TANZANIA'S ECONOMIC RECOVERY PROGRAMME

Tanzania’s most critical economic problem is the fact that foreign exchange income from the export of goods is less than one third of her minimum import requirements. As a result, imports have been ruthless1y cut back and part of the remainder has had to be financed by external grants and loans, which are increasingly difficult to negotiate. External debt amounts to 3.5 billion dollars, or nearly 70% of the gross domestic product. By March 1986 external payments arrears stood at 700 million dollars and total debt service obligations* were already the equivalent of about 60% of export earnings. This very grave situation was brought about by a combination of influences – the toll on foreign exchange reserves exacted by the war in Uganda, the effects of the oil price shock of 1979-80, the world recession, adverse terms of trade in Tanzania’s exports, a series of drought years and above all the decline in agricultural and industrial performance caused by the need to cut back on imports of essential spares and inputs, with cumulative effect on the economy. In the middle seventies Tanzania’s economy was strong and malleable enough to recover from the first oil price shock and the effects of the severe drought of 1974- 75, but the combined effects of the fresh blows sustained at the turn of the decade proved too much for Tanzania’s frail economy. The result was a downward spiral of economic performance. Escape from this trend was bound to be both difficult and costly and to require the active co-operation of international organisations and friendly countries over a substantial period of time.

The protracted negotiations of Tanzania with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have often been referred to in the ‘Bulletin’. These discussions have extended over a period of more than seven years and until 1986 they have led to no lasting agreement mainly for four reasons. First, Tanzania feared a violent and perhaps uncontrollable rise in inflation as a result of the drastic devaluation demanded by the Fund, bringing with it the risk of civil disorder. Secondly, Tanzania saw the Fund’s proposals as a potential threat to the country’s political ideals. Thirdly, it was calculated that the short term nature and relatively high cost of Fund facilities were bound to impose impossible burdens just at the moment of tentative recovery. Fourthly, IMF finance alone was adequate neither in amount, nor in duration, to fund a recovery programme, The experience of the aborted IMF agreement in 1980 showed that a Fund programme did not automatically open the door to complementary external finance. The Fund’s record elsewhere in the ‘Third World’ was not reassuring. Moreover, Fund support was terminable automatically if Tanzania failed to deliver on the Fund’s performance criteria, leaving the economy in the lurch.

In May 1986, provisional understanding with the IMF was finally reached. This outcome was understood to have been made possible by the presence of the World Bank during negotiations, which introduced a moderating voice into the discussion, emphasizing the need to safeguard Tanzania’s potential for development. Moreover, the participation of the Bank held out the hope of Bank and bilateral support for structural adjustment on soft terms. The approach of the Fund and the Rank in tandem to the problems of the least developed countries during recent years reflects a growing realisation in America and elsewhere that the Fund, with its primary concern for measures needed to restore balance to foreign exchange accounts and the severely restrictive nature of its prescriptions, was not a suitable instrument for dealing alone with the problems of poor countries. This new approach was later described by the US Secretary to the Treasury, James Baker, as “adjustment with growth”.

The negotiations involved from the outset both the Fund and the Bank and on their successful conclusion a so-called Consultative Group Meeting was summoned in Paris on 1Oth and 11th June, at which representatives of the Tanzanian Government were able to explain their proposals for economic regeneration to representatives of the Bank, the IMF, 18 bilateral donor countries, the African Development Bank, the Commission of the European Communities and other bodies. The object of these meetings was to consider how the shortfall in resources to meet a minimum import bill of 1,205 million dollars was to be funded in the first year of the Economic Recovery Programme.

The result was agreement in principle for the first year of a three year programme on an IMF standby credit of 45 million dollars and an IMF structural adjustment facility of 24 million dollars , drawn on the IMF Trust Fund. At the same time the Rank undertook to negotiate a structural adjustment loan of 50 million dollars in the first year of a five year programme and a drawing on the sub-Saharan facility in the same amount, both on ‘soft’ terms**. It was expected that these agreements would facilitate debt rescheduling, thus making possible a resumption of imports with the resources now becoming available as well as reducing the annual debt service burden. Initial negotiations on the debt position are to be held in Paris in mid-September.

The total sum required to close the gap between the minimum import bill and export earnings in the first year was estimated to be 550 million dollars. With debt rescheduling providing some postponement of foreign debt obligations, it was calculated that, after taking into account the contributions from the multilateral organisations, some 260 million dollars would be necessary from bilateral sources. In the event, bilateral commitments of about 150 million dollars *** made at the Paris conference fell short of the desired total by about 100 million dollars As a result, an import bill of 1,100 million dollars is now being assumed for purposes of planning and resource allocation.

Amongst he bilateral donors, the United Kingdom offered $10 million in the first year as so-called ‘programme aid’ to provide foreign exchange for essential imports from the United Kingdom, A further £10 million would be available in 1987-88 subject to continued implementation of the agreed programme. In addition, 255 million of untied aid would be available in 1987-88 in association with the World Bank’s Special Facility for Africa.

These agreements were based on the Tanzanian Government’s Economic Recovery Programme, details of which were disclosed during the budget speech of 19th June 1986. This programme drew on the advice of the Presidential Commission on Exports under the chairmanship of Hon. Amir Jamal MP, whose report was submitted in August 1985, by making a radical adjustment of the exchange rate and by further increasing producer prices. The price of the shilling had already been adjusted downward from Tshs 17.7 to the dollar in 1985 to Tshs 29.4 to the dollar in early June 1986. On 20th June the value was fixed at Tshs 40 to the US dollar, or roughly 60 shillings to the pound. Devaluation in successive steps rather than a single mighty jump suggests that with Bank support, Tanzania’s policy of stepwise adjustment had prevailed over the Fund’s preference for a single drastic reduction in shilling values. The Tanzanian approach was held to provide the best means of keeping inflation under control. Henceforth the rate is to be adjusted monthly in line with Tanzanian inflation and at the end of July a rate of Tshs 42 to the dollar had been reached. Devaluation may mike some Tanzanian exports more competitive on world markets, except in those cases where prices are fixed internationally, or quantities determined by quota, but it will also increase the shilling price of imports, thus immediately triggering substantial price rises, the amount varying in accordance with the import content of particular commodities. Only in the longer run, as production levels in industry rise from the present average capacity utilisation of between 20% and 30% and as economic infrastructure, notably roads, railways, vehicles, fuel and spares, is improved, will downward pressures on the price level gather strength. Mercifully, the fall in oil prices has recently brought some relief.

The prices paid to producers of Tanzania’s exports were substantially raised in the 1984 budget, but now further increases took place in amounts varying from 80% for coffee to 30% for cotton and tobacco. In general, it is planned to maintain producer prices at 60% to 70% of export prices at the Tanzanian port, The Government also plans where possible to limit the increases in price of agricultural equipment and inputs by changes in taxation and by encouraging new investment. To cushion to some extent the inevitable sharp rise in the cost of living, allowances will be paid to teachers amounting to 25% of salary, while civil servants will be given allowances ranging from 30% of gross earnings on the minimum wage to 2.5% on salaries in excess of shs.6,000 per month, pending the recommendations of the Nsekela Commission on public sector salaries at the end of 1986 At the same time the rates of income tax will be revised downwards. Hitherto, tax has been collected at rates varying from 25% to 95%, but henceforth rates will range from 20% to 75% The combined results of these changes in salary and income tax will be an increase in monthly earnings ranging from 30% for minimum wage earners to 14.4% for those earning more than Tshs. 6,000 per month, Without departing from the general redistributive function of income tax, the intention is to give the maximum relief to the poorest and at the same time to provide additional incentives for those in the middle and upper salary ranges. The incomes of those outside the civil service are expected to rise in similar fashion.

To stimulate domestic saving, interest rates will be raised in stages until they reach a level commensurate with the market value of capital. Furthermore, strict national housekeeping and increased external resource flows will progressively reduce the budget deficit t o be financed by bank borrowing from Tshs. 5,200 million in the 1985-86 budget to Tshs 2,500 million in 1986-87. Budgetary control as a means of reducing inflation occupies a prominent place in the Economic Recovery Programme. Government financing of parastatal deficits will be ended and additional domestic finance will be available to them only through internal savings, or through the financial institutions. This objective, it must be said, has featured in successive budgets, but has not hitherto been achieved.

