by Ben Taylor

Standard newspaper cover – October 29th (election day)

Standard cover – October 30th

Standard cover October 31st

Standard cover 3rd November

Tumultuous 2025 “elections” and their aftermath
It was already clear well before election day that Tanzania’s general “election” of October 29, 2025, would be far from a perfect exercise of democracy. But few predicted the horror that befell the country on polling day and its aftermath.

The country’s first mass protests in decades rose up soon after polls opened, targeting a combination of election infrastructure and the property of prominent ruling party figures and supporters. This was met with a swift and uncompromising response by security forces – one that has reportedly cost the lives of hundreds, or very possibly thousands of citizens.

The “election” itself
President Samia Suluhu Hassan of CCM was contesting re-election as President essentially unopposed after her two meaningful opponents, Tundu Lissu of Chadema and Luhaga Mpina of ACT Wazalendo, were both blocked from standing. Lissu languished in a prison cell awaiting trial on charges of treason – charges that independent observers have described as baseless and politically motivated. Mpina was barred from standing by the “Independent” National Electoral Commission on the grounds on a supposed irregularity in his party’s nomination process.

There were wider signs of democracy in trouble as well, with new restrictions on the media and opposition political parties. UN human rights experts had earlier in 2025 expressed concern over a “pattern of enforced disappearance and torture” against political opponents, with over 200 cases documented.

Citing these and other concerns, Chadema declined to participate in the election at all. As a result, most CCM candidates for parliamentary seats were effectively unopposed as well.

Nevertheless, despite the lack of meaningful opposition, the “election” went ahead on October 29. Officially, President Samia was re-elected with 98% of the vote on an unprecedently high 87% turnout, figures that The Economist described as “ridiculous”. CCM candidates also “won” 270 out of 272 directly elected seats in parliament (ACT won the other two). A discreet, swearing-in ceremony for the President took place on military grounds on November 3, 2025.

The protests
In the lead up to polling day, various social media activists, including Mange Kimambi and Maria Sarungi, had been calling for citizens to take to the streets on election day to make their opposition to the “sham” elections clear. The widespread anger among citizens – particularly among young (so-called “Gen Z”) urban residents – appeared to stem from a combination of political and economic factors. Supporters of Chadema and Tundu Lissu were upset with the country’s political direction and increasing repression, with abductions featuring heavy on complaints on social media, while others focussed more on the lack of economic opportunities, especially for young people.

Nevertheless, previous attempts to mobilise similar protest movements in Tanzania (such as around constitutional and electoral reform in 2018) had largely fallen flat. There was therefore scepticism among observers that calls to protest on election day would deliver anything much.

In fact, the election day protests proved to be substantial. Thousands of protesters took to the streets of Dar es Salaam, Mwanza, Arusha and other urban centres across the country, marching and chanting and occasionally attacking polling stations and other election infrastructure or the property of prominent CCM leaders and supporters. Images on social media showed buses and petrol stations on fire, makeshift barricades with burning tyres erected, police stations and government offices torched or damaged, campaign billboards set on fire and ballot boxes and papers strewn across streets.

Protesters made concerted efforts to persuade security forces (particularly the army) to join them and/or to claim on social media that the army were on their side.

The reaction
On election day itself, the security forces had a highly visible presence on the streets of cities and towns nationwide. In some cases, this led to clashes with protestors, with stones and bullets flying in opposite directions.

Around the same time, as soon as substantial protests became apparent, the internet was taken offline across Tanzania, followed soon after by a nighttime curfew. The internet blackout made it harder for protesters to organise their efforts and to share what was happening with the wider world. It also made it harder for international observers and media organisations to understand what was taking place. For the next few days, only small amounts of information leaked out of the country. There was much misinformation too, on both sides.

And yet, the information blackout was not complete. Especially after the internet shutdown ended (five days later), thousands of stories and images and videos were shared with the wider world. Some of these have been scrutinised closely by the international media or human rights organisations, and found to be genuine. It is not possible to verify every image and every video, but nor is it credible that they were nothing more than a misinformation campaign by protesters and their supporters aiming to discredit the government.

The story told by these images and videos, as well as the testimony of participants and witnesses is horrific. Two days after polling day, a spokesperson from Chadema told the AFP news agency that “around 700” people had been killed in clashes with security forces, and a diplomatic source in Tanzania told the BBC there was credible evidence that at least 500 people had died. The violence did not stop there.

CNN, the BBC, Amnesty and the Centre for Information Resilience (among others) each separately reviewed a wide range of images and videos from social media and other sources and found them to be credible. What they show include uniformed officers appearing to fire at crowds and at people fleeing for their lives, and hundreds of images of bodies lying on the streets or piled up outside hospitals. There have been reports of mass graves on the outskirts of cities including Dar es Salaam and Arusha.
Stories have circulated widely of security forces picking up suspected protestors and supporters from their homes, many of whom have not been heard from since, and eyewitness accounts describe how live ammunition, tear gas, and brutal beatings became disturbingly common.

Amnesty’s Evidence Lab verified one video showing at least 70 bodies piled up on the floors and on stretchers in the morgue at Mwananyamala Hospital in Dar es Salaam. “I had never seen so many people shot like this, and so many dead bodies piled up and crows eating their flesh,” said one Dar es Salaam-based healthcare professional.

Other health workers spoke of how they told those with injuries that they were better off away from the hospital, as armed officers were visiting health facilities to “finish the job”.

The Centre for Information Resilience conducted a detailed data collection and verification exercise, finding “a clear, repeated pattern of security forces using live ammunition against protesters,” and “multiple instances where uniformed police and plain-clothed armed individuals were seen shooting.”

The overall death toll from the violence will likely never be known, but UN experts in December estimated at least 700 extrajudicial killings (while noting that other estimates point to thousands.) Chadema leaders have suggested various much higher figures. Online compilations of those whose were killed or whereabouts are unknown have several hundred names and videos or images.

Amnesty concluded that Tanzanian security forces “used unnecessary or disproportionate force, including lethal force, to suppress election protests, … showing a shocking disregard for the right to life and for freedom of peaceful assembly as hundreds of people were reported killed or injured across the country.” They found that security forces fired live ammunition and teargas directly at protesters and other individuals who posed no imminent threat of death or serious injury, and that security forces used firearms recklessly, injuring and killing bystanders, and abusively deployed tear gas in residential areas and into people’s homes.

A text message was reported as being sent to all mobile phone users nationwide around the time of internet restoration (around November 3–4, 2025), when people began sharing unverified images of bodies and violence. The message read: “Avoid sharing pictures or videos that cause panic or degrade a person’s dignity. Doing so is a criminal offense, and if identified, strict legal action will be taken.”

In the immediate aftermath of the election, a senior minister described the violence as limited to “very few small pockets of incidents” caused by “criminal elements”. He denied excessive force and called opposition death toll claims “hugely exaggerated.”

Later, officials labelled critical media reports (e.g., CNN’s investigation on shootings and mass graves) as “biased” or “information warfare” intended to “mislead and incite.” The President herself in December said that “these were not protests, it was violence with malicious intentions. … What happened was a manufactured event and those who planned it intended to bring down our government. In that situation, the government has a responsibility, and we swear to defend this country and its borders, to protect the safety of citizens and their property. And in that case, the force used is proportional to the event.”

Commission of Inquiry
President Samia Suluhu Hassan has established a Commission of Inquiry into incidents of unrest during and after the October 2025 General Election, which she announced on November 14, 2025 at the opening of Tanzania’s 13th Parliament in Dodoma. She also offered condolences for the loss of life.

She formally launched and inaugurated the commission on November 20, at State House Chamwino in Dodoma. In her launch speech, she emphasised its role under the Commissions of Inquiry Act of 2023 and directed it to examine claims that some protesters (particularly youth) were “paid” to participate and to investigate the role of local and international NGOs in the events.

The commission is an eight-member panel (described as “independent” by the government but criticised by others as lacking true independence), chaired by retired Chief Justice Mohamed Chande Othman. Other members include former state officials and retired civil servants, such as a former Inspector General of Police and the immediate former Minister of Defence (who held office during the period of violence).

The commission was initially asked to report within 90 days. Around the 90-day mark, it was reported that the commission had been granted an additional 42 days, effective from February 20. With the extension, the commission is now required to finalise its work and submit its report on or before April 3, 2026. The commission cited several reasons for the extension, stating that “the additional time will provide an opportunity for any individual, whether inside or outside the country, who has information, evidence or views to present, to come forward.”

