuade security forces (particularly the army) to join them and/or to claim on social media that the army were on their side.

The reaction
On election day itself, the security forces had a highly visible presence on the streets of cities and towns nationwide. In some cases, this led to clashes with protestors, with stones and bullets flying in opposite directions.

Around the same time, as soon as substantial protests became apparent, the internet was taken offline across Tanzania, followed soon after by a nighttime curfew. The internet blackout made it harder for protesters to organise their efforts and to share what was happening with the wider world. It also made it harder for international observers and media organisations to understand what was taking place. For the next few days, only small amounts of information leaked out of the country. There was much misinformation too, on both sides.

And yet, the information blackout was not complete. Especially after the internet shutdown ended (five days later), thousands of stories and images and videos were shared with the wider world. Some of these have been scrutinised closely by the international media or human rights organisations, and found to be genuine. It is not possible to verify every image and every video, but nor is it credible that they were nothing more than a misinformation campaign by protesters and their supporters aiming to discredit the government.

The story told by these images and videos, as well as the testimony of participants and witnesses is horrific. Two days after polling day, a spokesperson from Chadema told the AFP news agency that “around 700” people had been killed in clashes with security forces, and a diplomatic source in Tanzania told the BBC there was credible evidence that at least 500 people had died. The violence did not stop there.

CNN, the BBC, Amnesty and the Centre for Information Resilience (among others) each separately reviewed a wide range of images and videos from social media and other sources and found them to be credible. What they show include uniformed officers appearing to fire at crowds and at people fleeing for their lives, and hundreds of images of bodies lying on the streets or piled up outside hospitals. There have been reports of mass graves on the outskirts of cities including Dar es Salaam and Arusha.
Stories have circulated widely of security forces picking up suspected protestors and supporters from their homes, many of whom have not been heard from since, and eyewitness accounts describe how live ammunition, tear gas, and brutal beatings became disturbingly common.

Amnesty’s Evidence Lab verified one video showing at least 70 bodies piled up on the floors and on stretchers in the morgue at Mwananyamala Hospital in Dar es Salaam. “I had never seen so many people shot like this, and so many dead bodies piled up and crows eating their flesh,” said one Dar es Salaam-based healthcare professional.

Other health workers spoke of how they told those with injuries that they were better off away from the hospital, as armed officers were visiting health facilities to “finish the job”.

The Centre for Information Resilience conducted a detailed data collection and verification exercise, finding “a clear, repeated pattern of security forces using live ammunition against protesters,” and “multiple instances where uniformed police and plain-clothed armed individuals were seen shooting.”

The overall death toll from the violence will likely never be known, but UN experts in December estimated at least 700 extrajudicial killings (while noting that other estimates point to thousands.) Chadema leaders have suggested various much higher figures. Online compilations of those whose were killed or whereabouts are unknown have several hundred names and videos or images.

Amnesty concluded that Tanzanian security forces “used unnecessary or disproportionate force, including lethal force, to suppress election protests, … showing a shocking disregard for the right to life and for freedom of peaceful assembly as hundreds of people were reported killed or injured across the country.” They found that security forces fired live ammunition and teargas directly at protesters and other individuals who posed no imminent threat of death or serious injury, and that security forces used firearms recklessly, injuring and killing bystanders, and abusively deployed tear gas in residential areas and into people’s homes.

A text message was reported as being sent to all mobile phone users nationwide around the time of internet restoration (around November 3–4, 2025), when people began sharing unverified images of bodies and violence. The message read: “Avoid sharing pictures or videos that cause panic or degrade a person’s dignity. Doing so is a criminal offense, and if identified, strict legal action will be taken.”

In the immediate aftermath of the election, a senior minister described the violence as limited to “very few small pockets of incidents” caused by “criminal elements”. He denied excessive force and called opposition death toll claims “hugely exaggerated.”

Later, officials labelled critical media reports (e.g., CNN’s investigation on shootings and mass graves) as “biased” or “information warfare” intended to “mislead and incite.” The President herself in December said that “these were not protests, it was violence with malicious intentions. … What happened was a manufactured event and those who planned it intended to bring down our government. In that situation, the government has a responsibility, and we swear to defend this country and its borders, to protect the safety of citizens and their property. And in that case, the force used is proportional to the event.”