The Economic Recovery Programme has been planned over a period of three years. Total minimal foreign exchange resources required in 1986- 87 will be 1,205 million dollars, though, as already stated, finance for only 1,100 million dollars is expected to be forthcoming. In the second and third years the requirement will rise to 1,230 million dollars in 1987-88 and 1,300 million dollars in 1988-89. The hope is that this level of resources will enable Tanzania to increase her export earnings by 11.6% in 1987, 19% in 1988 and 19% in 1989, thus raising export income from an estimated 400 million dollars in 1986 to 632 million dollars in 1989, Even this will take Tanzania less than half way towards the goal of self-reliance in foreign trade. The target requirement of foreign exchange resources is, moreover, minimal and leaves little room for imports that are not essential to the Recovery Programme, or for the accumulation of contingency reserves.

The Minister of Finance has recognised that the attainment of self- sustained growth will be a long haul – he has suggested five to seven years – and steps are now being taken to work out a Second Union Plan covering a five-year period from July 1887, based on economic trends and future prospects. The future will also depend on the human reaction to measures now being taken. There is a good deal of evidence both in Tanzania and elsewhere that peasant farmers react sensitively to incentives and disincentives both in the volume of their marketed output and in their choice of crops. The budget seeks to provide incentives by increasing producer rewards, improving access to farm machinery and inputs, and increasing the supply of common consumption goods by restoring industry to reasonable levels of output. Improved performance within parastatal and private industry is encouraged by alterations in the income tax structure, an improved flow of foreign inputs and machinery spares and a stricter credit regime. But not all human incentives are amenable to financial manipulation and much depends on the quality of leadership given by the Government and the Party. People work hard irrespective of material gain when they believe in what they are doing.
Very grave dangers lie ahead. The initial inflation provoked by devaluation may prove to be much more serious than expected, causing damage to public morale and risks of urban disorder. Industrial regeneration relies on foreign purchases, which will only become possible when new external resources become available . Agriculture, on which the country mainly relies for increased exports, is unavoidably slow to respond to new planting, better husbandry, increased inputs and improved infrastructure. So there will inevitably be a substantial period of greatly increased costs and negligible gains before the benefits of the recovery programme take hold. This time lag will be damagingly increased if there is delay in the payment of donor contributions. Finally, the underfunding of imports by 100 million dollars is a matter of considerable concern. The future is, therefore, – full of uncertainties. It now remains to be seen whether by astute management the Tanzanian Government can survive the interregnum and use this limited opportunity to reverse the country’s economic decline.

J . Roger Carter.

*Of Tanzania’s debt outstanding in 1984, 80.3% was from official sources and largely at concessionary rates, while 19,7% was from private sources.

**’Soft’ terms are negotiated by the Bank’s affiliate, the International Development Association, and provide for a 50 year maturity and repayment beginning after 10 years. There are no interest payments, but a service charge of 0,75% on the disbursed balance and a commitment charge of 0.5% on the undisbursed balance are levied.

***Outright grants or loans or concessional terms.

TANZANIA AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

Years ago when I was an English teacher in Madagascar, I asked a class to write about their home town. Most of the class began with a sentence like “Tulear is 600 kilometers from Tananarive, the capital and 6000 kilometers from Paris”. For them, Paris was the focal point of the world; Africa might as well not have existed. Similar attitudes prevail throughout Africa wherever different languages and customs adopted during the colonial era have led to a lack of awareness about neighbouring countries.

One of the many products of the agonisingly slow and belated progress towards increased co-operation in Europe has been a desire to lessen these barriers between Africans created by colonial rule, and to encourage development and regional co-operation. Bilateral assistance, conditioned as it often is by language and traditional trade ties, usually tends to reinforce these divisions. By bringing together several former colonial powers and other important bilateral donors, the European Community is uniquely well placed to encourage pan-African initiatives such as the preferential trade area, as well as supporting joint action amongst countries affected by problems such as the spread of pests and diseases, or desertification.

Readers of the Bulletin will be aware of the importance of such concepts as Pan-African co-operation in Tanzanian policy over the years since independence. From the beginnings of the Organisation of African Unity through to present day initiatives like the PTA and the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) Tanzania has been prepared to lend its weight, even though its own experience of closer co-operation in the East African Community highlighted the difficulties which can arise. If such problems can arise between countries with strong historical ties how much more hazardous must wider co-operation be ! Yet it is not only natural – the early explorers would surely be dismayed at the cultural gulf and plain lack of contact between some of the areas in the region – but even a geographical necessity that a common approach to problems should be sought. Tanzania’s importance stems not just from its political will in approaching these issues but from its strategic position as a transit country for much of central Africa and from the importance of its own natural resources in the potential development of the region* The EEC through the European Development Fund is supporting Tanzania’s efforts to improve transport facilities which are important for the development of neighbours such as Rwanda and Burundi, by improving the port facilities at Kigoma, assisting Tanzanian Railway Corporation and helping to construct new facilities at Isaka and a road linking them with Rwanda. Emphasis has also been placed on the working out at national level of policies for food production; such a strategy has now been produced for Tanzania. The idea is to bring together all the various factors affecting the provision of an adequate diet for all the population. Regional food security is best achieved by starting at village level or even the individual shamba.

Tanzania has the potential not just to feed itself, but to produce exportable surpluses. However, before that potential can be realised, many constraints must be overcome. Tanzania is almost the poorest of African countries, with all the problems that they share: acute shortage of foreign exchange, weak planning capacity, poor institutional performance. Moreover Tanzania faces particular difficulties in ensuring that all its people have sufficient food, not only because of its size and the poor state of its infrastructure, but also the remoteness of the food producing areas from the deficit regions. Any responsible programme of assistance towards the provision of food for all in Tanzania must face these problems within a realistic time scale.

The Tanzanian Government acknowledges that the sector has suffered from inadequate investment, inadequate incentives to producers, poor performance of the relevant institutions, a lack of foreign exchange and a transport service in a state of disrepair. In its 1982 policy statement on agriculture, on the basis of which the national food strategy was prepared, the Government outlined measures covering institutional reform, prices and input supply and marketing in order to move towards the objective of self sufficiency in food.

It was within the framework of this approach that talks were held in Dar es Salaam in July 1985 between the Tanzanian Government and the European Commission delegation headed by Dieter Frisch, the Director- General for Development. The aim was to agree on the way in which funds available to Tanzania for its national development programme, from the EEC would be allocated. Put simply, the question was, what was the best way for Tanzania to spend about Shs.2,130 million in foreign exchange?

Most farmers in Tanzania grow crops for cash as well as for their own food. In some areas the two crops are grown on the same piece of ground, as is often the case with coffee and bananas grown in the North and North-West. How much each family decides to grow of each depends partly on the price which they will receive for each crop as well as on the suitability of the soil and their own requirements. But Tanzania needs to earn foreign exchange from export crops like coffee and cotton to buy both the inputs needed to grow more food, and the spare parts and fuel to move food around the country. A balanced programme requiring food and cash crops was therefore required. As the EEC has been the main donor for the development of coffee production in Tanzania over the past few years, through a fairly successful programme of support to the Coffee Authority of Tanzania (now the Coffee Marketing Board) which has ensured that coffee production levels were maintained, it was decided to focus the allocation of the finance available on agriculture in the coffee-growing areas. The programme to be supported will cover all the problems affecting coffee and food production in the se areas, including the need to ensure that the newly formed co-operatives can do their job properly. Transport is a particular problem in some of these areas, and the BBC agreed to consider proposals for the repair of lorries along the lines of a successful project carried out a few years ago, and for the maintenance of minor roads giving access to agricultural areas.

The funds available to this programme result from the signature in 1984 of the third Lome convention, a contractual agreement between the EEC and over sixty countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (known as the ‘ACP’ countries). This is a unique agreement covering not only finance for national and regional development, but also a scheme for the stabilisation of export earnings (‘STABEX’ for short) and a wide variety of other forms of support. The EEC’s food aid and its scheme for co-financing projects with voluntary agencies like Christian Aid and Oxfam are funded separately from the Convention (they come from the EEC annual budget) but every attempt is now being made to ensure that all these different forms of co-operation fit together within a coherent framework. The EEC is fast becoming one of Tanzania’s major aid donors, and in fact the share of Tanzania’s aid coming from the Community (including Member States ‘bilateral programmes) is now over 40%. Coupled with the fact that about 50% of the country’s trade is with the European Community, this means that the ties between the two are stronger than at any time since independence.
Martyn Pennington

TANZANIA : A TIME FOR DECISION (ON IMF)

The rains have come early this year in Tanzania, bringing the promise of a second successive year of good crops with only the threat of some damage being caused by the spread of the maize borer worm.