Youth ministry
In the same speech to Parliament, the President also established the Ministry for Youth Affairs, which she said was specifically designed to address the socio-economic frustrations that fuelled much of the 2025 post-election unrest. It is also a strategic response to the demographic reality that youth (under age 35) make up more than 60% of Tanzania’s population.

The ministry is led by Dr Joel Arthur Nanauka, a well-known youth activist and author who previously focused on leadership and economic empowerment.

The ministry has already launched several high-profile initiatives. This includes a “Vijana App” national digital platform designed to coordinate youth issues and provide a feedback loop between the government and young people; a Youth Investment Fund aiming to establish over 100,000 youth-led companies by 2030; and a “Vijana Tuyajenge” campaign to shift the narrative from youth as “political protesters” to “nation builders” through entrepreneurship and civic participation.

The ministry is widely viewed as a “de-escalation tool.” By providing a dedicated seat at the cabinet table for youth issues, the government is attempting to address the high unemployment and lack of political inclusion that became flashpoints during the October 2025 protests.

Arrests, and forgiveness?
Large numbers of Tanzanians, mainly young people, have been arrested in connection with the protests. Precise numbers are not available, but it has been reported that over 2,000 were arrested, with as many as 250 charged with treason.

Many of those charged were released starting in late November 2025, following a presidential directive from President Hassan urging leniency. In her address to Parliament, she acknowledged arrests of many young people, stated they “did not fully understand what they were getting involved in,” and asked prosecutors to “show leniency” toward those arrested in connection with the violence. Again, precise numbers are not available, but some reports have claimed that as many as 1,700 have been released.

Diplomatic reactions
The African Union (AU) election observation mission declared that the elections “did not comply with AU principles, normative frameworks, and other international obligations and standards for democratic elections,” citing issues like ballot stuffing, internet blackouts, and excessive force, while urging restraint and thorough investigations into violence against protesters.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) issued a rare sharp rebuke in its preliminary statement, describing the electoral commission as “compromised from inception” and concluding that “in most areas, voters could not express their democratic will.”

The European Union (EU) expressed deep concern over credible reports of killings, serious injuries, violence, and irregularities, including internet shutdowns, with the High Representative urging maximum restraint to preserve human lives and later supporting debates on freezing development aid amid the crackdown. In a joint statement, the EU Delegation, multiple EU member states (including France, Germany, and others), the UK (via the British High Commission), Canada, Norway, Switzerland, and additional partners on December 5, 2025, expressed regret over tragic losses of life and injuries, called for the release of bodies to families, the freeing of political prisoners, and addressing shortcomings identified in AU and SADC election reports.

The United States announced a comprehensive review of its bilateral relationship with Tanzania on December 4, 2025, citing “disturbing violence against civilians” before and after the elections, alongside ongoing repression of religious freedom and free speech, which it said threatened mutual prosperity and security.

Regional leaders from neighbouring countries (such as Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, and South Africa) notably skipped President Hassan’s inauguration, signalling either disapproval or unwillingness to risk stirring domestic anger by showing support for her. Former South African President Thabo Mbeki went further, stating through his foundation that Tanzania “currently lacks a legitimate government.”

China has taken a supportive stance toward the Tanzanian government, emphasising non-interference and stability. On January 11, the Chinese government conveyed congratulations to Tanzania for the “successful conduct of the General Elections held in October 2025” and expressed “strong support for the Government of Tanzania to safeguard constitutional order, protect lives, property, and national stability in accordance with law.”

The Commonwealth Secretariat attempted to initiate mediation, announcing Malawi’s former president Lazarus Chakwera as special envoy. However, his appointment was quietly rejected by the Tanzanian government and openly criticised by civil society groups.

Despite the internet restrictions and the absence of journalists from international media outlets in Tanzania at the time, global news coverage of the post-election situation was considerable. Coverage has been highly critical of the President and the security forces’ actions.

Chadema officially called for an investigation by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in November 2025. Later that same month, a coalition of Tanzanian civil society organisations and victims filed a formal petition at The Hague. This petition specifically named President Samia Suluhu Hassan and senior security officials, accusing them of authorising a “premeditated crackdown” on civilians. The court has not yet opened a formal investigation, but the Office of the Prosecutor is in the “Initial Review” phase. Under the court’s rules, the Prosecutor must first determine if the alleged crimes fall under the court’s jurisdiction and if the Tanzanian national justice system is “unwilling or unable” to prosecute the crimes itself. The Tanzanian government has pointed to the Commission of Inquiry as proof that this does not apply.

A way forward?
The trauma of October and November 2025 will cast a long shadow. As of February 2026, the immediate violence has subsided, but underlying tensions and deep divisions persist. Nor is it entirely over: reports of further abductions continue almost daily.

The commission of inquiry is ongoing, expected to guide the creation of a permanent Truth, Reconciliation, and Healing Commission, a long-term initiative aimed at addressing historical grievances and fostering national unity. President Samia has also committed to re-starting a constitutional review process, a key demand of the opposition. If genuinely inclusive and far-reaching, this has the potential to address fundamental issues of governance, electoral integrity, and human rights protection.

Nevertheless, the outcomes of these initiatives are highly dependent on the government’s political will to implement meaningful reforms and ensure accountability for past abuses.

The 2025 elections and their violent aftermath represent a major setback for Tanzania’s democratic journey, and perhaps the end of the country’s reputation as an “island of peace” in a troubled region. The country descended into a maelstrom of contention, violence, and apparently widespread human rights abuses, leaving an indelible scar on the political landscape.

Perhaps there is a chance for President Samia and the nation as a whole to learn from this painful chapter, to collectively say “never again”, to genuinely address the grievances that fuelled the unrest, and to rebuild independent democratic institutions – the electoral commission, security forces, the media and more.

The path to true reconciliation and a stable, democratic future will be long and arduous, requiring courage, transparency, and a profound commitment to justice for all Tanzanians. At the time of writing, there’s a danger that President Samia will go down in history as the person who tipped Tanzania over the edge into tyranny, division, anger and brutality. But it’s not too late to find another path – she could instead become the person who brought the country back from the brink and established lasting stability and prosperity.

by Ben Taylor
In a separate-but-related development, court proceedings in the treason trial of Tundu Lissu resumed in early February at the High Court in Dar es Salaam, after a hiatus of several months. Lissu is charged with treason, which carries a mandatory death penalty in Tanzania. The state alleges that he used public rallies in early 2025 to incite a rebellion and disrupt the election. He maintains the charges were “fabricated” to prevent him from participating in the election.

Lissu, who is representing himself, has been systematically picking apart the state’s case witness by witness. More than once during cross-examination of prosecution witnesses, the courtroom has reportedly erupted in laughter. In one case, Lissu exposed that a witness had identified himself in court as an “electrician” but had listed his profession as a “farmer” in his police statement, and he exposed similar inconsistencies in other witnesses’ testimony.

Lissu received three procedural boosts to his case. First, he has successfully argued that much of the state’s evidence, including digital videos, is procedurally flawed and inadmissible. Second, the High Court ruled that laws allowing prosecution witnesses to testify in absolute secrecy (from enclosed booths) were unconstitutional. The judges noted that “justice must be seen to be done” and ordered Parliament to reform the law. This has severely weakened the state’s plan to use anonymous “protected” witnesses against Lissu. Third, the prosecution failed in its attempt to block social media and news reporting of the trial, complaining that witnesses were being called “liars” online. The three-judge panel sided with Lissu’s argument that “darkness” has no place in a treason trial.

The court has committed to hearing the case for 20 consecutive working days to clear the backlog caused by the election unrest. A final ruling on this specific treason trial is tentatively expected in early March, although procedural delays or new witnesses could push this date. Lissu remains in a maximum-security prison in Dar es Salaam, where he has been held since April 2025.

by Genevieve Sekumbo

Young Tanzanians are fed up with not getting a slice of the economic action – research
When young Tanzanians poured into the streets on 29 October 2025, most observers saw an election protest. Protests in Dar es Salaam, Arusha, Mwanza and other cities were met with live ammunition and internet blackouts. There were hundreds of casualties, according to human rights organisations.

My research suggests a deeper dynamic: a generation asserting their right to become adults.

As a PhD candidate, I set out in 2020 to understand how Tanzania’s natural gas industry was shaping young people’s transitions to adulthood. My research examined two interconnected questions. How does the gas industry shape youth transitions and experiences in Mtwara, a resource rich region, particularly in the context of unmet development promises? And how do young people themselves navigate and shape development narratives tied to natural gas extraction?

I found that youth transitions to adulthood are closely tied to commodity cycles: while the gas boom of 2010 briefly expanded pathways to employment, independence and social recognition, the subsequent downturn left many young people in prolonged “waithood”.