Commission of Inquiry
President Samia Suluhu Hassan has established a Commission of Inquiry into incidents of unrest during and after the October 2025 General Election, which she announced on November 14, 2025 at the opening of Tanzania’s 13th Parliament in Dodoma. She also offered condolences for the loss of life.

She formally launched and inaugurated the commission on November 20, at State House Chamwino in Dodoma. In her launch speech, she emphasised its role under the Commissions of Inquiry Act of 2023 and directed it to examine claims that some protesters (particularly youth) were “paid” to participate and to investigate the role of local and international NGOs in the events.

The commission is an eight-member panel (described as “independent” by the government but criticised by others as lacking true independence), chaired by retired Chief Justice Mohamed Chande Othman. Other members include former state officials and retired civil servants, such as a former Inspector General of Police and the immediate former Minister of Defence (who held office during the period of violence).

The commission was initially asked to report within 90 days. Around the 90-day mark, it was reported that the commission had been granted an additional 42 days, effective from February 20. With the extension, the commission is now required to finalise its work and submit its report on or before April 3, 2026. The commission cited several reasons for the extension, stating that “the additional time will provide an opportunity for any individual, whether inside or outside the country, who has information, evidence or views to present, to come forward.”

Youth ministry
In the same speech to Parliament, the President also established the Ministry for Youth Affairs, which she said was specifically designed to address the socio-economic frustrations that fuelled much of the 2025 post-election unrest. It is also a strategic response to the demographic reality that youth (under age 35) make up more than 60% of Tanzania’s population.

The ministry is led by Dr Joel Arthur Nanauka, a well-known youth activist and author who previously focused on leadership and economic empowerment.

The ministry has already launched several high-profile initiatives. This includes a “Vijana App” national digital platform designed to coordinate youth issues and provide a feedback loop between the government and young people; a Youth Investment Fund aiming to establish over 100,000 youth-led companies by 2030; and a “Vijana Tuyajenge” campaign to shift the narrative from youth as “political protesters” to “nation builders” through entrepreneurship and civic participation.

The ministry is widely viewed as a “de-escalation tool.” By providing a dedicated seat at the cabinet table for youth issues, the government is attempting to address the high unemployment and lack of political inclusion that became flashpoints during the October 2025 protests.

Arrests, and forgiveness?
Large numbers of Tanzanians, mainly young people, have been arrested in connection with the protests. Precise numbers are not available, but it has been reported that over 2,000 were arrested, with as many as 250 charged with treason.

Many of those charged were released starting in late November 2025, following a presidential directive from President Hassan urging leniency. In her address to Parliament, she acknowledged arrests of many young people, stated they “did not fully understand what they were getting involved in,” and asked prosecutors to “show leniency” toward those arrested in connection with the violence. Again, precise numbers are not available, but some reports have claimed that as many as 1,700 have been released.

Diplomatic reactions
The African Union (AU) election observation mission declared that the elections “did not comply with AU principles, normative frameworks, and other international obligations and standards for democratic elections,” citing issues like ballot stuffing, internet blackouts, and excessive force, while urging restraint and thorough investigations into violence against protesters.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) issued a rare sharp rebuke in its preliminary statement, describing the electoral commission as “compromised from inception” and concluding that “in most areas, voters could not express their democratic will.”

The European Union (EU) expressed deep concern over credible reports of killings, serious injuries, violence, and irregularities, including internet shutdowns, with the High Representative urging maximum restraint to preserve human lives and later supporting debates on freezing development aid amid the crackdown. In a joint statement, the EU Delegation, multiple EU member states (including France, Germany, and others), the UK (via the British High Commission), Canada, Norway, Switzerland, and additional partners on December 5, 2025, expressed regret over tragic losses of life and injuries, called for the release of bodies to families, the freeing of political prisoners, and addressing shortcomings identified in AU and SADC election reports.

The United States announced a comprehensive review of its bilateral relationship with Tanzania on December 4, 2025, citing “disturbing violence against civilians” before and after the elections, alongside ongoing repression of religious freedom and free speech, which it said threatened mutual prosperity and security.

Regional leaders from neighbouring countries (such as Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, and South Africa) notably skipped President Hassan’s inauguration, signalling either disapproval or unwillingness to risk stirring domestic anger by showing support for her. Former South African President Thabo Mbeki went further, stating through his foundation that Tanzania “currently lacks a legitimate government.”