However, even two seasons of good harvests are not going to be adequate to rescue Tanzania from its desperate economic crisis and decline, which has now lasted for almost thirteen years beginning with the quadrupling of oil prices in mid-1973, compounded by adverse international trading conditions, drought and a number of major errors in Government policies.

Julius Nyerere’s successor, President Mwinyi, faces the need to decide in the next few weeks whether his Government will finally come to terms with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to assure an injection of fresh capital aid and foreign exchange or whether to try and overcome the country’s economic crisis by relying on its own resources involving major sacrifices for years to come.

Tanzania’s most loyal foreign aid givers, the four Nordic countries, have collectively advised the Government that the level of their future aid will depend on practical evidence of structural economic reforms.

The political debate over whether to reach an agreement with the IMF or not, though not aired much in public, is being waged with passion and vigour behind the scenes. The signs are that the Government is itself deeply divided, as is the Party. More than that, some of the leaders themselves appear to be divided in their own minds. They do not have much time to decide on their future course of action since the national budget is due to be presented in June. If the decision goes in favour of a deal with the IMF, it will require a decision within the next month at the latest. The preliminaries with the IMF have already been largely completed.

The economic debate is being conducted at the same time as the leadership faces the need to clarify the ambiguous relationship between the Government and the ruling party. So long as Julius Nyerere was both President and Party Chairman, the institutional relationship between Government and Party was difficult but not impossible to handle. The situation is quite different now that the country has a powerful figure in the form of Nyerere at the head of the ruling party – which is responsible for determining policy – while the Government has a new leader (Mwinyi), who is expected to assert his independence.

Mwinyi and Nyerere are in no sense to be seen as rivals; in fact, they complement each other. However, Nyerere is now concerned with rebuilding the authority and organisation of the Party which has lost some of its popular base in recent years; while Mwinyi is being looked up to by the country to demonstrate that he can fill the role of an independent President.

Critics of past Government policies featured prominently at an economic policy workshop convened by the Finance Minister to discuss policies and strategies for economic recovery. One of the most widely discussed papers was presented by two University economists, Professor Idulu and Dr. Lipumba. They summed up the nature and extent of the economic crisis as a slowing down of economic growth, declines in real per capita income, high rates of inflation, severe reduction in import and debt-servicing capacity, and a general breakdown of the Government control systems exemplified by the growth of parallel markets including a growing black market. Real growth in the gross domestic product (GDP) declined to an average of 0.72% per annum between 1979 and 1984 – down from the average of 2.9% between 1976 and 1978.

If one takes into account the rate of population growth this means that there has been a negative growth rate since 1979 amounting to minus 0.67%.The combined effects of a slowing down of production and high inflation reduced real incomes of both rural and urban dwellers.

According to ILO estimates for 1985, rural incomes have declined since 1979 by 13.5% and for urban wage-earners by a massive 65%.

The overall decline of Tanzania’s foreign trade balance has been spectacular. In 1977 the country still had a surplus of about £27 million; by 1984 the negative balance had reached almost £105 million. Real imports declined by 42% between 1978 and 1982.

The country’s inability to pay for imports led to an accumulation of arrears of payments amounting to $764 million during the 1980-84 period. During the past six years export earnings financed less than half the cost of imports. This meant increasing dependence on an external inflow of funds to finance even the reduced level of imports.

The volume of exports has fallen continuously from its peak in 1972. Although there were other factors accounting for this fall – such as the bottlenecks caused by a lack of foreign exchange – Ndulu and Lipumba insist that this is only a partial explanation. In their view the basic problem has been an “incentive structure and institutional set-up” that, over time, has discouraged peasants and farmers from an increasing production in general, and export crops in particular.

They add that “probably the more poignant problem of the agricultural sector is the inefficient crop marketing and input delivery system and policy uncertainty that faced economic agents in the agricultural sector.-“

The only sector that has persistently maintained high rates of economic growth from the 1970′ s has been the public administration. The authors stress the widespread laxity in management and public administration and the lack of accountability at all levels. And they argue that “without linking rewards to performance and responsibilities. it is unlikely that a sustainable recovery can be initiated even when the level of resource inflow is increased.” They criticise the institutional rigidities and unresponsiveness to economic changes that characterise governmental and parastatal organisations, as well as excessive centralisation.

The two economists come out firmly in favour of an agreement with the IMF which they say is necessary to unlock bilateral aid resources. Even then they envisage as “shock treatment” a period of eighteen months with a five year horizon to achieve sustained adjustments of the economy. The additional inflow of foreign resources, they suggest, should be at least $335 million for immediate needs.

They also propose adjusting the exchange rate to 40/- to a dollar – in fact, a substantial devaluation; but the effect of devaluation of exports should be passed on to agricultural producers. Nominal prices should be increased by at least 65%.

“Peasants”, they say, “should get a strong message that it is worth their while to increase production of export crops.” Finally, they believe it is possible to increase both export and food crops if marketing constraints are removed and the incentive to produce agricultural crops is restored; and they argue in favour of creating “a more liberal trade environment.”

Colin Legum. (Third World Reports)

SEMINARS AND WORKSHOPS

Colin Legum has referred in the paper above to a seminar and a workshop. But during the last 3 months there has been a veritable plethora of seminars and workshops as Tanzania struggles to solve its serious problems. Eight have been reported on in the pages of the Daily News between January and March ’86.

It is quite apparent that there has been a great deal of frank and open discussion at these meetings. Speaking at the end of what was in fact the third annual “Workshop on Policies and Strategies for Economic Recovery”, Prime Minister J.S. Warioba stated that such workshops dispel the notion that it is taboo to be openly critical of Government policy. Referring to the two previous workshops he said that “The many constructive critical papers and the few unconstructive ones which have been submitted at each workshop and the range of open debate which has taken place is testimony to this. It has dispelled the myth that Government is a rigid institution with a fixed position. I am sure you have noted that several recommendations that you have made in the previous workshops have been incorporated in Government policy measures. This is proof that the Government is always open to new ideas and it is ready to listen to advice. We appreciate a critical appraisal of our policies from every quarter, even from our detractors.”

There is every indication that at this particular seminar there were some fairly heated and emotional exchanges particularly on the issue of the IMF. Ndugu Warioba’s words on this are interesting: “In his opening remarks the President encouraged you to make comprehensive studies and analysis of the foreign institutions, multilateral and bilateral recovery packages as well as our own internal adjustment programmes and come out with some practical recommendations for the Government to consider. I have read some of the papers presented at this workshop and I have also read about your discussions. But I feel we have stagnated or we are becoming stereotyped. We should not treat this as a subject for a debating club where you pick a subject, you have a proposer and an opposer, you debate and the matter ends there. This country faces a very serious economic crisis. With or without the IMF things will be very tough for the next several years. A stabilisation package is not going to be a novel thing, not even for Tanzania. Many countries have had stabilisation packages, with or without the IMF.

Unlike the subject of a debating club the real business of a stabilisation package begins after the debate and after the choice has been made. It is important therefore to know exactly how that package is going to affect every sector of the economy and society. A failed academic paper will at worst end up in a waste paper basket, but a failed stabilisation package has very serious consequences for the country and the people, particularly the ordinary people. I have detected a note of emotionalism and polarisation. It is beginning to appear that one is either pro-IMF or anti-IMF. I think this is wrong particularly for economic experts. Tanzanians are neither pro-IMF nor anti-IMF. They are pro-Tanzania. You can help this country if you remain objective. Try to guard that objectivity and you will be very useful to this society; if you do not do so you will not have much of an impact.”

A singular note had been struck a few days earlier in a commentary in the Daily News but this also included some reference to the British position.

“The IMF is not formally on the agenda but their demand for a devaluation of up to 50/- to the dollar and an increase in interest rates to 35% are uppermost in the minds of those who have been negotiating with the IMF. As if to pre-empt the discussion of alternatives to the IMF only this week a British Minister (as if she forgot the present place of Britain) urged Tanzania to enter into an agreement with the IMF. Fortunately Tanzania’s diplomacy is sophisticated so there has not yet been any public rebuke.

“Britain is not in a good position to offer advice on assistance to Africa especially at this time when the position of the British leadership is probably the most extreme in defence of apartheid. Moreover among the OBCD countries the level of British aid is now the lowest, given the free market ideas of the present leader. As a long standing trading partner of Tanzania, Britain has been one of the tightest in the offering of export guarantees to Tanzania. Her leaders find it easier to lend to South Africa than to Tanzania. This is why Tanzania’s indebtedness to Britain is relatively small, much smaller than Tanzania’s present debt to Algeria or to India.