This broader pattern of blocked transitions helps explain why youth-led protests such as those on 29 October resonate so deeply.

Blocked transitions to adulthood
My research lasted 15 months between 2020 and 2022. I conducted ethnographic fieldwork focused on young people aged 20-35. I began fieldwork in Mtwara region just as the gas sector entered a “gas bust”. This was a dramatic reversal from the earlier “gas rush” of 2010-2015. The 2010 discovery of offshore natural gas had generated enormous expectations. Then president Jakaya Kikwete promised “Mtwara will be the new Dubai”.

Young people saw prospects for industrialisation, jobs and economic independence. These were necessary to marry, build homes and establish themselves as adults. But by 2015, contractual disputes between the Tanzanian government and international oil companies, combined with falling global commodity prices, halted exploration. The promised transformation never materialised.

I documented how the gas sector’s boom-bust cycle shaped young people’s economic strategies and life trajectories.

Understanding what adulthood means in Tanzania requires recognising it as more than just age. It requires overcoming structural barriers to employment, housing and family formation, and being able to marry, start a family, and establish an independent household. Achieving these milestones enables the social and cultural responsibilities of adulthood. These include gaining respect, supporting extended family and participating meaningfully in community life. Tanzania’s National Youth Development Policy defines youth as those up to age 35. That is over one-third of the population and nearly two-thirds of the labour force. For many young Tanzanians, the markers of adulthood remain perpetually out of reach.

My fieldwork revealed three interconnected dynamics that help explain both the everyday crisis young people face and the mobilisation on 29 October.

First, the crisis is not only about unemployment. It is about blocked adulthood. Young people I worked with understood clearly that Tanzania is not a poor country. They see natural resources extracted, infrastructure projects announced, and political elites displaying wealth on social media. From their perspective, their stalled transitions are not the result of national scarcity. They are born from a system in which political and social connections shape who benefits from public investment.

The economic reality reinforces this perception. Street vending, casual labour, motorcycle taxi driving and short-term contracts provide survival income. This is rarely enough to save, secure housing, or plan for family life. In Mtwara, young people watched offshore gas extraction generate capital flows with minimal local employment. Beyond the initial construction phase, the highly technical nature of operations excluded many from core jobs and from ancillary sectors operating in their own region.

Second, educational credentials have proved insufficient to overcome structural barriers. Many young people in their late twenties and thirties held secondary diplomas or tertiary certificates. They were unable to secure stable employment that would enable them to attain recognised markers of adulthood. What emerged was a prolonged phase of waithood: a social limbo in which young people cannot fully claim adult status or access the respect and authority associated with it.

Thirdly, prolonged exclusion generates political consciousness, not only frustration. When young people cannot meet the economic and social criteria for adulthood, their claims to full citizenship are weakened. Their voices carry less weight, their grievances are dismissed, and their participation is treated as peripheral. Economic precarity, in this sense, translates into civic marginalisation.

During my study young people frequently referred to the 2013 and 2014 gas protests. These followed the government’s decision to pipe newly discovered gas to Dar es Salaam rather than process it locally. The demonstrations became a defining political moment in the region. In conversations, they were described as about more than employment. They were framed as claims to recognition and inclusion in national development.

The 29 October protests follow a similar pattern: blocked economic futures translating into collective mobilisation for political recognition.

Why October 2025 became a breaking point
October 2025 brought together the structural conditions I documented between 2020 and 2022 with a tightening of political controls. In the months preceding the election, opposition leaders were jailed or barred from contesting, and reports of abductions and targeted violence circulated widely. President Samia Suluhu Hassan was declared the winner with 97.66% of the vote.

In my fieldwork, economic and political exclusion were consistently discussed as intertwined. Conversations about employment and income were frequently accompanied by concerns about voice and representation – perceptions of not being heard by authorities. These discussions reflected a broader sense that both economic mobility and political participation were constrained.

Seen in this context, the October protests reflected longer-term frustrations rooted in stalled transitions to adulthood and limited access to stable employment. They were linked not only to electoral developments but to perceptions of unequal access to opportunity and national resources.

The state’s response followed patterns observed in earlier episodes of unrest in Mtwara. Security operations were concentrated in neighbourhoods where protests had taken place. Reports suggested an uneven use of force, with young men disproportionately affected. When further demonstrations were called for 9 December, they did not materialise.

The structural conditions shaping prolonged waithood and youth disillusionment, however, remain in place.

From this perspective, youth protest is tied to how young people attempt to secure economic independence, social recognition and meaningful inclusion under constrained conditions. Where pathways to adulthood remain uncertain, mobilisation becomes one of the few visible ways to assert presence and claim belonging.

Genevieve Sekumbo is a PhD Candidate in Anthropology and Sociology at the Graduate Institute – Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement (IHEID). This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license.

by Ben Taylor

Presidential election – the three main party leaders: President Samia (CCM), Luhanga Mpina (ACT Wazelendo) and Tundu Lissu (Chadema)

General elections in Tanzania: October 29, 2025
Tanzania’s forthcoming general elections represent a significant moment in the nation’s democratic trajectory. These polls will determine the presidency, 393 seats in the National Assembly, and local government positions across the mainland and the semi-autonomous islands of Zanzibar, for the next five years.

With over 30 million registered voters, the elections occur against a backdrop of some political re-opening under President Samia Suluhu Hassan, who assumed office in 2021 following the untimely death of President John Magufuli. However, concerns remain over restrictions on critics, opposition participation and institutional disputes, raising questions about the credibility of the broader democratic rebuilding process.

In particular, it looks likely that President Hassan, seeking re-election as the candidate of the ruling party, CCM, will face no meaningful opposition candidate. Chadema’s leader, Tundu Lissu, will miss the election, as he is in prison on charges of treason, and his party has refused to legitimise the elections by putting forward candidates. In any case, the electoral commission has blocked them from participating. The Alliance for Change and Transparency (ACT Wazalendo), the only other party with significant support, has had its campaign interrupted by the electoral commission’s decision to block their proposed Presidential candidate, Luhaga Mpina, from standing – a move on which the High Court has (at the time of writing) not yet reached a final decision.

Voter turnout, which has historically fluctuated between 50%-70%, may be low, due to apathy or bans / boycotts. Meanwhile, a historic surge in female candidates – over 40% of parliamentary aspirants – highlights evolving gender dynamics.

The legacy of 2020
The 2020 general elections inevitably form part of the context for this year’s polls. These were marked by widespread allegations of fraud and violence that eroded trust in Tanzania’s electoral institutions. Incumbent President John Magufuli of CCM secured a landslide victory with 84.4% of the presidential vote, while his party claimed 365 of 393 parliamentary seats. Official turnout was reported at 50.7%.

Opposition parties, led by Chadema, rejected the results, alleging ballot irregularities, intimidation, and the disqualification of many candidates on questionable technical grounds. Chadema’s presidential candidate, Tundu Lissu, garnered just 13%, but rejected the outcome, fleeing to exile amid arrests of party officials.

The polls unfolded under Magufuli’s tightened political environment, including restrictions on independent media and political rallies, which stifled opposition campaigns. International observers, such as the European Union, were absent after being denied visas, leaving only limited Commonwealth and African Union missions that faced restrictions.

Critics argue these elections exemplified “electoral authoritarianism,” where formal democratic processes mask one-party rule. Hassan’s ascension promised reforms, but the 2020 legacy – including distrust in election authorities – persists, fuelling opposition demands for constitutional reforms and true independence for the electoral commission.

Authoritarian drift?
Tanzania heads to the polls amid what some analysts have described as a new narrowing of political space under President Hassan. Once hailed for tentative reforms post-John Magufuli’s death in 2021, this democratic re-opening been increasingly called into question. Freedom House downgraded Tanzania from “Partly Free” to “Not Free” in its 2025 report, citing manipulated voter registrations and broader erosion of electoral integrity. Similarly, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), says the ruling party’s approach has transformed what could have been a competitive democratic exercise into one of unchallenged CCM dominance.

UN human rights experts in June 2025 expressed concern over a “pattern of enforced disappearance and torture” against political opponents, urging the government to halt such practices. Amnesty International reports that four government critics have been forcibly disappeared and one killed in 2024-2025, attributing these to efforts to curb opposition ahead of the elections.

More recently, the Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority (TCRA) suspended the license of Jamii Forums, a major social media news platform on September 6, and has directed police to “patrol the internet” for election-related content since August. Human Rights Watch (HRW) reports broader clampdowns, including bans and/or measures to block access to online platforms like WhatsApp and Twitter / X.