China has taken a supportive stance toward the Tanzanian government, emphasising non-interference and stability. On January 11, the Chinese government conveyed congratulations to Tanzania for the “successful conduct of the General Elections held in October 2025” and expressed “strong support for the Government of Tanzania to safeguard constitutional order, protect lives, property, and national stability in accordance with law.”

The Commonwealth Secretariat attempted to initiate mediation, announcing Malawi’s former president Lazarus Chakwera as special envoy. However, his appointment was quietly rejected by the Tanzanian government and openly criticised by civil society groups.

Despite the internet restrictions and the absence of journalists from international media outlets in Tanzania at the time, global news coverage of the post-election situation was considerable. Coverage has been highly critical of the President and the security forces’ actions.

Chadema officially called for an investigation by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in November 2025. Later that same month, a coalition of Tanzanian civil society organisations and victims filed a formal petition at The Hague. This petition specifically named President Samia Suluhu Hassan and senior security officials, accusing them of authorising a “premeditated crackdown” on civilians. The court has not yet opened a formal investigation, but the Office of the Prosecutor is in the “Initial Review” phase. Under the court’s rules, the Prosecutor must first determine if the alleged crimes fall under the court’s jurisdiction and if the Tanzanian national justice system is “unwilling or unable” to prosecute the crimes itself. The Tanzanian government has pointed to the Commission of Inquiry as proof that this does not apply.

A way forward?
The trauma of October and November 2025 will cast a long shadow. As of February 2026, the immediate violence has subsided, but underlying tensions and deep divisions persist. Nor is it entirely over: reports of further abductions continue almost daily.

The commission of inquiry is ongoing, expected to guide the creation of a permanent Truth, Reconciliation, and Healing Commission, a long-term initiative aimed at addressing historical grievances and fostering national unity. President Samia has also committed to re-starting a constitutional review process, a key demand of the opposition. If genuinely inclusive and far-reaching, this has the potential to address fundamental issues of governance, electoral integrity, and human rights protection.

Nevertheless, the outcomes of these initiatives are highly dependent on the government’s political will to implement meaningful reforms and ensure accountability for past abuses.

The 2025 elections and their violent aftermath represent a major setback for Tanzania’s democratic journey, and perhaps the end of the country’s reputation as an “island of peace” in a troubled region. The country descended into a maelstrom of contention, violence, and apparently widespread human rights abuses, leaving an indelible scar on the political landscape.

Perhaps there is a chance for President Samia and the nation as a whole to learn from this painful chapter, to collectively say “never again”, to genuinely address the grievances that fuelled the unrest, and to rebuild independent democratic institutions – the electoral commission, security forces, the media and more.

The path to true reconciliation and a stable, democratic future will be long and arduous, requiring courage, transparency, and a profound commitment to justice for all Tanzanians. At the time of writing, there’s a danger that President Samia will go down in history as the person who tipped Tanzania over the edge into tyranny, division, anger and brutality. But it’s not too late to find another path – she could instead become the person who brought the country back from the brink and established lasting stability and prosperity.

TUNDU LISSU’S TRIAL

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by Ben Taylor
In a separate-but-related development, court proceedings in the treason trial of Tundu Lissu resumed in early February at the High Court in Dar es Salaam, after a hiatus of several months. Lissu is charged with treason, which carries a mandatory death penalty in Tanzania. The state alleges that he used public rallies in early 2025 to incite a rebellion and disrupt the election. He maintains the charges were “fabricated” to prevent him from participating in the election.

Lissu, who is representing himself, has been systematically picking apart the state’s case witness by witness. More than once during cross-examination of prosecution witnesses, the courtroom has reportedly erupted in laughter. In one case, Lissu exposed that a witness had identified himself in court as an “electrician” but had listed his profession as a “farmer” in his police statement, and he exposed similar inconsistencies in other witnesses’ testimony.

Lissu received three procedural boosts to his case. First, he has successfully argued that much of the state’s evidence, including digital videos, is procedurally flawed and inadmissible. Second, the High Court ruled that laws allowing prosecution witnesses to testify in absolute secrecy (from enclosed booths) were unconstitutional. The judges noted that “justice must be seen to be done” and ordered Parliament to reform the law. This has severely weakened the state’s plan to use anonymous “protected” witnesses against Lissu. Third, the prosecution failed in its attempt to block social media and news reporting of the trial, complaining that witnesses were being called “liars” online. The three-judge panel sided with Lissu’s argument that “darkness” has no place in a treason trial.