“One clear lesson to be learnt from other experiences so far is that there is no quick remedy for recovery. Whatever the strategies they will have to be borne on the shoulders of the vast majority of the working poor of Tanzania. The question will be which sections of the society will bear the burden of recovery. Will it be borne by all or by the poorest of the poor ? It is clear that economic strategies will need political change so the balance between the required political changes and the specific alternatives are significant.

“One concern which can be expressed is to question the very conception of annual meetings on economic policies and strategies. The nature of the Tanzanian economy is such that it takes three to five years to see the results of new changes in policies.”

President Mwinyi in opening the seminar had clarified the Government’s position. “The Government will continue with its dual policy of negotiating with the IMF for realistic terms while making internal adjustments aimed at economic stabilisation.”

He reiterated, however, that whether or not an IMF package was won, a realistic solution to Tanzania’s economic problems depended on what the people did to improve the situation through higher agricultural and industrial production.

At a seminar for political commissars and political education officers of the Tanzanian Peoples Defence Forces and the National Service there was no reluctance in expressing opinions. One of the resolutions passed stated that the Government should not succumb to the conditions of the IMF. Accepting the rigid IMF conditions “would bring about political and economic turmoil and disrupt unity, peace and tranquillity in the country.”

One of the measures the Government has already taken to deal with the economic crisis was referred to by Ndugu Daudi Mwakawago, the Minister for Labour and Manpower Development at another seminar organised by the Union of Tanzania Yorkers (JUWATA). “The Government expects to save 190 million shillings annually following the laying off of 12,360 civil servants last year” he said. He went on to say that 14,117 other employees were layed off by parastatal organisations under the cost reduction exercise, affecting a 160.8 million shillings saving in salaries and another 964.2 million shillings in operational costs.

He told seminar participants that more lay-offs could not be ruled out at this point. “I can’t say how long the exercise will take – it all depends on the economic performance,” he said.

He explained that if the situation deteriorated the Government might be forced to scrap some public institutions along with their employees. The Government had earmarked 27,261 workers for redundancy to save 305.9 million shillings, but 15,354 of the Employees were absorbed by local Governments. Ndugu Mwakawago pointed out that apart from the lay-offs, the Government had cut down the number of ministries from 21 to 14 under the cost reduction measures.

He said all but 108 of the civil servants declared redundant had received their terminal benefits by the end of last month. Ndugu Mwakawago said an appeals committee formed by his Ministry received 333 complaints by lay-off victims last year, 60 of which were proved genuine and the complainants ordered reinstated.

At a seminar in Arusha organised by the Institute of Engineers in Tanzania (IET), the Minister for Communications and Works, Ndugu Mustafa Nyang’anyi said that the country was only too aware of the unsatisfactory implementation of development projects. “The Kirumi Bridge project, for instance, which you will also be discussing in this seminar, has taken us twelve years to complete instead of the initially planned three years”. He told the nearly two hundred engineers attending the seminar that a technical audit system to ensure that Government and parastatal projects comply with established standards is to be introduced in the country soon. This was aimed at curbing wastage of millions of public funds, he added.

The Minister said that the audit system had been decided upon because foreign firms which were mostly responsible for planning and designing local projects, did not always comply with standards applicable in Tanzania. The foreign firms did not only plan and design local projects, but also executed and supervised their implementation with very little involvement of the local engineers, he pointed out. “The case of the Mbeya cement factory serves to illustrate this point”.

Seminars have also been held on “Productivity Management at the Shop Floor Level” in Zanzibar and on “Strategies for the Development of Women and Children” on the mainland.

David Brewin

PEASANT FARMING IN TANZANIA IN THE TIME OF PRESIDENT NYERERE

Since independence peasant farming has received great emphasis in Tanzania at least at the rhetorical level. In his inaugural address to the Republican Parliament on 10 December 1962 President Nyerere said that “Tanganyika is in fact a country of peasant farmers… for this reason, in drawing up our Three Year Development Plan, Government decided to lay the greatest emphasis on agriculture. But it is ridiculous to concentrate on agriculture if we are not going to make any change in our old methods of cultivation and our old ways of living. .. The hand hoe will not bring us the things we need today.” He realised, as he does today , that peasant agriculture was operating under enormous cultural and technical constraints associated with the mode of life, traditions and customs of the peasantry. He envisaged this change taking place only if rural people stopped living in scattered homesteads in the countryside and started living in nucleated villages.

“For the next few years Government will be doing all it can to enable the farmers of Tanganyika to come together in village communities … Unless we do we shall not be able to provide ourselves with the things we need to develop our land and to raise our standard of living. We shall not be able to use tractors; we shall not be able to provide school s for our children; we shall not be able to build hospitals, or have clean drinking water, it will be quite impossible to start small village industries.”

Nyerere’s concept of village community life was not limited to the advantages to agriculture from the use of tractors and oxen, or the provision of social services which he regarded as essential prerequisites to the improvement of t he quality of life in the countryside, but he also envisaged villages as providing the basic units of participatory and democratic government.

“If the people are to be able to develop they must have power. They must be able to control their own activities within the framework of their village communities. And they must be able to mount effective pressure nationally also. The people must participate not just in the physical labour involved in economic development, but also in the planning of it and the determination of priorities.”

Thus, Nyerere’s ideas for improving the life of people in the rural areas embraced a wide spectrum of objectives – political, social, economic and cultural. These aims were encapsulated in the philosophical concept of ‘ujamaa’, a vision of rural life that would give substance to his beliefs about human development.

However, early attempts to promote the resettlement of the rural people in villages proved abortive. It was only after the publication of the Arusha Declaration in 1967, which set out a new national development strategy based on socialist principles, that the peasants began in any numbers to move into villages, known popularly as ‘ujamaa villages’. The key elements of this new policy were education and persuasion, resulting in voluntary movement into village communities. Even so, by the middle of 1973 it was evident that villagisation was proceeding at a pace much slower than expected and in October 1973 the Party directed the Government to ensure that all rural people were living in villages by the end of 1976. In 1973 there 5,628 villages in mainland Tanzania with a total population of just over two million representing about 15% of the total population of mainland Tanzania, but by 1976 the number of villages had increased to 7,684 embracing a population of over 13 million, or 81% of the total.

Nyerere’s concern for the welfare of rural people stems from the fact of his own peasant origin and his continuing close links with village life. He is a full member of Butiama village, the home of his birth, and delights to visit it whenever he can spare time away from the burdens of party office. He participates actively in village activities and works on the village farm alongside his fellow villagers. It is common knowledge in Tanzania, especially among the bureaucratic elite , that when it comes to working with the hand hoe or machete it is not advisable to stand close to Nyerere. You just cannot match up with his zeal and vigour and will only end up in shame and dejection !

It would however be misleading to attribute Nyerere’s concern with the welfare of the peasantry solely to his own close links with the countryside. His belief that poverty is incompatible with social justice and human dignity underlies the emphasis that he has placed on increased agricultural production by the adoption of modern methods of cultivation as the key to individual fulfilment.

After independence the Ministry of Agriculture’s extension services were entrusted with the task of providing training in improved farming practices and exercising a measure of supervision over the application of modern methods of crop management and animal husbandry. Extension staff were also expected to concern themselves with the timely procurement and distribution of agricultural inputs as well as giving advice on their proper use. The field extension worker – the Bwana Shamba – was, and still is, a key Government agent of grassroots development in the rural economy. There were of course difficulties arising from traditional practices and the natural conservatism of peasant populations. But the central problem lay with the extension workers themselves. There was truth, if also a measure of exaggeration, in President Nyerere’s remark in October 1985, that he could dismiss all the extension staff in the country and there would be no change in agricultural production.

Critics of the Tanzanian extension services have listed the following causes of their relative ineffectiveness:
-the presence of poorly trained or untrained and unmotivated staff;
-lack of close and effective supervision;
-lack of planning;
-ill-defined responsibilities and accountability;
-rigid bureaucratic procedures;
-lack of transport facilities and equipment; and
-poor links between research and extension, with the result of poor or no dissemination of research findings to the peasants.

There were also serious pedagogical shortcomings, which Nyerere was quick to recognise. Himself a trained teacher, he realised that old-fashioned didactical methods were almost useless.