In response to such criticisms, President Hassan on September 17, 2025, urged unity and highlighted the preparedness of security forces to maintain order during the elections: “Peace and stability in our country are more important than anything else. Elections are not a war but a democratic process. Our defence and security organs, both in Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar, are fully prepared to protect this peace. Citizens must remain calm and united.” Earlier, in March, she said that “we have sworn to protect the rights and dignity of every Tanzanian, and we will not hesitate to act against anyone who exploits these freedoms to incite discord.”

The Tanzania Police Force, in an official statement released on June 18, in response to reports of abductions and disappearances, denied state involvement and attributed many cases to unrelated factors: “In the cases reported at police stations and thoroughly investigated – where the missing individuals were later found either alive or deceased – evidence in some instances has revealed causes such as self-staged abductions, jealousy in romantic relationships, superstitious beliefs, property disputes, acts of revenge, travel to foreign countries to learn extremist ideologies, and fleeing from justice after committing crimes.”

The statement further defended the police’s role: “The government, through the Police Force, has the responsibility to protect people’s lives and property and not otherwise. Furthermore, all reported incidents involving the disappearance of various individuals are still under investigation until the truth is established about what happened to our fellow Tanzanians.”

Beyond Tanzania, the SADC Electoral Commissions Forum (ECF­SADC), which deployed a pre-election assessment mission to Tanzania from August 12-16, reported “no major issues flagged” in preparations for the elections. They recommended enhancements like increased voter education, framing the process as stable rather than flawed. The AU has offered similarly measured endorsement through a June 2025 pre­election assessment that “praised logistical preparations” while urging civic education and rights safeguards, avoiding outright criticism and focusing on constructive engagement.

Chadema’s ban and boycott stance
Chadema, Tanzania’s largest opposition party, will watch this year’s election from the sidelines, facing a controversial ban and/or their own boycott. In April 2025, the (so-named) Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) disqualified Chadema from presidential and parliamentary contests, after party officials refused to sign the 2025 Election Code of Ethics. Chadema had said it would not sign the code until the government undertook electoral reforms. This followed the arrest of Tundu Lissu, Chadema’s recently-returned leader, on charges that critics have described as politically motivated, and raids on party offices. Chadema, which polled strongly in 2020 in urban areas, also now faces exclusion from all by-elections until 2030.

Rather than a full boycott, Chadema has framed its response as a “No Reforms, No Election” campaign. They call for a truly independent electoral commission, revival of the stalled constitution writing process abandoned in 2013, and legal changes to allow independent presidential candidates and judicial review of presidential election results.

Party officials insist this is not disengagement but a fight for fairness. Nevertheless, the ban / boycott / protest effectively undermines the opposition challenge at the polls, handing CCM a much clearer path.

Zanzibar
Zanzibar’s elections are likely to be more competitive. As a semi-autonomous region, Zanzibar elects its own President, 85-member House of Representatives, and local councils under the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC), as well as casting votes for Tanzania’s president and MPs in Tanzania’s National Assembly. CCM’s Hussein Mwinyi seeks re-election as President of Zanzibar.

Debates over the relationship between Zanzibar and the Union simmer, with many islanders supporting calls for independence referendums, or at least for constitutional reforms to give Zanzibar increased autonomy.

The opposition landscape on the isles is also somewhat confused. The decline of CUF after 2015 paved the way for ACT Wazalendo as a rising force on the islands. This left-leaning party blends social justice with anti-corruption rhetoric. Nevertheless, lingering elements of CUF threaten to weaken ACT Wazalendo’s vote share and their potential post-election coalition role.

ACT on the national level
Nationwide, ACT Wazalendo faces some similar challenges to Chadema. Their presidential candidate for Tanzania, Luhaga Mpina, was initially banned by INEC from standing. The ban stems from an objection by Attorney General Hamza Said Johari, who argued that Mpina lacks the necessary qualifications based on a prior ruling by the Registrar of Political Parties, citing irregularities in ACT Wazalendo’s internal nomination processes.

Mpina was MP for Kisesa constituency, representing CCM, and served for three years as Minister of Livestock and Fisheries under President Magufuli. In August 2025 he left CCM and joined ACT Wazalendo.
The High Court overturned this decision on appeal, only for INEC to reinstate the ban. ACT Wazalendo immediately challenged the second ban through multiple legal avenues, culminating in a constitutional petition filed on September 19. At the time of writing, with less than one month remaining before the election, the court ruling is pending, thought to be imminent.

Election Monitoring Initiatives
The EU has deployed a 100-member Election Observation Mission (EOM), following Tanzania’s invitation. The African Union conducted a June pre-election assessment, praising logistics but urging civic education. SADC’s Electoral Commissions Forum visited in August.

Other Significant Developments
Beyond core issues, the 2025 elections spotlight women’s empowerment, with over 200 female parliamentary candidates – a 50% jump – driven in part by quotas as well as by Hassan’s trailblazing example.

by Ben Taylor

What do the Manifestos say?
As Tanzania gears up for the elections, the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and opposition Alliance for Change and Transparency (ACT Wazalendo) have unveiled their manifestos outlining their goals for 2025–2030. CCM’s document, launched on May 31, 2025, emphasises continuity and alignment with the ambitious Tanzania Development Vision 2050, targeting a $1 trillion economy. ACT Wazalendo’s manifesto, released August 11, 2025, adopts a bolder, reformist tone, critiquing “elite capture” and pledging radical shifts toward equity and resource nationalism. Both prioritise economic transformation, job creation, and social welfare but differ in scope and ideology: CCM’s business-friendly growth-focused approach versus ACT’s interventionist, people-centered reforms.

CCM Manifesto: Building on Stability for Inclusive Growth
CCM’s manifesto for 2025–2030 emphasizes continuation and acceleration of economic transformation, infrastructure development, social services, and stronger institutions. Some of the highlights include:
• Economic growth & industrial transformation: A target to modernize the economy by adding value to local resources rather than exporting raw materials. Industry sector growth target of 9% annually by 2030.
• Agriculture, livestock & irrigation: Aim to improve agricultural production significantly: subsidies on inputs, better seeds, more modern farming, increased irrigation, increase grazing lands (livestock) and fishing sector improvements.
• Employment & revenue: Target to generate 8.5 million jobs in both formal and informal sectors. Strengthening revenue collection, aiming revenue-to-GDP ratio of 15.6%.
• Infrastructure, trade & local industrial zones: Greater investment in roads, ports, railways (including a new/revamped line connecting Tanga, Arusha and Musoma on Lake Victoria), and logistics to boost trade and connectivity. Establishing district-level industrial zones to support localised industrialisation.
• Social sectors & human development: Free education from primary through secondary; more vocational training.
• Housing: formalising housing, surveying, granting ownership, improving access to decent housing.
• Constitutional reform & governance: CCM pledges to revive the constitution review process. Increased attention to inclusivity, participation of civil society, youth, community leaders in consultations.
• Debt, macroeconomic stability: Ensuring national debt remains sustainable and that external and domestic borrowing is used for productive projects.

ACT Wazalendo
ACT Wazalendo positions itself more strongly on redistribution, governance reforms, social justice, and asserting community rights over land and natural resources. Key features include:
• Land, natural resources & resource nationalism: The party describes land as “life” and calls for bold reforms in how land is managed, reversing “arbitrary privatisations,” returning lands improperly converted (ie. to protected areas), allocating idle land to youth/vulnerable groups. They also propose greater transparency in extractive industries; ensuring citizens benefit from mining, oil, gas, forests.
• Social services, equality, human development: Universal health insurance; free education up to university level; improved access to clean water and electricity; stronger social protection, especially for informal sector and rural communities.
• Infrastructure & connectivity: Major infrastructure plans include a Southern Standard Gauge Railway (linking Lindi, Mtwara, Songea/ Ruvuma and mining projects in Njombe), rehabilitation of regional rail lines, strategic roads, and improving ports (Mtwara, Tanga, Bagamoyo, Kigoma). Rural electrification and last-mile access to water, transport and communications networks.
• Governance, justice & constitution: Police and judicial reforms, repealing repressive laws, restarting constitutional review within six months for power limits and an independent electoral body, and a three-tier Union structure for Mainland-Zanzibar equity.
• Inclusive economy & empowerment of ordinary citizens: Reducing elite dominance in national resources; putting citizens at centre of economic planning; formalisation of informal businesses and support for small traders; fair markets and prices for farmers, herders, fishermen; removal of unfair levies etc.
• Environment, climate, tourism: Balancing development with environmental protection; more community-based conservation, protecting coastal areas, mangroves, reefs; implementing green growth; reform in tourism to ensure more of the value stays in Tanzania.