The court has committed to hearing the case for 20 consecutive working days to clear the backlog caused by the election unrest. A final ruling on this specific treason trial is tentatively expected in early March, although procedural delays or new witnesses could push this date. Lissu remains in a maximum-security prison in Dar es Salaam, where he has been held since April 2025.

YOUTH FED UP

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by Genevieve Sekumbo

Young Tanzanians are fed up with not getting a slice of the economic action – research
When young Tanzanians poured into the streets on 29 October 2025, most observers saw an election protest. Protests in Dar es Salaam, Arusha, Mwanza and other cities were met with live ammunition and internet blackouts. There were hundreds of casualties, according to human rights organisations.

My research suggests a deeper dynamic: a generation asserting their right to become adults.

As a PhD candidate, I set out in 2020 to understand how Tanzania’s natural gas industry was shaping young people’s transitions to adulthood. My research examined two interconnected questions. How does the gas industry shape youth transitions and experiences in Mtwara, a resource rich region, particularly in the context of unmet development promises? And how do young people themselves navigate and shape development narratives tied to natural gas extraction?

I found that youth transitions to adulthood are closely tied to commodity cycles: while the gas boom of 2010 briefly expanded pathways to employment, independence and social recognition, the subsequent downturn left many young people in prolonged “waithood”.

This broader pattern of blocked transitions helps explain why youth-led protests such as those on 29 October resonate so deeply.

Blocked transitions to adulthood
My research lasted 15 months between 2020 and 2022. I conducted ethnographic fieldwork focused on young people aged 20-35. I began fieldwork in Mtwara region just as the gas sector entered a “gas bust”. This was a dramatic reversal from the earlier “gas rush” of 2010-2015. The 2010 discovery of offshore natural gas had generated enormous expectations. Then president Jakaya Kikwete promised “Mtwara will be the new Dubai”.

Young people saw prospects for industrialisation, jobs and economic independence. These were necessary to marry, build homes and establish themselves as adults. But by 2015, contractual disputes between the Tanzanian government and international oil companies, combined with falling global commodity prices, halted exploration. The promised transformation never materialised.

I documented how the gas sector’s boom-bust cycle shaped young people’s economic strategies and life trajectories.

Understanding what adulthood means in Tanzania requires recognising it as more than just age. It requires overcoming structural barriers to employment, housing and family formation, and being able to marry, start a family, and establish an independent household. Achieving these milestones enables the social and cultural responsibilities of adulthood. These include gaining respect, supporting extended family and participating meaningfully in community life. Tanzania’s National Youth Development Policy defines youth as those up to age 35. That is over one-third of the population and nearly two-thirds of the labour force. For many young Tanzanians, the markers of adulthood remain perpetually out of reach.

My fieldwork revealed three interconnected dynamics that help explain both the everyday crisis young people face and the mobilisation on 29 October.

First, the crisis is not only about unemployment. It is about blocked adulthood. Young people I worked with understood clearly that Tanzania is not a poor country. They see natural resources extracted, infrastructure projects announced, and political elites displaying wealth on social media. From their perspective, their stalled transitions are not the result of national scarcity. They are born from a system in which political and social connections shape who benefits from public investment.

The economic reality reinforces this perception. Street vending, casual labour, motorcycle taxi driving and short-term contracts provide survival income. This is rarely enough to save, secure housing, or plan for family life. In Mtwara, young people watched offshore gas extraction generate capital flows with minimal local employment. Beyond the initial construction phase, the highly technical nature of operations excluded many from core jobs and from ancillary sectors operating in their own region.

Second, educational credentials have proved insufficient to overcome structural barriers. Many young people in their late twenties and thirties held secondary diplomas or tertiary certificates. They were unable to secure stable employment that would enable them to attain recognised markers of adulthood. What emerged was a prolonged phase of waithood: a social limbo in which young people cannot fully claim adult status or access the respect and authority associated with it.

Thirdly, prolonged exclusion generates political consciousness, not only frustration. When young people cannot meet the economic and social criteria for adulthood, their claims to full citizenship are weakened. Their voices carry less weight, their grievances are dismissed, and their participation is treated as peripheral. Economic precarity, in this sense, translates into civic marginalisation.