“Agricultural progress is indeed the basis of Tanzanian development … We have to make it understood and meaningful. There is now only one way we can do that. We have to demonstrate by actions that better agricultural methods are possible… We have to show and not say; we have to act, not talk.”

Thus Nyerere put his faith in the demonstration plot, in working with and alongside the peasants. To communicate new methods to the peasantry it was necessary to provide objective proof that the new technology worked.

In the past Government allocations of resources to agriculture have fallen short of the rhetoric. Between 1976-77 and 1981-82 the agricultural sector received an average of only 10.1% of the development budget at central and regional level. Only after the President’s address to the National Conference of CCM in October 1982 did the Government begin to raise the budgetary allocations to the agricultural sector. In 1983-84 the allocation was 23.4% of the development budget, in 1984-85 28.4% and for 1985-86 30.7%.

But the problems of Tanzanian agriculture did not flow from inadequate capital allocations alone. Other causes were the poor distribution of inputs, inadequate rural credit, late cash payment of peasants by the crop authorities, poor marketing organisation, erratic pricing policies, wastage caused by pests and vermin and inadequate warehousing facilities. Agricultural research was inadequate and often irrelevant and information poorly disseminated. Above all there was the unreliability of the weather.

Although, therefore, agriculture has been recognised as the mainstay of the Tanzanian economy at least as far back as 1967, in practice peasant farming, which is by far the largest component of agricultural activity, has been neglected but this situation is now changing and there is a greater awareness of the crucial role of agriculture. Substantial increases in producer prices have been a signal to the peasants of the importance now attached to their work, even if the shelves in the village dukas, where money is converted into things, remain relatively bare. Above all, the atmosphere in which agricultural activities are undertaken is now changing and as the obstacles in the way of production, distribution and marketing are mastered one by one there is now real hope that the agricultural potential of Tanzania will be realised and that the long term goal of self-sufficiency in foodstuffs will at last be reached.
Juma Ngasongwa

Ndugu JUMA NGASONGWA is on the staff of the Sokoine University in Morogoro dealing with Development Studies.

TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE ON MICROCLIMATE MODIFICATION

AN ETHNO-SCIENTIFIC APPROACH IN TANZANIA

The relatively recent recognition that sub-Saharan Africa is in a deep crisis has fostered many inventorial studies on African affairs. Research endeavours and particularly those in agricultural research have not been excluded from this review rage. And the resulting diagnosis is as negative as on most other subjects studied. These recent reviews on agricultural research have a few main conclusions in common.

Firstly the present situation has its roots in the colonial past, in which a dual agricultural economy emerged: a plantation economy serviced by a network of scientific institutions alongside an African subsistence economy which received little or no scientific attention. This situation largely continued in national research efforts after independence. Secondly, the slow expansion rate of University faculties of Agriculture may be taken as the main cause for the present severe shortage of agricultural scientists, despite long-standing commitments to become more self-reliant in this field. Thirdly, courses at African Universities often use curricula developed outside Africa or by outsiders with too short an experience inside Africa, and there is a general tendency of those remaining in research to continue working on subjects largely irrelevant to local smallholder production. And finally, traditional knowledge on local conditions is not valued. Rarely do researchers and extension workers undertake the additional burden of listening to farmers who are using few inputs from outside and inviting them to participate in outlining, performing, validating and using the results of research.

Whether the last two conclusions will continue to be drawn in the near future depends heavily on the national impacts of recent international trends, because internationally increasing attention is now being directed to local farming systems and smallholder participation in collecting, researching and disseminating the locally most successful traditional agricultural practices. This kind of research, with what we may call an ethno-scientific approach, will not be the only one needed. But as long as most of the African -subsistence (or near-subsistence) farmers will have to practice a low external-input agriculture (with respect to their food crops) it will be an extremely important one. Only if this research policy and other policy measures have led to improvement of their conditions, may research on the introduction of seed, fertilizer and water applications specific to the smallholder economy be able to support the next step upwards.

How to tap local knowledge?
The author spent five years (1975-1980) with counterparts and students building up teaching and an infrastructure for research in physical aspects of agricultural meteorology at the Physics Department, University of Dar es Salaam. However, in that whole period we completely failed to obtain local information on a subject thought to be extremely important for research: how traditional farmers in Tanzania learned by trial and error to modify the microclimate of crops to improve quantity, quality and above all protection of their yields. This failure was, after all, understandable against the background of the conclusions reviewed above. Only limited attention had ever been paid to traditional methods of managing soil, water and vegetation, but the least attention of all had been accorded to local knowledge acquired on management and manipulation of the microclimate. This had been recognised by Professor Gene Wilken, a geographer at Colorado State University, who had made a preliminary review of examples of such modifications applied by traditional farmers from all over the world in 1972. But nobody in agricultural meteorology and microclimate research appeared to pick up the challenge his review provoked.

Failing time and again to obtain much information along the official lines, even after having established with colleagues of the Tanzanian Directorate of Meteorology a National Agrometeorological Committee, we resorted to a scientifically unorthodox method: tapping the public at large through a newspaper contest. Of course, in Tanzania still close to 90% of the population works in agriculture. And even among those reading local Kiswahili and English newspapers the large majority come from rural areas and families. Very many of them have their own low-input “shambas” (agricultural plots) to help them to survive with little means, the harsh economic conditions of the city and/or they have close relatives who are farming and with whom they have strong social links which yield mutual support in harsh times. Knowing we would not reach small peasants directly by a newspaper contest, we hoped to reach those newspaper readers and we stimulated them to write up their examples by offering generous prizes for the best (reviews of) examples.

Traditional microclimate modifications
The contributions we obtained, late 1980/early 1981, were generous in number (more than a hundred) and in more than 25% of cases extremely useful and of high quality. From these we first made a catalogue, a shortened version of which is given in the Table. This shows which manipulations and which kinds of management are used by traditional farmers to modify the microclimate of crops and produce. We were also able to single out a series of subjects which appeared most important and least studied from the point of view of traditional applications. These were shading, mulching (covering by a layer different from the original soil), wind protection and modification at/or surfaces. Other important conclusions were that the examples collected were often extremely local in their application and that there was much room for dissemination of such practices.

Shading is a subject about which a reasonable amount of knowledge has been collected on plant physiological aspects, but hardly any work has been done on aspects relevant to the agricultural meteorology of smallholder farming systems such as agroforestry and other multiple cropping systems. Labour intensive systems using soil and seedling protection and modification of soil temperature and moisture conditions by mulching have been studied extensively in horticulture, but the trend towards more and more climate controlled greenhouse cultivation in Japan and the Western countries has appreciably diminished research in this area. This is even more true for the materials locally available in the tropics.

Wind protection by traditional farmers in the tropics appears to be completely different from the single and multiple row windbreaks used and researched heavily in more developed agriculture. Protection at four sides (or nearly so) and making use of wind reduction by scattered obstacles such as trees and bushes are found to be extremely important but there are hardly any studies of the efficiency of such systems.

Table: Examples of Manipulation of Climate

Manipulation of radiation
-Shading
-Increase or decrease of surface absorption
-Cover for radiation loss at night
-Using solar radiation for field and in-storage drying

Manipulation of heat and/or moisture flow
-Non-Tillage
-Mulching
-Windbreaks or other shelter (storage)
-Protection for ripening purposes
-Influencing flow processes by changing conditions at/on the surface•
-Using warmed air for field and/or storage drying
-Manipulating natural dew fall

Manipulation of mechanical impact of wind, rain and hail
-Changing of wind speed and/or direction
-Planting in lower places or pits or where deep rooting is possible
-Improving soil conditions by natural deposits
-Protection from soil erosion by wind, rain and hail
-Protection of crops and produce against impact by rain, hail and wind
-Use of wind for winnowing

Two general examples
-Fitting cropping periods to the seasons
-Making use of superhuman intervention

Finally, the exposure to the atmosphere of and the impact of the environment on agriculturally relevant surfaces is often modified in ways very particular to traditional technology. This applies to various managements and manipulations such as traditional irrigation, drying, storage and soil and crop protection.