What about Chadema?
Given that Chadema is boycotting the election / has been deemed ineligible, they have not published a manifesto. However, for completeness, their stated priorities include:
• “No Reforms, No Election” is Chadema’s central campaign slogan, calling for “fundamental” reforms in the electoral system. This includes a new constitution or significant constitutional reforms; reforms of electoral bodies and processes, to ensure elections are free, fair, and credible; equal opportunity for all political parties in elections; and fairness in how the rules are applied.

In conclusion
Many of the promises (from both manifestos) are ambitious in scale. Implementation will depend heavily on financing, institutional capacity, corruption control, legal frameworks, and external economic factors (e.g. global markets, climate change). Both align with Vision 2050’s $1 trillion goal but diverge on means: CCM via private partnerships, ACT through state assertiveness.

ACT’s proposals around land restitution and resource sharing may face pushback from existing stakeholders (private investors, communities that benefited under the old allocations, foreign investors). For CCM, sustaining high budget commitments (on infrastructure, jobs, agriculture subsidies) without increasing unsustainable debt or wasting resources will be a challenge.

by Ben Taylor
Tanzania’s Development Vision 2050, commonly known by its Swahili name, Dira 2050, is a set of ambitious, long-term goals for Tanzania, centred around the aim of transforming the country into an industrialised, knowledge-driven upper-middle-income economy by mid-century. The targets are audacious: a national GDP of about US$1 trillion (which would require annual growth of over 10% for 25 years) and a per-capita income near US$7,000 by 2050, underpinned by structural change from low-productivity agriculture toward diversified manufacturing, services and high-value digital sectors.

To gather input from citizens into the drafting process, the government organised face-to-face meetings, public workshops, symposia, and stakeholder dialogues in regions around the country. These allowed people, local leaders, civil society organisations, private sector and religious / cultural / community leaders to make submissions. A nationally-representative survey of citizens was also conducted.

Dira 2050 organises its aims around three interlinked pillars. The first is “A Strong, Inclusive and Competitive Economy,” focused on macroeconomic stability, fiscal sustainability, private-sector dynamism, value addition and export-led industrialisation. The second pillar, “Human Capabilities and Social Development,” prioritises health, education (especially STEM skills), social protection and inclusive access to services so that citizens are ready to work in higher-productivity sectors. The third pillar, “Environmental Integrity and Climate-Change Resilience,” commits Tanzania to safeguard biodiversity, manage wetlands and water resources, and build climate-resilient infrastructure. Together these pillars are driven by five strategic enablers: integrated logistics, energy, science & technology, research & development, and digital transformation.

The Vision emphasises public-private partnerships, deliberate sector prioritisation, and leveraging Tanzania’s geographic advantages to become a regional trade hub through improved ports, rail and digital trade systems. It also sets concrete targets, for example, raising national research and development investment toward at least 1% of GDP, expanding digital literacy (targeting a high percentage of citizens), and shifting the energy mix toward renewable sources while keeping energy reliability central to industrial expansion. The document stresses that coherent policy sequencing, predictable regulation and stronger institutions will be needed to translate ambition into sustained investment and jobs.

At the launch event in July, President Samia Suluhu Hassan congratulated the drafters of the Vision. “But now,” she added, “let us implement it in action, not just in words. … It is clear we won’t reach these goals if we continue with business as usual. We must change our thinking, our outlook, and our actions.”

Analysts and civil-society experts have broadly welcomed the Vision’s scope but warn that it will only succeed if implementation gaps are closed and crucially if funding, governance and climate risks are taken seriously. A common concern is that the targets are technically feasible only with sustained reform, clear accountability and large financing flows, both domestic and international, that cannot be assumed. The World Bank’s climate analysis, for instance, warns that climate impacts could push millions into poverty unless adaptation and mitigation are prioritised.

Writing in The Chanzo online newspaper, Martin Hockey, Benjamin Foster, Brian Cooksey and Deus Valentine Rweyemamu noted that Tanzania has frequently missed earlier development targets. They expressed concern that the Vision’s environmental commitments are under pressure due to excessive extractive ambitions (mining, large-scale agriculture, fossil fuels). They also emphasised that governance and accountability challenges, weak institutions, and insufficient civil society participation could undermine success.

Development specialist Rutashubanyuma Nestory notes that the Vision is “transformative in scope” but warns it “faces execution hurdles,” pointing to vague accountability mechanisms and heavy reliance on political will for follow-through.

In all, Dira 2050 is a broad, ambitious and technically detailed roadmap that places industrialisation, human capital and environmental resilience on equal footing. However, its success will hinge less on drafting than on hard choices: mobilising finance, enacting institutional reforms that lock in transparency and accountability, prioritising climate resilience in sectoral plans, and sequencing investments so growth creates broad-based employment. If those implementation challenges are met, the Vision could reshape Tanzania’s economy; if they are not, the plan risks becoming yet another well-crafted national statement whose reach exceeds its delivery.

by Leah Mwainyekule
Tanzania’s social media clampdown and the elections: what’s at risk?

Social media platforms like WhatsApp, Instagram, Facebook and X have transformed political dialogue and activism in Tanzania. The democratisation of political expression has especially empowered young voters and activists to challenge government actions and champion causes such as human rights, the release of political prisoners, and electoral reforms.

This is significant in a country politically dominated by one ruling party since independence in 1961. The government has responded by frequently clamping down on social media through arrests, mass content removals and platform-specific shutdowns. This is in addition to direct controls over media outlets. Media and communication scholar Leah Mwainyekule examines Tanzania’s social media landscape ahead of elections in October 2025.

What is the history of Tanzania’s social media curbs?
Tanzania’s political system is dominated by the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party, which has held power continuously since independence in 1961. The ruling party has kept in place a political structure headed by a powerful president in a tightly controlled political space. Opposition parties have faced suppression marked by restrictions on rallies, arrests, violence and exclusion from electoral processes. This worsened under former president John Magufuli, who clamped down on political dissent, persecuted opposition figures and imposed legal curbs against media and civic debate.

While President Samia Suluhu Hassan has recently introduced moderate reforms – restoring some rights, easing bans and facilitating dialogue – opposition leaders still confront severe charges or incarceration. The main opposition party – Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (Chadema) – still can’t contest major elections.

Tanzania’s social media curbs are embedded in this political environment. The government claims to be controlling digital content to maintain political and social stability. This strategy is often justified by concerns about national security, misinformation and public order.
Laws and regulations govern the digital space. The landmark legislation is the Cybercrimes Act of 2015, which introduced provisions about online activities.

• It is illegal to share or receive unauthorised information, even if truthful or publicly available.
• Police have extensive powers to conduct searches and seizures.
• Secret surveillance and interception of communications can happen without judicial authorisation or proper due process.

The law has been condemned for provisions which limit political expression through blogs, online media and mobile platforms like WhatsApp. People have been arrested for criticising government officials or the president on WhatsApp and Facebook.

Further controls relate to obligations for internet service providers, social media platform owners, and expanded categories of prohibited content. They are contained in another law which was amended in 2025.

Critics highlight provisions that undermine online anonymity. Internet service providers and online content service providers have to be able to identify the source of online content. Internet café operators are required to register users through recognised IDs, assign static IP addresses, and install cameras to monitor users’ activities.

The laws are vague about defining what’s not allowed. It might be:
• content which “offends individuals or groups”
• sharing “evil content”
• promoting material “likely to mislead or deceive the public”.

The lack of clear guidelines enables officials to target critics or unwanted content as they please.

Finally, critics have pointed to unrealistic deadlines for content removal. The 2018 regulations said platforms must remove prohibited content within 12 hours of notification. The 2020 update reduced this deadline to just two hours. This made it one of the most stringent requirements globally.

The two-hour removal window applies mainly to content flagged by the Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority. But it could also relate to complaints from affected users. Platforms must also suspend or terminate accounts of users who fail to remove prohibited content within this period. This short deadline makes it nearly impossible to check whether content is legal before removal.

These regulations are widely perceived as politically motivated. They appear designed to suppress government critics, media and opposition voices. They stifle legitimate public discourse.

What are the government’s most recent actions?
The most recent example is the government’s suspension of the country’s most popular online forum, Jamii Forums, for 90 days in September 2025. The government cited the publication of content that “misleads the public”, “defames” the president and undermines national unity.

The government has also resorted to blanket bans of platforms like X (formerly Twitter). The most recent followed the hacking of official police accounts in a cyber attack. Although some users access X through virtual private networks (VPNs), the ban remains officially enforced by internet service providers across the country.