During my study young people frequently referred to the 2013 and 2014 gas protests. These followed the government’s decision to pipe newly discovered gas to Dar es Salaam rather than process it locally. The demonstrations became a defining political moment in the region. In conversations, they were described as about more than employment. They were framed as claims to recognition and inclusion in national development.

The 29 October protests follow a similar pattern: blocked economic futures translating into collective mobilisation for political recognition.

Why October 2025 became a breaking point
October 2025 brought together the structural conditions I documented between 2020 and 2022 with a tightening of political controls. In the months preceding the election, opposition leaders were jailed or barred from contesting, and reports of abductions and targeted violence circulated widely. President Samia Suluhu Hassan was declared the winner with 97.66% of the vote.

In my fieldwork, economic and political exclusion were consistently discussed as intertwined. Conversations about employment and income were frequently accompanied by concerns about voice and representation – perceptions of not being heard by authorities. These discussions reflected a broader sense that both economic mobility and political participation were constrained.

Seen in this context, the October protests reflected longer-term frustrations rooted in stalled transitions to adulthood and limited access to stable employment. They were linked not only to electoral developments but to perceptions of unequal access to opportunity and national resources.

The state’s response followed patterns observed in earlier episodes of unrest in Mtwara. Security operations were concentrated in neighbourhoods where protests had taken place. Reports suggested an uneven use of force, with young men disproportionately affected. When further demonstrations were called for 9 December, they did not materialise.

The structural conditions shaping prolonged waithood and youth disillusionment, however, remain in place.

From this perspective, youth protest is tied to how young people attempt to secure economic independence, social recognition and meaningful inclusion under constrained conditions. Where pathways to adulthood remain uncertain, mobilisation becomes one of the few visible ways to assert presence and claim belonging.

Genevieve Sekumbo is a PhD Candidate in Anthropology and Sociology at the Graduate Institute – Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement (IHEID). This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license.

ECONOMICS

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by Dr Hildebrand Shayo

With robust gold reserves, the Bank of Tanzania is well placed to maintain the shilling’s stability.
In 2026, particularly following the leadership of Dr. Samia, the President of Tanzania, who meticulously oversaw the initiative to commence gold purchases under the Central Bank of Tanzania’s vigilant oversight, the outcome is the fortification of the Tanzanian shilling against other currencies. The analysis I have conducted, utilising data generated by the Central Bank of Tanzania, strongly indicates that the shilling is poised to maintain stability in 2026.

The appreciation of the Tanzanian shilling in the second half of 2025 was attributed to central bank intervention, stricter regulations on domestic US dollar usage, and positive developments in the external sector.
As we begin 2026, the shilling has appreciated by 6.5% against the USD in the second half of 2025. This indicates significant central bank intervention, exceeding USD260 million by the end of November (compared with less than USD170 million in the same period in 2024), with a marked escalation of support in October and November, attributed to heightened dollar hoarding in the lead-up to the election.

The central bank has progressively implemented stringent regulations regarding the use of domestic US dollars. In March 2025, the central bank declared that all pricing and payment for goods and services within the nation must be conducted in Tanzanian shillings. Based on BOT’s data, an analysis of dollar sales, the USD exchange rate, and the USD per TSh % y-o-y, (see chart), indicates that shillings remain strong.

Net dollar sales and exchange rate variation

In conjunction with the robust performance of the Tanzanian shilling, a favourable trend in the trade deficit has further bolstered the currency. Rising gold prices, strong horticultural exports, and sustained government backing for import substitution have collectively boosted export levels and moderated import demand.

An examination of the BOT monthly economic review reports shows that Tanzania has achieved self-sufficiency in essential construction materials such as cement, tiles, iron sheets, and steel and is now aiming to enhance domestic production of sugar and fertiliser. From an economic point of view, these trends are bolstering the external sector and strengthening the shilling.

Capital goods and oil price variation

Nonetheless, demand for higher-value capital inputs, excluding raw materials, is expected to remain elevated due to robust infrastructure development. However, this pressure on the import bill has been somewhat mitigated by declining global energy prices; for example, oil accounted for 19.9% of goods imports in 2024.