Once the “state of the art” was discovered from studying the Tanzanian examples we did two things. We singled out a few subjects for local MSc research and we tried to rouse international interest in traditional microclimate modification, so as to be able to confirm our findings elsewhere in Africa, in Asia and in Latin America. An official report will be published this year by the World Meteorological Organisation whose Technical Commission for Agricultural Meteorology singled out the subject in 1983 for a specialised Working Group study. The MSc work in Dar es Salaam concentrated on the efficiency of local grass mulch applications, in cooperation with the Tea Research Foundation of Kenya, where efficiency of erosion protection and temperature manipulation by mulches had been studied. Temperature modification and shading efficiency of the same mulches were now studied in Dar es Salaam with the infrastructure built up earlier and physical theories to explain these efficiencies were developed. The result was an operational method of determining quickly the thermal efficiency of local mulches and provision of advice (which we call weather advisories) for farmers on quantities and qualities of dry and live grass mulches traditionally applied. This kind of work showed that even at the MSc level research may be done that can be relevant to low external-input agriculture.

Future Work
Much more has to be done before we have developed a new area of applied research in agricultural meteorology which can be carried out by Third World research students and supervisors and which is rooted in tapping local traditional knowledge.

Based on the Tanzanian experience the author has recently started a project in which he co-supervises PhD research in Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania (with India to be added soon) on the four main subjects reviewed above, by backstopping from the Netherlands and frequent travelling. We are working on the effects of the re-introduction of traditionally applied light shade in tea growing in Kenya, a traditional irrigation method and its water use efficiency for groundnut and sorghum compared to “laissez faire” furrow irrigation in the Sudan, traditional wind protection from scattered trees against wind erosion effects and of parts of homegarden systems against mechanical wind damage in the Sudan and Tanzania respectively.

It appears that tapping local knowledge works in research on low external-input agriculture. But for this to happen it is essential for farmers and extensionists to be involved from the beginning. Only then might we be able, in places where the population pressure is not yet the all-determining and all-overriding factor, to improve a bit, in some cases, on the efficiency of traditional methods. But, even more important, we might in this way succeed in disseminating such traditional technology, now better understood, to places and conditions where it was not applied before.
Kees Stigter

Dr. C. J. STIGTER was a Professor of Physics at the University of Dar es Salaam from 1975 to 1984. He is now a Principal Research Scientist at the Wageningen Agricultural University, the Netherlands.

MISCELLANEOUS

TEA and the “Daily News”
In a full length column entitled “Comment” on 16 January 1986 the “Daily News” turned its attention to Tanzania’s tea industry. There was a strong reaction a few days later in a letter to the Editor from reader H T Masinde. “While it might be true that ‘the crop has greatly helped to improve the people’s living conditions’, it is not true that in ‘practically every area where tea is grown there are glaring signs of affluence….’ Also your generalising statement that ‘production in small holder farms has always been increasing steadily…’ is misleading. Here I have in mind such areas as Bukoba where small tea farms have been abandoned to turn into bushes while labour in organised estates has constantly been difficult to secure. Adding salt into my tea you assert that ‘in almost every house, a cup of tea is a never miss item’. Perhaps, but I believe if this is not a deliberate distortion of truth then you are completely out of touch with the reality. It just defeats my mind to imagine of a person in present Tanzania who does not know, at least, that for the majority of citizens drinking tea is a luxury for the blessed few. Your joke that ‘even during these difficult days when most essential commodities are in short supply, tea has always faithfully remained on the shop shelf …‘ is just a mockery in the hearts of the majority. Man, I couldn’t take tea at Christmas not because there was no tea but because Mr Sudeco couldn’t supply me with sugar! In this sense, tea will always faithfully remain on shop shelves not because it is plenty but because of the missing sugar. It might be of great service to our economy if Mr Tea Authority increased the export and reduced the domestic quota:”

COFFEE – Problem in Transporting
The “Daily News” reported at the end of January on one of the many serious transport problems facing Tanzanian agriculture. “Tanzania Railways Corporation (TRC) has sent nine wagons to Kagera Region to be used for transporting coffee stranded at Kemondo Bay to the Tanga port. TRC General Manager Ndugu Tom Mmari said yesterday that other wagons would be sent to Bukoba at the end of the week for the same purpose. The corporation had charged the Kagera Region Cooperative Union more than Shs 180,000/- as damages for failing to unload 6 wagons containing fertilizer. The fertilizer has been lying unloaded for almost two weeks now, he said. A statement issued in Bukoba by the Kagers Regional Cooperative Union (KCU) said some 1,384 tonnes were at Kemondo Bay outside Bukoba town, 111 tonnes were at Bukoba Port and 170 tonnes at the Bukoba coffee processing plant (Bukop). The Kagera Regional Party Secretary, Ndugu Nicodemus Banduka, accompanied by KCU leaders has visited the Kemondo port where he urged the TRC to increase the nunt>er of wagons. He also directed the KCU management to hire lorries and transport the crop still in Bukoba to Kemondo ready for railing to Tanga. Similarly, wagons at the port should be unloaded ‘immediately to give room for the crop, he further directed. Ndugu Banduka was told by the KCU management that 13 wagons would be required to haul the coffee from the port. The union is allocated 11 wagons each week. The Kemondo port manager, Ndugu Benjamini Kibira, said TRC had already directed that wagons bringing in goods to Bukoba should not be loaded with other goods and that they should be used for transporting the crop.”

SUGAR
Following talks last year between Mwalimu Nyerere and President Fidel Castro ten Cuban sugar experts have arrived in Tanzania to advise on the rehabilitation of some of the sugar factories, which are running below capacity.

CASHEWNUTS – The Decline in Production
Writing in the February 1986 edition of “South” Brian Cooksey has analysed some of the causes of the recent decline in production of cashewnuts. He states that “The Cashewnut Authority of Tanzania bought little more than 32,000 tonnes of cashews from local producers last year. Such poor production figures were last recorded in 1958; only 12 years ago, farmers were selling 145,000 tonnes.

“The authorities have blamed declining production on the weather, insect and fungus attacks, bush fires, smuggling and poor farming methods. Others, though, say responsibility rests squarely with the Government and some of its outside advisers (the writer mentions the World Bank) -the very institutions planning to revive the industry by spending 250 million shillings under the 1984-92 National Cashewnut Programme.

“Throughout the 1970s, the Government’s critics say, official policy discouraged production of export crops by peasants, who were treated as a source of investment for other sectors. The growth of parastatal crop authorities with monopoly purchasing powers, the abolition of cooperatives and the communisation programme were all means to further state control of farm surpluses.

“By 1980, producers were receiving only 24 per cent of the export price of raw nuts, down from 72 per cent in 1970. Communisation was another big disincentive. And while both these policies have now been officially reversed, the latest increase in producer prices is only half the official inflation rate.”

LIVESTOCK POLICY
Among the main features of Tanzania’s new national policy paper on livestock (Sera Ya Mifugo, Tanzania) dated 1986 is a requirement that villages will not, under any circumstances, be allowed to maintain livestock over and above the numbers recommended so as to ensure the judicious use of land. The Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development, the policy says, will work out incentive schemes aimed at encouraging the involvement of the people in modern livestock development. The schemes would entail the scrupulous implementation of the sales and price policy with the objective of increasing real incomes of livestock keepers while simultaneously enhancing efficiency.

The Ministry will conduct research on the possibility of producing locally drugs for cattle dips, pumps for spraying insecticides and other inputs. The Tanzania Livestock Research Organisation (TALIRO) will concentrate on developing better use of well known livestock development methods by livestock keepers in the country instead of embarking on new methods. Large scale private livestock keepers will be encouraged and given expanses of land provided it is not owned by villagers or parastatal organisations – Daily News

RICE PROJECT IN MOSHI
The first phase of a Tanzanian-Japanese project which forms part of the Kilimanjaro Integrated Development Programme was completed in Moshi District recently according to Shihata, the Tanzanian News Agency. 955 hectares of the 2,300 hectare project (2,000 for paddy) has been provided with irrigation canals, drainage and flood protection control measures and 300 hectares of paddy was reported as being harvested. Phase 2 has already started and is due to be completed in 1987.

LIONS IN LINDI REGION

Man-eating lions killed five people and injured one in six villages in Liwale District in Lindi Region in January this year according to the Daily News. Farming activities were interrupted as a massive hunt was launched by the Game Division and the local people. The lions were eventually killed. A Game Officer with the Lindi Regional Game Division, Ndugu Asterius Ndunguru, said the situation became normal after the Game Division in Liwale District was provided with sufficient rounds of ammunition to counter the beasts.

THE USAMBARA MOUNTAINS

A CASE FOR CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT

(This article is based partly on an International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN )/Conservation for Development Centre report to the Government of Tanzania, “Agricultural Development and Environment Conservation in the East Usambara Mountains”, IUCN Regional Office, Nairobi, November 1985.)