The timing of the shutdown echoes similar action in 2020 in the run-up to the previous general election. Tools to bypass national network restrictions are illegal and punishable by law. Traditional media such as radio, television and newspapers face growing government censorship and surveillance pressure.

What is the effect on social and political debates?
Tanzania is set for general elections on 29 October 2025. The restrictions on social media will doubtless be felt. The restrictions reduce the platforms available for open discussion of government policies, political ideas and election choices. This shrinking digital space undermines public participation and limits access to diverse viewpoints critical for democratic debate.

Social media also play another important role. Social media users are known to expose electoral fraud, misinformation and government misconduct. The scales are tilted against dissent, opposition narratives and minority voices. At the same time, misinformation and hate speech may grow. This can increase the risks of polarisation and identity-based tensions.

The expanding restrictions reflect a governance model favouring information control over transparency and accountability. This can normalise censorship, arbitrary detentions and media suppression. In essence, Tanzania’s social media curbs are likely to weaken governance. They undermine transparency, increase tension, and erode public trust, limiting democratic accountability.

Leah Mwainyekule is a lecturer at the University of Westminster. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article at https://theconversation.com/tanzanias-social-media­clampdown-and-the-elections-whats-at-risk-265215.

Tundu Lissu during his court appearance in April 2025

Tundu Lissu arrested, charged with treason
On April 9, 2025, Tundu Lissu, the recently elected chairperson of Chadema, the most prominent opposition party, and the party’s most likely 2025 presidential candidate, was arrested in Mbinga, southwest Tanzania. He had been addressing a rally calling for electoral reforms under the slogan “No Reforms, No Election.”

Lissu was charged with treason, a non-bailable offense carrying a potential death penalty, and three counts of “publication of false information” under Tanzania’s cybercrime laws, stemming from a YouTube post on April 3, 2025, alleging police involvement in electoral malpractices ordered by President Samia Suluhu Hassan.

Lissu was transferred to Dar es Salaam and appeared at Kisutu Magistrates Court on April 10, 2025. His treason case was adjourned to April 24, 2025, and he remains in custody, as treason charges do not allow bail.

On April 24, the police used force, including teargas, to disperse Chadema supporters outside the court, injuring at least 14 people. Lissu refused to attend a virtual court hearing, and two Chadema officials, John Heche and John Mnyika, were arrested en route to a join a group of supporters near the courthouse.

In context
On April 12, 2025, the Independent National Elections Commission barred Chadema from participating in the October 2025 elections, citing the party’s refusal to sign an electoral code of conduct, which Chadema views as a tool to suppress opposition. This disqualification severely limits Lissu’s and Chadema’s ability to challenge the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM).

Lissu has consistently called for an electoral commission that is genuinely independent, arguing that the current one, appointed by President Hassan, cannot ensure free and fair elections. His campaign intensified after the November 2024 local elections, where Chadema claimed thousands of its candidates were disqualified, allowing CCM to win almost all the seats contested.

A recent address to party members included a strong reminder of last year’s local government elections where official results gave candidates from the ruling CCM party more than 99% of the grassroots level seats at stake amid widespread claims of electoral fraud. “After going through that experience, any Chadema member who hopes to win in the same circumstances is not serious,” Lissu said. “We will just be slaughtered again, and that’s why we are pushing for reforms across the entire system of conducting the elections to prevent a repeat of that kind of farce.”

In September 2024, a senior Chadema official, Ali Mohamed Kibao, was abducted and killed, and the Tanganyika Law Society has reported 83 abductions or disappearances of government critics. There have also been mass arrests, including over 100 Chadema members (and five journalists) in Mbeya in August 2024, for planning a youth rally.

Lissu is no stranger to political difficulties. In 2017, he survived an assassination attempt, sustaining 16 bullet wounds, which forced him into exile in Belgium until 2020. He ran against President John Magufuli in the 2020 election, which was marred by allegations of rigging, and returned to Tanzania in 2023 after Hassan lifted a ban on rallies.

Some responses
Neither the Home Affairs Minister, Prime Minister nor President Samia Suluhu Hassan have directly addressed Lissu’s April 2025 arrest in public statements available up to May 15, 2025.

President Samia has previously positioned herself as open to dialogue with opposition leaders, though Chadema leaders have questioned how wholehearted these efforts have been. Despite introducing some reforms in 2021-2022, such as lifting bans on opposition rallies, recent signs suggest Hassan is retreating from democratic commitments, with Lissu’s arrest seen as part of a strategy to suppress opposition ahead of the October 2025 elections.

Zitto Kabwe, a leading figure in ACT Wazalendo, Tanzania’s second-largest opposition party, has expressed his concern over Lissu’s arrest. “Tundu Lissu’s case is a test for Tanzania’s democratic credentials under President Samia. How the courts handle it will be closely watched, both locally and internationally.” Unlike Chadema, ACT Wazalendo did (with reservations) sign the electoral code of conduct.

John Heche, the vice-chair of Chadema, defended Lissu’s campaign for electoral reform, invoking Tanzania’s founding president: “Mwalimu Nyerere said that Tanzanian youth should rebel against oppressive systems. What is the problem with rebelling against people who steal elections, against elections being stolen?”

John Mnyika, the party’s secretary general said: “They may silence Lissu for a day, but they cannot silence the will of the people forever.”

The party has also released official statements on the case. “The arrest of the Chairman of Chadema, Tundu Lissu, is a clear signal by the Samia and CCM regime that they do not respect the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania that declares Tanzania to be a multiparty democracy.”

Religious leaders in Tanzania have actively commented on Tundu Lissu’s arrest and the broader state of Tanzania’s democracy, expressing alarm over democratic backsliding and human rights violations. On April 20, 2025, the TEC, representing Catholic bishops, issued a statement calling for the immediate and unconditional release of Lissu and other detained political leaders, emphasizing that such actions are essential for preserving national peace ahead of the October 2025 elections.

The European Parliament and Amnesty International have called for Lissu’s immediate release, condemning his arrest as politically motivated and urging Tanzania to uphold freedom of expression and assembly. On May 8, the EU Parliament passed a resolution condemning Lissu’s arrest and expressing “grave concern over the charges against him, which appear to be politically motivated and carry the risk of capital punishment.” It called for his “immediate and unconditional release,” ensuring his safety and right to a fair trial and legal representation. The resolution also urged Tanzania to respect democratic principles and allow opposition parties to operate freely.

A backlash to the backlash?

Father Charles Kitima, secretary general of the TEC (Tanzania Episcopal Conference), who was attacked in April

Father Charles Kitima, secretary general of the TEC and a longstanding critic of human rights abuses, was attacked on April 30, 2025 at the TEC headquarters in Kurasini, Dar es Salaam, by unknown assailants. It has been widely alleged that this was in retaliation for his outspoken stance. He had criticised the government’s actions, including Lissu’s detention, as “unlawful”, and linked Lissu’s arrest to broader electoral malpractices. “Stealing citizens’ votes, introducing fake or invalid ballots, and declaring someone who did not receive the majority of votes, while ignoring the rightful winner, that is evil, and it is the work of the devil.”

In a social media video recorded just hours before he was attacked, Kitima criticized “lawlessness” in Tanzania’s political system, urging the government to address electoral injustices to ensure free and fair polls. Following his attack, he relayed a message urging Tanzanians to “stand firm in defending fundamental national issues” and “not be afraid to pay the price for upholding justice and our national responsibilities.”

Opposition leaders condemned the attack, including Chadema’s John Heche who described it as “bad news for the country” and ACT Wazalendo’s Dorothy Semu who said it was “shocking and disturbing”. She questioned whether an ordinary person would attack a prominent religious leader in such a public location.

The government has not directly responded to Kitima’s specific comments on Lissu or electoral reforms, nor has it issued an official comment on the attack on Fr Kitima. However, both President Samia Suluhu Hassan and the Prime Minister Kassim Majaliwa had recently warned religious leaders against using their platforms for political purposes. Just in April, Mr Majaliwa urged religious leaders to focus on moral issues like gender-based violence rather than political matters.

On May 2nd, the EU delegation in Tanzania expressed being “deeply saddened” by the attack, and the US Embassy issued a statement condemning the “shocking and brutal attack.” The EU described Kitima as a “respected voice for civic education, inter-faith dialogue, and a peaceful, inclusive society.” They echoed calls for a “thorough investigation” and wished for Kitima’s speedy recovery, emphasizing his role in promoting democratic values.

Looking to the election
The next issue of Tanzanian Affairs is due out in October, around the time of the next elections. In the meantime, the situation is more than usually tense.