This interplay has helped moderate import expenditure and bolster the country’s overall trade balance, as briefly shown in the figure below, which illustrates how rising capital goods import demand is partially offset by lower oil prices.

Given this trend, the Tanzanian shilling is projected to average approximately TSh 2,550 per USD across 2026. In light of possible lender withdrawals that could reduce financial inflows, the Bank of Tanzania has both the readiness and capacity to intervene, thereby ensuring the stability of the shilling.

The recent international scrutiny of the Tanzanian government’s management of the October 2025 general elections could affect the immediate demand for Tanzanian assets. For example, the European Parliament has requested that the European Commission retract its proposed decision on the financing of the EU’s Annual Action Plan for Tanzania, valued at EUR 156 million (approximately USD 181 million).
Notwithstanding donors’ apprehensions and heightened domestic demand for US dollars, the central bank, led by Governor Mr. Tutuba, has shown commendable readiness to intervene to stabilise the currency.

The BoT’s initiative to buy gold more strategically has indeed enhanced reserves, which, according to the BoT’s calculations, totalled USD 6.2 billion at the end of October. The rise in gold receipts, coupled with ongoing central bank initiatives to amass reserves, will undoubtedly equip the Bank of Tanzania with the capability and resolve to intervene, thereby bolstering dollar liquidity and currency stability.

Undoubtedly, a reduction in the current account deficit will contribute to the stability of the shilling. An in-depth analysis of BOT data shows that the current account deficit is projected to fall from 3.2% of GDP in 2025 (a revision from the previously estimated 2.5%, based on Q3 outcomes) to 2.5% in 2026 (adjusted from an earlier forecast of 2.3%).

Although primary income outflows are expected to remain substantial due to high debt-servicing obligations, strong performance in trade and services exports – especially from gold, horticulture, and the projected completion of the East African Crude Oil Pipeline by late 2026 – will help to offset this.

In the mining sector, data from the London Metal Exchange indicate that gold prices are projected to rise further in 2026, averaging USD3,700/ oz, up from USD3,400/oz in 2025. With gold accounting for 39.4% of Tanzania’s goods exports in 2024, the path to a stable shilling appears clear. Enhanced regional connectivity and competitive port costs are expected to bolster exports of transport services further.

Regarding the implications of currency revaluation, a weaker dollar, coupled with an expanding real interest rate differential between Tanzania and the United States, is poised to mitigate the shilling’s depreciation against the US dollar in 2026.

My assessment of the data from the central bank of Tanzania contained in monthly economic review reports and how the august institution manages the economy, the DXY (that is U.S. Dollar Index, USDX, a benchmark that shows how strong the dollar is in global markets by measuring its value against a weighted basket of major foreign currencies i.e., the Euro, Japanese Yen, British Pound, Canadian Dollar, Swedish Krona, and Swiss Franc), is likely to experience a period of restraint in 2026, oscillating between 95 and 100.

This is attributable to robust US growth and solid corporate earnings, which will be offset by prevailing policy uncertainties and ongoing global fiscal deficits. Amidst this, the Bank of Tanzania is likely to maintain its policy rate in 2026, in contrast to the expected 50-basispoint reduction by the US Federal Reserve. This divergence will likely widen the real interest-rate differential between Tanzania and the United States dollar, thereby enhancing the relative appeal of Tanzanian assets.

Tanzania’s decision to hold gold to boost the economy and the value of the Tanzanian shilling could be challenged if a significant drop in global gold prices were to adversely affect export revenues, hinder reserve accumulation, diminish the Bank of Tanzania’s ability to intervene in foreign exchange markets, and put pressure on the shilling.

While other partners have not explicitly endorsed the European Council’s decision to freeze or cancel the Annual Action Plan for Tanzania, there are indications that these trade partners recognise Tanzania’s assertiveness on issues affecting its citizens and the reality on the ground, as the picture of what happened during the 29th October 2025 election slowly unfolds.

In light of this, Tanzania’s continued alignment with partners such as China, for instance, in the rehabilitation of the Tanzara railway line, and its cooperation with other partners adopting distinct approaches to collaboration, will serve as mitigating factors in maintaining the shilling’s stability in 2026, a positive sign for investors. In addition, an extension or renewal of the IMF’s programmes, which are set to conclude in May 2026, will provide further support for inflows and help maintain Tanzania’s currency stability.