As Norman Myers so succinctly puts it, “Tropical forests offer a wealth of environmental services”. (The Primary Source: Tropical Forests and our Future). Not least in those services is the regulation of floods and the mitigation of droughts; two climatic phenomena that afflict all Africa at one time or another. In close association come the additional services provided through the prevention of soil erosion, the control of sedimentation and the provision of a rich store of biomass suitable for multipurpose sustained economic development – that is, if only it were managed correctly.

Rarely are tropical forests accorded a realistic evaluation of their costs and benefits in development planning. Their conservation appears to be an expensive luxury to loggers and national exchequers alike. In reality, however, such short term exploitation hides the longer term cost of damage to the forest, its locale and the many services it provides. There is no reason why conservation and development should not be compatible. The East Usambara Mountains of Tanzania is a good case in point.

The East Usambaras are at the seaward end of a chain of forested, acid, igneous mountains stretching from near the Kenya-Tanzania border right down to southern Malawi. Although adjacent to the sea at Tanga, they are a highland massif of 400km above 600m altitude with the highest point at 1250 m. About 300 km are forested, of which 80 percent has forest reserve status. The mountains receive 1500 to 1200mm of rainfall annually, ensuring an ideal growing environment of this ecological ‘island’ for a dense hardwood tropical rainforest. The tall canopy trees include endemic varieties such as Cephalosphaera and other timbers of exceptional economic value.

The forest cover is of crucial importance to the Usambaras themselves, the surrounding region and potentially to the economy of Tanzania. These forest roles may be summarised as:

* water catchment protection: the forest is vital to the storage and slow release of water to the lowland surrounds. The town of Tanga is reliant on Usambaran water and its slow release through the dry season to the coastal plains. Similarly, the forest cover protects the lowlands from floods. On both counts – drought and floods – recent years have seen a worsening position.

* topsoil fertility: the soils are primarily Acrisols, the leached, highly weathered soils of Africa, with no reserves, only transient fertility and virtually all nutrients bound up in the biomass and not in the soil.

* Use for shade-demanding crops, primarily spices. Cardamom is a big cash earner for local farmers and it is grown in the understorey to the forest where it demands shade and the nutrients of the forest litter. Continuous cardamom, however, cuts out forest regeneration.

* Timber is an important product and is exploited by the state-owned sawmills and by private pit sawyers. Up to 20 varieties of the largest trees are in great demand for such high-value products as veneers and furniture. Low density and selective exploitation is probably sustainable but the devastation caused by the sawmills operations is irreversible on these soils.

* The gene pool of the Usambara is the richest and most diverse in Africa for such a small area. Many plants are of economic interest not only for timber but for fruit, medicines and other products. Many are absent or rare anywhere else .

The notion of ‘hands-off’ conservation is unrealistic in the Africa of today; all the above forest roles can be achieved by selective and careful exploitation, and the use of the forest not only as a stock of resources but also as an environmental protector. In short, conservation and development.

Threats to the forest come from three sources: the loggers are the most obvious but are relatively easily controlled if existing regulations were enforced; the spice cultivators are a medium-term but not intractable problem. It is the pressure for cultivable land, coffee and tea plantations (which already exist but in a degraded state) and annual cropping that is the major uncertainty for the future. What can be done to head off the threat?

Arguably the Usambaras present an opportunity to combine forest preservation with catchment protection and resource utilization. It is clear that no single strategy can provide the whole answer; it will have to be a mixture of several activities, among which the most obvious are :

total protection and enforcement of forest reserve status on the more rugged parts to prevent gross erosion, and certain core areas to act as gene pools;

village-centred and village-planned development activities; to promote rational utilisation of the forest and/or to provide alternative income sources from occupations such as dairying, fruit, village industry etc; rehabilitation of existing tea estates and their improved management; to provide remunerative job opportunities on land that is already alienated from the forest, and to encourage some of the spice cultivators back into forest clearings;

communication, training and education, especially in the vital role of forests; the interactions between vegetation, drought and floods; and the idea that conservation need not mean throwing a fence around the forest and shooting trespassers.

These are heady challenges. Nevertheless, in response to the catalogue of repeated failures in agricultural development, the EEC has agreed to fund a first phase of conservation and development activities in the East Usambaras. It remains to be seen whether they will succeed because the inter linkages in the natural environment are complicated enough, but when combined with land utilisation they become like the proverbial plate of spaghetti – tangled and apparently endless. However, a start will be made on a pilot project basis to test the various options, to learn-by doing on a small scale and to lay the basis for deciding how to exploit and preserve the forest while protecting the catchment and the surrounding plains from the vagaries of an unkind climate, droughts and floods.
Michael Stocking

Dr. MICHAEL STOCKLING is a soil scientist in the Overseas Development Group, University of East Anglia, working mainly on soil conservation, agricultural development for small farmers, and soil fertility and productivity

THE GROUNDNUT SCHEME – ’40 MINUTES AND 40 YEARS ON’

“NUTS”- BBC2 TELEVISION
(March 27th 1986)

To someone (like me) who served as a District Officer in the Western Province of Tanganyika from 1948-50, in the Nzega Kahama and Kasulu Districts, this evocative programme aroused a bitter-sweet nostalgia, as memories of a long forgotten dream came flooding back. A dream which began on the first Colonial Service Course at Oxford to be held after World War II when the austere post-war Labour Government inspired a battered Britain, freezing, short of coal, clothes and food to a bright vision of a great self-governing Commonwealth of free Nations, economically interdependent, basking in the reflected glory of the British Crown.

Our mentors at Oxford elaborated on the speeches at Westminster and the ‘leaders’ in the ‘Times’; benevolent Britain would invest the then enormous sum of £30 million (equivalent to £300 million at today’s prices) into clearing 3 million acres of tsetse infested bush in the Central, Western and Southern Provinces of Tanganyika, which would then be planted with enough groundnuts to provide vegetable fats like margarine for the people of the United Kingdom – if not Europe and the world – to the mutual benefit of all! Useful spin-offs would be the eradication of the tsetse fly and the mosquito with the consequent reduction in sleeping sickness, Trypanosomiasis and malaria, the employment and ultimate resettlement of thousands of Tanganyikans and the provision of schools, hospitals, plus the usual infrastructure of roads, railways, ports, telecommunications and so on.

Clement Attlee, Stafford Cripps, John Strachey and Arthur Creech Jones were the heroes of the hour, if not the villains of the piece! We were proud indeed to be sailing for Tanganyika where such a splendid scheme was being launched, supervised by an impressive array of agricultural experts and scientists.

In Tanganyika itself it was a different story. The long-suffering professional Colonial Service Officers, many of whom had spent the entire war without home leave, trying to run the whole Government machine on £4,000,000 a year were resentful and suspicious of the “whole crazy Whitehall scheme”, superimposed by a Government in London with little or no local consultation, bringing in its wake an army of “highly paid helpers” and many Senior Officers, most of whom had little or no knowledge of the country or its language and still less farming skills.

This TV programme, though inevitably made up of somewhat uneven and disjointed sequences of old film and survivors, nonetheless did succeed to a “large extent in recapturing the extraordinary atmosphere of hope and despair, rumour and confusion, cultural conflict, disappointment, political intrigue and lies which reigned supreme. A night stop at Urambo station remains in my memory where a noisy drunken rabble of workers, prostitutes and hangers-on swarmed along the platform in the moonlight like a scene from a 19th Century gold rush. “Panda Mali Kufa Kwaja!”

The ghastly Beehive brandy which we drank as a last resort stirred old memories as did the swimming pool in the bush with the old fashioned costumes which reminded me of pleasant swims in the dams of Nzega District with Peter and Rachel Bleackley. It was good to see Tom Unwin suitably dressed for the bush reminiscing in his inimitable style. But the dream faded and eventually became a joke.

We were given the basic facts. The second year (1949) target for land clearing – 450,000 acres; land cleared 227,000. Target for production of groundnuts 58,500 tons; actually produced 2,500 tons or 4%. One case quoted was of 3,000 acres planted in 3 days at the rate of 112 lbs of seed per acre; the harvest averaged 82 lbs per acre! And we were given the reasons for the failure – bad management, inexperience, unsuitable equipment, very abrasive soils and lack of rain.