Chadema’s decision effectively to boycott the election means that one of the major players in Tanzanian politics will be sitting on the sidelines. It has also introduced some intra-opposition tension, as the other major opposition party – ACT Wazalendo – with a big presence in Zanzibar has not joined the boycott.

Both decisions are understandable. ACT’s major focus is Zanzibar, where the previous experience of CUF election boycotts has been that this has been ineffective and results only in a party being entirely locked out of power for five years. Party leader, Zitto Kabwe wrote recently that “to boycott these elections would be to hand victory to those who thrive on our silence. Instead, we fight, inspired by warriors of change who turned rigged elections into battlegrounds for justice. And that we will surely do!”

For Chadema, they highlight a situation where two key “referees” – the registrar of political parties and the electoral commission – are far from independent and ask how a meaningful election is possible in such circumstances. The “election code of conduct” appeared to be the immediate cause of their decision not to participate, and the party claims the code was a tool to suppress opposition. Nevertheless, their slogan “no reforms, no election” makes it clear that without significant electoral and/or constitutional reform, they were never likely to make a different choice.

With Chadema sitting things out, CCM faces little opposition. The only other party of significance is ACT-Wazalendo, which lacks Chadema’s organisational strength (with the exception of Zanzibar).

Voter turnout, which fell from 67% in 2015 to 52% in 2020, may fall even further, reflecting growing number who question the point of voting.

Electoral reform, particularly the establishment of a truly independent electoral commission, has been a central demand of opposition parties, civil society, and religious leaders. However, there are no prospects for meaningful reform before October 2025. In February 2024, Parliament passed amendments including the National Electoral Commission Act adding “Independent” to the name of the National Electoral Commission (NEC), making it “INEC” and shifting appointments to a panel chaired by the chief justice. However, these changes have been widely criticised as cosmetic, as the president retains veto power over appointees, and returning officers remain presidential appointees.

In September 2023, the President cited “insufficient time” for constitutional reform before the 2024 local elections, a stance that logically extends to 2025. This was despite a 2022 government task force recommending an independent electoral body and constitutional review. The government’s introduction of bills effectively maintaining the status quo as well as its response to Chadema’s “no reform, no election” campaign, have made it clear that the government has no inclination for change.

President Samia’s initial reforms (initiating cross-party dialogue, lifting rally bans in 2023, etc.) raised hopes for a democratic revival. However, more recent actions, including appointing Magufuli loyalists like Paul Makonda (see Issue 139), the arrest of Lissu and a growing number of apparent disappearances of critics strongly suggest a return to a hardline approach.

Neither domestic advocacy nor international pressure has shifted CCM’s stance, and the party’s ongoing dominance suggests that the official election results are not difficult to forecast. Given the high state of tension, however, as well as widespread anger among opposition party supporters, the broader outcome of the election is much more open. Chadema supporters in particular will have no obvious outlet for their frustrations. Protests and rallies are likely, to which the police response is highly predictable.

by Ben Taylor

President Samia officially nominated as CCM candidate for 2025 elections

The ruling CCM party has formally nominated President Samia Suluhu Hassan, the country’s current president, as the party’s presidential candidate in the elections scheduled for October 2025. She is currently serving out the term of President Magufuli, who won re-election in 2020 but died a few months later.

The party’s national congress passed a resolution on January 19th, endorsing President Samia Suluhu Hassan and President Hussein Ali Hassan Mwinyi as its official candidates for the Union and Zanzibar presidential elections, respectively. The resolution was unanimously approved by all delegates and followed pressure from the floor and a recommendation from former President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete.

“If we want to decide today that Samia is our candidate and Mwinyi is our candidate, we have the authority to do so,” Mr Kikwete told the delegates, to much applause.

Turning to President Samia, who chaired the congress, Mr Kikwete remarked: “Madam Chairperson, I am not sure whether I have clarified matters or made them more confusing. But the people have spoken. If they want you to continue, who else will say no?”

He then proposed that the congress formalise the decision through a written resolution to avoid ambiguity, which was then done. At the same meeting, President Hassan nominated Dr Emmanuel Nchimbi as her running mate for the upcoming elections. His nomination came shortly after Vice President Dr Philip Mpango requested to step down.

“After receiving Vice President Mpango’s letter, I consulted our elders and shared my thoughts,” President Hassan said. “Together, we agreed on one name that embodies experience and capability. That name is Dr Emmanuel Nchimbi.”

Dr Nchimbi, currently CCM’s Secretary-General, is well-versed in navigating high-stakes government and party leadership. He has a long CV both within the party and in government, as a former chair of the party’s youth wing, UVCCM, and former Home Affairs Minister (2012­13) under President Kikwete, among many other positions. He spent much of the last decade outside the country, as Tanzania’s ambassador to Brazil (2016-21) and then Egypt (2022-23).

He was a prominent support of Edward Lowassa in his 2015 bid for the CCM presidential nomination, though he did not follow Mr Lowassa to Chadema when his candidacy was rebuffed by CCM. Indeed, he was later seen as an important figure in efforts to negotiate a rapprochement, and some analysts have suggested that his ability to reach all parts of the party was a key factor in his nomination.

“By choosing someone like Dr Nchimbi, the party is not just prioritising competence but also signalling that it values unity and inclusivity,” said political analyst Faraja Kristomus of the University of Dar es Salaam.

Reading the runes – and the room
This is the earliest that CCM has settled on a presidential candidate. Indeed, it is believed to be the first time that there has been no procedure for collecting and submitting presidential nomination forms. And while the calls for the various nominations were apparently driven by delegates to the meeting, there can be little doubt that this was a pre-planned move. Some analysts suggested the vice-president’s letter announcing his intention to step down was choreographed.

This suggests that President Samia has become more adept in navigating the intricate dynamics and factions within CCM, effectively cutting off any potential obstacles to her candidacy in the 2025 elections before such shoots were able to emerge. It may also indicate that senior figures in the party are keen to project an image of unity as they approach the 2025 elections. The contrast with the current situation at the main opposition party, Chadema, is stark – see article below.

Nevertheless, the manoeuvre is not without risks. It doesn’t exude confidence if you need to launch a surprise raid while your potential opponents are unprepared. More seriously, those with presidential ambitions within the party will have to wait for another five years, and some may decide that their prospects look brighter outside CCM. Or they may feel that their time would be better spent in the background, preparing for 2030 rather than lining up behind President Samia’s 2025 campaign.

“Today we have finished the work. If there is someone who dreams of running for the presidency, forget it. Today is the end of the work. And if there is someone who had those dreams, maybe he should run for his mother’s party, but for the CCM, the work is done and completed,” said one delegate, Mr George Ruhoro, the MP for Ngara.

Those with dreams may also find that Dr Nchimbi now starts the race for the 2030 nomination in pole position. However, they will not give up hope, as the party’s practise on presidential nominations has generally been to recruit from those in mid-level ministerial experience rather than sitting vice-presidents or prime ministers.

Chadema power struggles
While the ruling party’s 2025 nominations process has concluded early, more than nine months ahead of the likely election date, the leading opposition party, Chadema, finds itself focussed on in-fighting. Specifically, the party’s previous presidential candidate, Tundu Lissu, is seeking to take over as party chair from the long-standing incumbent, Freeman Mbowe.

Supporters of Lissu argue that after 21 years under Mbowe’s stewardship without significant electoral success, Chadema needs fresh leadership. Meanwhile, Mbowe’s followers have accused Lissu of being divisive and breaching party confidentiality.

The accusations and counter-accusations from both camps, as well as the strong rhetoric employed by the candidates’ supporters, have only served to raise tensions and concerns. Observers worry that the process could deepen internal fractures, especially given the passionate support both candidates command.

Addressing Chadema’s National Executive Council in Dar es Salaam on January 20th, Mbowe urged members to remain steadfast in their commitment to the party’s mission.

“We have not come to Dar es Salaam to divide ourselves but to build and strengthen this party to fulfil the dreams of Tanzanians,” Mbowe said. He warned against succumbing to external forces seeking to destabilise Chadema and stressed that differences should strengthen rather than weaken the party.

“The whole world is watching. Our opponents are observing us, and our friends are waiting in anticipation. Let us demonstrate that Chadema is united and part of God’s plan,” he added.

Nevertheless, Mr Mbowe’s campaign took a heavy blow the same day when one of the party’s most prominent former MPs, Godbless Lema, previously an Mbowe-loyalist, declared his support for Tundu Lissu.

Lissu is well-known for his strong anti-corruption stance both within and outside the party. This endears him to the public, which is tired of corruption and other forms of malpractice in the running of public institutions. His clear commitment to transparency and accountability further strengthens his appeal as a leader capable of driving meaningful change.

In contrast, Mbowe has often appeared to struggle with the contrast between his demands for transparency and accountability from government on the one hand and his own domineering approach to party leadership on the other, though he has recently taken some steps to address internal governance issues under his leadership. STOP PRESS: After writing the above, on January 22nd, Tundu Lissu was elected as chair of Chadema. Mr Mbowe conceded defeat, writing on X: “I fully accept the decision of the General Assembly election of our party, Chadema. … I congratulate Hon. Tundu Lissu and his team for being entrusted with the party’s leadership. I wish them all the best as they move the party forward.”

Opposition, the media and activists face pressure
In October 2024, three of Tanzania’s leading newspapers – The Citizen, Mwananchi and Mwanaspoti – had their website licenses suspended by the government after publishing an animated video deemed to overstep the line in its criticism of President Samia Suluhu Hassan.

The three papers – all part of the same media house – were banned from publishing anything on their websites, on YouTube or social media for 30 days. The Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority (TCRA) said the video violated the Electronic and Postal Communications (Online Content) Regulations of 2020. Specifically, the regulator said the content “threatens and is likely to affect and harm national unity and social peace of the United Republic of Tanzania”.
The animated video depicted a female character who resembled the President with her signature hijab. It showed the character switching between different TV stations. On each one there was someone complaining about the killing, abduction or disappearance of a family member. At the end, the character appears upset by all the complaints.
Mpoki Thomson, The Citizen’s managing editor, said the animation depicted “events that raised concerns regarding the safety and security of individuals in Tanzania”.

A (possibly political?) murder, and a presidential response
As reported previously (see TA139), the issue raised in the video – that of disappearances of activists and opposition leaders – is genuine. Indeed, it was particularly pertinent at the time of the video’s publication, coming as it did, shortly after the brutal killing of a senior member of the main opposition party Chadema, Ali Kibao.

Mr Kibao, 69, was a retired military intelligence officer and had joined Chadema in 2008. He was forced off a bus by suspected security agents while travelling from Dar es Salaam to his hometown Tanga in early September, 2024. The post-mortem found that Mr Kibao had been “severely beaten and had acid poured on his face”, party chairman Freeman Mbowe told the AFP news agency.

Hundreds turned out for Mr Kibao’s funeral in Tanga, where people interrupted Home Affairs Minister Hamad Masauni as he tried to address the mourners. “Where is the government? People are being abducted and there’s no action,” they said. “Resign, resign, resign,” they shouted at the minister.

Mr Mbowe, who was also at the funeral, intervened, urging the crowd to allow the minister to complete his speech.

The US Embassy in Tanzania voiced their support for an “independent, transparent, and prompt investigation” into the killing of Mr Kibao. “Murder and disappearances, as well as last month’s detentions, beatings, efforts to disenfranchise citizens ahead of elections, should have no place in a democracy”.

The President herself addressed such criticism angrily in a speech in mid-September, at which she took several swipes at foreign government interference in internal matters, and contrasted the reaction to this particular murder with the lack of media and diplomatic attention for other recent acts of violence. Her speech is worth quoting at length:

“It is surprising that the death of our brother Kibao has stirred up such a huge outcry of condemnation, grief, and accusations of calling the government murderers. This is not right. Any death is just death. What we Tanzanians must do is stand together and condemn these acts, to stand firm against such behaviour. The blood of a Tanzanian should weigh on us; we should not shed blood without cause.”

“When others wish to show their compassion, we urge them to do so by adhering to the agreements of international diplomatic relations as outlined in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961. … I believe that the statement made is not the directive of the heads of state from where they came.”

“The government has worked very hard to restore the freedom of political parties, the freedom of the media, and the freedom of citizens in general. Those who were in exile returned to the country; … those who had criminal cases we turned a blind eye to; those who were in prison, we released them. Now they are free and are continuing with their activities, including political activities. Our goal was to bring people together to build our country.” “Now, when those same people forget all this and engage in actions or statements that harm or set us back, we will not be willing to allow it, we will not allow it. We will protect the peace and stability of our country at any cost. Just as other countries protect theirs, we Tanzanians will protect our country at any cost.”

“I will show no leniency toward anyone who seeks to disrupt the peace of our nation,” she concluded. “We have been tolerant on many issues, but when it comes to protecting this nation’s peace, I will show no leniency to anyone involved in such matters, whether they are coordinating, participating in, or executing these evil plans.”

And another abduction

Maria Sarungi speaks at a press conference in Nairobi on 13th January, the day after the abduction.

More recently, in early January, prominent freedom of speech advocate and government critic, Maria Sarungi, was abducted in Nairobi. She later told a press briefing that she had been manhandled, choked and shouted at by four unknown assailants who forced her into a vehicle in Kenya’s capital. The activist said she was freed several hours later and left on a “rough road, in a dark place”.

“I am sure that the reason for abduction was to get access to my social media and [because of] the whistleblowing job that I do,” she said, as her abductors kept asking how to unlock her phone.

Ms Sarungi is a staunch critic of Tanzania’s President Samia Suluhu Hassan, and has accused her government of “bringing tyranny back”. She fled to Kenya in 2020, seeking asylum after facing increasing threats, she, says, from the government of late President John Magufuli.

She blamed the Tanzanian government for what happened but said she thought the abductors were both Kenyan and Tanzanian. Officials from neither government have commented on the incident.

Change Tanzania, a movement founded by Ms Sarungi, said in a statement on X it believed she had been taken by Tanzanian security agents “operating beyond Tanzania borders to silence government legitimate criticism”. It added that her “courage in standing up for justice has made her a target”.

There is some history of abductions of foreign activists in Kenya. In 2024, Ugandan opposition leader, Kizza Besigye, was kidnapped in Nairobi, allegedly by Ugandan security officials, and taken across the border for trial by a court martial. The Ugandan government said Kenya helped them in the operation, but the Kenyan government denied this.

by Ben Taylor

What a second Trump presidency means for Tanzania
Much of the whole world waits in trepidation (as well as excitement for some) for the implications of Donald Trump’s second presidential term, and Tanzania is no exception. After all, during his first stint in the White House, he reportedly referred to some African nations as “shithole countries”.

In November, President Samia Suluhu Hassan was quick to congratulate President Trump on his election victory. She posted on Twitter: “On behalf of the Government and the people of the United Republic of Tanzania, I extend my heartfelt congratulations to His Excellency Donald Trump, President-elect of the United States of America on your election victory. Mr. President-elect, you have my best wishes.”

There are many possible global implications of a Trump presidency – not least for global security, the climate crisis and international trade and economics. However, here we will focus on the more direct implications for Tanzania.

First, among the many actions taken by the new president in his first days in office was one that will be felt almost immediately in Tanzania: the suspension of foreign development aid. This executive order was signed by Mr Trump on his first day in office, suspending aid for 90 days to allow for an evaluation of its effectiveness and alignment with his foreign policy. “All department and agency heads responsible for U.S. foreign development aid programmes are to immediately halt new activities and expenditures for development aid,” the order stated.

This includes assistance from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), which has been instrumental in supporting various projects, including the provision of antiretroviral (ARV) drugs to combat HIV/AIDS.

During his first term from 2017 to 2021, President Trump proposed slashing nearly a third of the U.S. diplomacy and aid budgets, including significantly reducing funding for United Nations peacekeeping operations and international agencies. However, Congress at the time resisted Trump’s proposals.

Second, strict immigration rules may limit opportunities for skilled Tanzanians to visit, work, or study in the US, as well as the potential deportation of Tanzanians who are currently living there. Precise numbers of Tanzanians who might be affected are hard to come by. However, in 2023, the number of African migrants recorded at the US-Mexico border was 58,000, and according to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) there are thought to be over 70,000 Tanzanians currently residing in the US, with a wide variety of immigration statuses.

It remains unclear how concertedly the new president will carry out his pledges to deport migrants. Nevertheless, given that Tanzanians living in the US already play an outsized role in Tanzanian domestic politics – largely through their vocal social media output mainly in support of opposition parties – the prospect of many of this group returning to Tanzania could have an outsized impact on political discourse within Tanzania.

Third, President Trump’s policies when it comes to trade are likely to have some – though limited – impacts directly on Tanzania. In particular, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which has enabled eligible African countries to export some of their produce to the US without paying taxes since 2000, is a source of concern for many countries. It is due to expire in 2025, and Mr Trump has previously stated that he will not renew. Further, he has announced his intention to introduce a universal 10% income tariff on all foreign-made goods.

However, Tanzanian producers have never taken much advantage of AGOA and exports from Tanzania to the US are low compared to many other countries in Africa.