Randal Sadleir
Dr. RANDAL SADLEIR was a District Commissioner in Tanzania and later founded the Swahili newspapers “Baragumu” and “Mwangaza”. He is now with the “Cancer Research Campaign”

AND A CANADIAN AIDED WHEAT SCHEME

If one were to judge by an extract from a recent article in “Links” magazine published by “Third World First” sent to us by a reader of the Bulletin, it would seem that Tanzania is facing something similar to the Groundnut Scheme but this time with wheat. The article is critical of a number of large-scale agri-business type food production projects underway in, for example, Mozambique, Mali and Senegal. About Tanzania, the author , Colin Hines, writes:

“In Tanzania a Canadian aided wheat scheme is causing even greater concern. Since it began in 1970, Canada has committed $44 million to the project with the hope that the Tanzanian Government will be able to run it independently in the foreseeable future. Yet the prospect of that is nil. In addition, $1.5 million was spent on equipment for each of the six farms in the Hanang district (totalling 60,000 acres).
“The land for the wheat schemes was taken from the Barabaig, a pastoral people who both occupied and grazed their cattle on the land. They have now been forced to overgraze on the surrounding land. The schemes themselves are far too intensive for the area, and a report on Agricultural and Livestock Production in Arusha Region noted with alarm that the technology being applied to these large scale fully mechanised operations is alarmingly similar to the technology used in western Canada which contributed to the catastrophic soil erosion (dust bowls) of the 1930s.

“The farms are laid out prairie style with no allowance for tropical downpours. Erosion is already severe as huge gullies cut through the fields – indeed £22,000 was spent on one farm trying to fill such a gully, without success. This catalogue of disasters might be excusable if the schemes were at least producing wheat on a comparable scale. In fact, Tanzania is now estimated to be producing less wheat than when the project began, and any prospects of even sustaining production without massive inputs are bleak.”

We asked the Canadian High Commission if they would like to comment. We received a telex in reply, extracts from which are as follows:

“ARTICLE BELITTLES OUTPUT OF WHEAT FARMS. CANADIAN-TANZANIAN WHEAT PROGRAM NOW AVERAGES APPROX 40,000 TONS OF WHEAT ANNUALLY, ENOUGH TO PRODUCE 180 MILLION LOAVES OF BREAD A YEAR. TOTAL ANNUAL PRODUCTION FROM THESE WHEAT FARMS HAS DOUBLED SINCE 1979. IN 1985 THEY PRODUCED 46,500 TONS Of WHEAT OR 75% OF TANZANIA’S DOMESTIC WHEAT PRODUCTION. ON AVERAGE TANZANIAN WHEAT FARMS HAVE PRODUCED AT LEVELS COMPARABLE TO WESTERN CANADA AND IN 1985 TANZANIAN WHEAT FARMS BETTERED PER ACRE YIELDS IN WESTERN CANADA DESPITE NOT USING FERTILIZER. WHILE TANZANIA AS A WHOLE IS PRODUCING LESS WHEAT THAN BEFORE, REASON IS LARGELY EMIGRATION Of EXPATRIATE WHEAT FARMERS. CANADIAN=TANZANIAN WHEAT PROGRAM HAS IN FACT COMPENSATED FOR DROPS IN PRODUCTION IN OTHER AREAS OF COUNTRY. MOREOVER, BEFORE, ONLY SUBSISTENCE FARMING CONTRIBUTING LITTLE TO TANZANIA’S AGGREGATE FOOD PRODUCTION EXISTED WHERE WHEAT FARMS ARE NOW. INCOMPARABLY MORE TANZANIANS ARE NOW BEING FED THROUGH THE WHEAT FARMS THAN WAS CASE WITH RELATIVELY FEW CATTLE THAT WERE PREVIOUSLY THERE AND WERE DISPLACED.

MISLEADING FOR ARTICLE TO SUBMIT THAT DISPLACEMENT Of BARABAIG HAS LED TO OVERGRAZING IN SURROUNDING AREAS. IRONIC THAT WHILE WESTERN FARMERS CRITICIZED FOR RAISING CATTLE WHERE GRAIN COULD BE GROWN, IN TANZANIA – WHERE NEED FOR FOOD MUCH MORE CRITICAL – TANZANIA/ CANADA CRITICIZED FOR GROWING GRAIN WHERE BARABAIG CATTLE ONCE GRAZED.

ARTICLE LAMBASTS MECHANIZED AGRIC AS INAPPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY BUT ONLY PRACTICAL WAY TO PRODUCE WHEAT IN THIS REGION Of TANZANIA IS THROUGH MECHANIZATION. OX-POWER SIMPLY COULD NOT PLOUGH AND PLANT ENOUGH ACRES IN THE SHORT SEASON TO MAKE IT WORTHWHILE.

ARTICLE UNFAIRLY IMPLIES THAT CANADA SOMEHOW IMPOSED WHEAT AND WHEAT PROJECT ON TANZANIA. IN FACT WHEAT HAS INCREASINGLY BEEN STAPLE FOOD SINCE 1940s. FARMS FIRST CONCEIVED AND DESIGNED BY TANZANIAN GOVERNMENT WHICH THEN EXPLICITLY ASKED FOR ASSISTANCE FROM CANADIAN GOVERNMENT. TANZANIAN GOVERNMENT PLACES HIGH PRIORITY ON SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN FOOD PRODUCTION, WITH TANZANIA-CANADA WHEAT PROGRAM AS ITS CENTREPIECE.

ARTICLE MAINTAINS THAT PROSPECT OF TANZANIAN GOVT BEING ABLE TO RUN WHEAT FARMS INDEPENDENTLY IS NIL. WHILE AT PRESENT THERE IS DECIDED CANADIAN PRESENCE ON FARMS, AFTER ONLY DECADE AND HALF OF CANADIAN ASSISTANCE TO TANZANIA ALL MANAGEMENT DECISIONS NOW BEING MADE BY TANZANIANS. PART OF REASON IS THAT TRAINING PROGRAM HAS GENERATED SIGNIFICANT CONTINGENT OF WELL-TRAINED TANZANIANS.

ARTICLE POSITS THAI ANY PROSPECT OF EVEN SUSTAINING PRODUCTION WITHOUT MASSIVE INPUTS FROM ABROAD ARE BLEAK, BUT HANANG FARM COMPLEX NOW PROFITABLE AND IN FINANCIAL POSITION TO PAY FOR OWN EQUIPMENT AND SPARE PARTS IN TANZANIAN SHILLINGS. FOREIGN EXCHANGE SHORTAGE IS REFLECTION OF MACRO ECONOMIC SITUATION IN COUNTRY. ARTICLE DOES NOT MENTION HUGE IMPACT OF WORSENING ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN TANZANIA AND THROUGHOUT AFRICA IND THIRD WORLD, AFFECTING IN PARTICULAR COSTS OF INPUTS SUCH AS FUEL AND SPARE PARTS.

RE: ARTICLE’S CLAIMS ABOUT EROSION PROBLEM ON WHEAT FARMS, INITIAL PROBLEMS ALMOST INVITABLE WHEN PIONEERING AN AGRICULTURAL EXPERIMENT. HAVE SINCE MADE ADJUSTMENTS. WHEAT PROGRAMS RESEARCH COMPONENT NOW HAS SOIL MANAGEMENT SECTION. RESULT IS PROPER GRASS STRIPS IN CONTOUR HAVE BEEN INSTALLED ON TWO MOST-RECENTLY DEVELOPED FARMS, AND SIMILAR EROSION CONTROL FEATURES BEING ELABORATED FOR OLDER FARMS AS WELL. HEAVY EMPHASIS HAS ALWAYS BEEN PLACED ON DEVELOPMENT OF MINIMUM TILLAGE METHODS IN SUPPORT OF SOIL PROTECTION AND WATER CONSERVATION. FURTHER THRUST TOWARDS BETTER SOIL CONSERVATION PRACTICES BEING PROMOTED BY CROP MANAGEMENT SECTION. DEVOTING MORE AND MORE ATTENTION TO FINDING ALTERNATIVE CROPS IN ORDER TO EXPLORE ALTERNATIVES TO MONO-CROPPING WHEAT.

IN LIGHT OF THESE ADJUSTMENTS OBJECT TO ARTICLE MAKING ANALOGY BETWEEN TANZANIAN WHEAT FARMS AND WESTERN CANADA DUST BOWL OF 1930s. SUBSEQUENT HALF CENTURY HAS REVOLUTONIZED FARM PRACTICES AND THESE IMPROVED TECHNIQUES ARE BEING ADAPTED TO TANZANIA.”